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Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation. In stochastic games, there is a feedback loop between a group's social behaviors and its environment. Kleshnina et al. show that groups are often more cooperative when they know the exact state of their environment, although there are also intriguing cases when ignorance is beneficial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In repeated social interactions, individuals often employ reciprocal strategies to maintain cooperation. To explore the emergence of reciprocity, many theoretical models assume synchronized decision making. In each round, individuals decide simultaneously whether to cooperate or not. Yet many manifestations of reciprocity in nature are asynchronous. Individuals provide help at one time and receive help at another. Here, we explore such alternating games in which players take turns. We mathematically characterize all Nash equilibria among memory-one strategies. Moreover, we use evolutionary simulations to explore various model extensions, exploring the effect of discounted games, irregular alternation patterns, and higher memory. In all cases, we observe that mutual cooperation still evolves for a wide range of parameter values. However, compared to simultaneous games, alternating games require different strategies to maintain cooperation in noisy environments. Moreover, none of the respective strategies are evolutionarily stable. In many instances of reciprocity, individuals cooperate in turns. Here, the authors analyze the equilibria and the dynamics of such alternating games, and in particular describe all strategies with one-round memory that maintain cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by COVID-19, we develop and analyze a simple stochastic model for the spread of disease in human population. We track how the number of infected and critically ill people develops over time in order to estimate the demand that is imposed on the hospital system. To keep this demand under control, we consider a class of simple policies for slowing down and reopening society and we compare their efficiency in mitigating the spread of the virus from several different points of view. We find that in order to avoid overwhelming of the hospital system, a policy must impose a harsh lockdown or it must react swiftly (or both). While reacting swiftly is universally beneficial, being harsh pays off only when the country is patient about reopening and when the neighboring countries coordinate their mitigation efforts. Our work highlights the importance of acting decisively when closing down and the importance of patience and coordination between neighboring countries when reopening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Selection and random drift determine the probability that novel mutations fixate in a population. Population structure is known to affect the dynamics of the evolutionary process. Amplifiers of selection are population structures that increase the fixation probability of beneficial mutants compared to well-mixed populations. Over the past 15 years, extensive research has produced remarkable structures called strong amplifiers which guarantee that every beneficial mutation fixates with high probability. But strong amplification has come at the cost of considerably delaying the fixation event, which can slow down the overall rate of evolution. However, the precise relationship between fixation probability and time has remained elusive. Here we characterize the slowdown effect of strong amplification. First, we prove that all strong amplifiers must delay the fixation event at least to some extent. Second, we construct strong amplifiers that delay the fixation event only marginally as compared to the well-mixed populations. Our results thus establish a tight relationship between fixation probability and time: Strong amplification always comes at a cost of a slowdown, but more than a marginal slowdown is not needed. Population structure can influence the probability of and time to fixation of new mutants. Here, Tkadlec et al. demonstrate mathematically that structures that increase fixation probability necessarily slow fixation, but also identify amplifying structures with minimal reductions in fixation time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Great Oxygenation Event (GOE), ca. 2.4 billion years ago, transformed life and environments on Earth. Its causes, however, are debated. We mathematically analyze the GOE in terms of ecological dynamics coupled with a changing Earth. Anoxygenic photosynthetic bacteria initially dominate over cyanobacteria, but their success depends on the availability of suitable electron donors that are vulnerable to oxidation. The GOE is triggered when the difference between the influxes of relevant reductants and phosphate falls below a critical value that is an increasing function of the reproductive rate of cyanobacteria. The transition can be either gradual and reversible or sudden and irreversible, depending on sources and sinks of oxygen. Increasing sources and decreasing sinks of oxygen can also trigger the GOE, but this possibility depends strongly on migration of cyanobacteria from privileged sites. Our model links ecological dynamics to planetary change, with geophysical evolution determining the relevant time scales. The Great Oxygenation Event (GOE) 2.4 billion years ago is believed to have been critical for the evolution of complex life. Here, Olejarz et al. propose a model suggesting that competition between major bacterial groups could have triggered the GOE in a feedback loop with geophysical processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans routinely engage in many distinct interactions in parallel. Team members collaborate on several concurrent projects, and even whole nations interact with each other across a variety of issues, including trade, climate change and security. Yet the existing theory of direct reciprocity studies isolated repeated games. Such models cannot account for strategic attempts to use the vested interests in one game as a leverage to enforce cooperation in another. Here we introduce a general framework of multichannel games. Individuals interact with each other over multiple channels; each channel is a repeated game. Strategic choices in one channel can affect decisions in another. With analytical equilibrium calculations for the donation game and evolutionary simulations for several other games we show that such linkage facilitates cooperation. Our results suggest that previous studies tend to underestimate the human potential for reciprocity. When several interactions occur in parallel, people often learn to coordinate their behavior across games to maximize cooperation in each of them. Most evolutionary game theory focuses on isolated games. Here, Donahue et al. present a general framework for 'multichannel games' in which individuals engage in a set of parallel games with a partner, and show that such parallel interactions favor the evolution of reciprocity across games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major evolutionary transitions, including the emergence of life, likely occurred in aqueous environments. While the role of water's chemistry in early life is well studied, the effects of water's ability to manipulate population structure are less clear. Population structure is known to be critical, as effective replicators must be insulated from parasites. Here, we propose that turbulent coherent structures, long-lasting flow patterns which trap particles, may serve many of the properties associated with compartments — collocalization, division, and merging — which are commonly thought to play a key role in the origins of life and other evolutionary transitions. We substantiate this idea by simulating multiple proposed metabolisms for early life in a simple model of a turbulent flow, and find that balancing the turnover times of biological particles and coherent structures can indeed enhance the likelihood of these metabolisms overcoming extinction either via parasitism or via a lack of metabolic support. Our results suggest that group selection models may be applicable with fewer physical and chemical constraints than previously thought, and apply much more widely in aqueous environments. Models of the origin of life generally require a mechanism to structure emerging populations. Here, Krieger et al. develop spatial models showing that coherent structures arising in turbulent flows in aquatic environments could have provided compartments that facilitated the origin of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Population structure affects the outcome of natural selection. These effects can be modeled using evolutionary games on graphs. Recently, conditions were derived for a trait to be favored under weak selection, on any weighted graph, in terms of coalescence times of random walks. Here we consider isothermal graphs, which have the same total edge weight at each node. The conditions for success on isothermal graphs take a simple form, in which the effects of graph structure are captured in the ‘effective degree’—a measure of the effective number of neighbors per individual. For two update rules (death-Birth and birth- Death), cooperative behavior is favored on a large isothermal graph if the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the effective degree. For two other update rules (Birth-death and Death-birth), cooperation is never favored. We relate the effective degree of a graph to its spectral gap, thereby linking evolutionary dynamics to the theory of expander graphs. Surprisingly, we find graphs of infinite average degree that nonetheless provide strong support for cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions1–4. It requires that interacting individuals are sufficiently equal, such that everyone faces similar consequences when they cooperate or defect. Yet inequality is ubiquitous among humans5,6 and is generally considered to undermine cooperation and welfare7–10. Most previous models of reciprocity do not include inequality11–15. These models assume that individuals are the same in all relevant aspects. Here we introduce a general framework to study direct reciprocity among unequal individuals. Our model allows for multiple sources of inequality. Subjects can differ in their endowments, their productivities and in how much they benefit from public goods. We find that extreme inequality prevents cooperation. But if subjects differ in productivity, some endowment inequality can be necessary for cooperation to prevail. Our mathematical predictions are supported by a behavioural experiment in which we vary the endowments and productivities of the subjects. We observe that overall welfare is maximized when the two sources of heterogeneity are aligned, such that more productive individuals receive higher endowments. By contrast, when endowments and productivities are misaligned, cooperation quickly breaks down. Our findings have implications for policy-makers concerned with equity, efficiency and the provisioning of public goods. A framework that includes inequality shows that extreme inequality prevents cooperation, but overall welfare is maximized when endowments and productivities are aligned such that more-productive individuals receive higher endowments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most adult carcinomas develop from noninvasive precursor lesions, a progression that is supported by genetic analysis. However, the evolutionary and genetic relationships among co-existing lesions are unclear. Here we analysed the somatic variants of pancreatic cancers and precursor lesions sampled from distinct regions of the same pancreas. After inferring evolutionary relationships, we found that the ancestral cell had initiated and clonally expanded to form one or more lesions, and that subsequent driver gene mutations eventually led to invasive pancreatic cancer. We estimate that this multi-step progression generally spans many years. These new data reframe the step-wise progression model of pancreatic cancer by illustrating that independent, high-grade pancreatic precursor lesions observed in a single pancreas often represent a single neoplasm that has colonized the ductal system, accumulating spatial and genetic divergence over time. Comparison of multiple lesions from individual pancreases sheds light on how ancestral clones can spread through the ductal system and give rise to precursor lesions, with acquisition of further mutations leading to pancreatic cancer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation among humans. Many of our daily interactions are repeated. We interact repeatedly with our family, friends, colleagues, members of the local and even global community. In the theory of repeated games, it is a tacit assumption that the various games that a person plays simultaneously have no effect on each other. Here we introduce a general framework that allows us to analyze "crosstalk" between a player's concurrent games. In the presence of crosstalk, the action a person experiences in one game can alter the person's decision in another. We find that crosstalk impedes the maintenance of cooperation and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. The magnitude of the effect depends on the population structure. In more densely connected social groups, crosstalk has a stronger effect. A harsh retaliator, such as Tit-for-Tat, is unable to counteract crosstalk. The crosstalk framework provides a unified interpretation of direct and upstream reciprocity in the context of repeated games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The efficacy of antiretroviral therapy is significantly compromised by medication nonadherence. Long-acting enteral systems that can ease the burden of daily adherence have not yet been developed. Here we describe an oral dosage form composed of distinct drug-polymer matrices which achieved week-long systemic drug levels of the antiretrovirals dolutegravir, rilpivirine and cabotegravir in a pig. Simulations of viral dynamics and patient adherence patterns indicate that such systems would significantly reduce therapeutic failures and epidemiological modelling suggests that using such an intervention prophylactically could avert hundreds of thousands of new HIV cases. In sum, weekly administration of long-acting antiretrovirals via a novel oral dosage form is a promising intervention to help control the HIV epidemic worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a population can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations remains difficult. Mathematical results are known for special structures in which all individuals have the same number of neighbours. The general case, in which the number of neighbours can vary, has remained open. For arbitrary selection intensity, the problem is in a computational complexity class that suggests there is no efficient algorithm. Whether a simple solution for weak selection exists has remained unanswered. Here we provide a solution for weak selection that applies to any graph or network. Our method relies on calculating the coalescence times of random walks. We evaluate large numbers of diverse population structures for their propensity to favour cooperation. We study how small changes in population structure-graph surgery-affect evolutionary outcomes. We find that cooperation flourishes most in societies that are based on strong pairwise ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Interstitial brachytherapy for localised prostate cancer may be followed by transient increases in prostate-specific antigen (PSA) that resolve without therapy. Such PSA bounces may be associated with an improved outcome but often cause alarm in the patient and physician, and have defied explanation.Methods: We developed a mathematical model to capture the interactions between the tumour, radiation and anti-tumour immune response. The model was fitted to data from a large cohort of patients treated exclusively with interstitial brachytherapy. Immunohistological analysis for T-cell infiltration within the same tumours was also performed.Results: Our minimal model captures well the dynamics of the tumour after therapy, and suggests that a strong anti-tumour immune response coupled with the therapeutic effect of radiation on the tumour is responsible for the PSA bounce. Patients who experience a PSA bounce had a higher density of CD3 and CD8 cells within the tumour that likely contribute to the PSA bounce and the overall better outcomes observed.Conclusions: Our observations provide a novel and unifying explanation for the PSA bounce in patients with early prostate cancer and also have implications for the use of immune-based therapies in such patients to improve outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most cancers in humans are large, measuring centimetres in diameter, and composed of many billions of cells. An equivalent mass of normal cells would be highly heterogeneous as a result of the mutations that occur during each cell division. What is remarkable about cancers is that virtually every neoplastic cell within a large tumour often contains the same core set of genetic alterations, with heterogeneity confined to mutations that emerge late during tumour growth. How such alterations expand within the spatially constrained three-dimensional architecture of a tumour, and come to dominate a large, pre-existing lesion, has been unclear. Here we describe a model for tumour evolution that shows how short-range dispersal and cell turnover can account for rapid cell mixing inside the tumour. We show that even a small selective advantage of a single cell within a large tumour allows the descendants of that cell to replace the precursor mass in a clinically relevant time frame. We also demonstrate that the same mechanisms can be responsible for the rapid onset of resistance to chemotherapy. Our model not only provides insights into spatial and temporal aspects of tumour growth, but also suggests that targeting short-range cellular migratory activity could have marked effects on tumour growth rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reconstructing the evolutionary history of metastases is critical for understanding their basic biological principles and has profound clinical implications. Genome-wide sequencing data has enabled modern phylogenomic methods to accurately dissect subclones and their phylogenies from noisy and impure bulk tumor samples at unprecedented depth. However, existing methods are not designed to infer metastatic seeding patterns. Here we develop a tool, called Treeomics, to reconstruct the phylogeny of metastases and map subclones to their anatomic locations. Treeomics infers comprehensive seeding patterns for pancreatic, ovarian, and prostate cancers. Moreover, Treeomics correctly disambiguates true seeding patterns from sequencing artifacts; 7% of variants were misclassified by conventional statistical methods. These artifacts can skew phylogenies by creating illusory tumor heterogeneity among distinct samples. In silico benchmarking on simulated tumor phylogenies across a wide range of sample purities (15-95%) and sequencing depths (25-800x) demonstrates the accuracy of Treeomics compared to existing methods., Mathematics, Organismic and Evolutionary Biology

The fixation probability is the probability that a new mutant introduced in a homogeneous population eventually takes over the entire population. The fixation probability is a fundamental quantity of natural selection, and known to depend on the population structure. Amplifiers of natural selection are population structures which increase the fixation probability of advantageous mutants, as compared to the baseline case of well-mixed populations. In this work we focus on symmetric population structures represented as undirected graphs. In the regime of undirected graphs, the strongest amplifier known has been the Star graph, and the existence of undirected graphs with stronger amplification properties has remained open for over a decade. In this work we present the Comet and Comet-swarm families of undirected graphs. We show that for a range of fitness values of the mutants, the Comet and Cometswarm graphs have fixation probability strictly larger than the fixation probability of the Star graph, for fixed population size and at the limit of large populations, respectively., Mathematics

The stage of evolution is the population of reproducing individuals. The structure of the population is known to affect the dynamics and outcome of evolutionary processes, but analytical results for generic random structures have been lacking. The most general result so far, the isothermal theorem, assumes the propensity for change in each position is exactly the same, but realistic biological structures are always subject to variation and noise. We consider a finite population under constant selection whose structure is given by a variety of weighted, directed, random graphs; vertices represent individuals and edges interactions between individuals. By establishing a robustness result for the isothermal theorem and using large deviation estimates to understand the typical structure of random graphs, we prove that for a generalization of the Erdő s-Rényi model, the fixation probability of an invading mutant is approximately the same as that of a mutant of equal fitness in a well-mixed population with high probability. Simulations of perturbed lattices, small-world networks, and scale-free networks behave similarly. We conjecture that the fixation probability in a well-mixed population, (1 - r-1)/(1 -r-n), is universal: for many random graph models, the fixation probability approaches the above function uniformly as the graphs become large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Overexploitation of renewable resources today has a high cost on the welfare of future generations. Unlike in other public goods games, however, future generations cannot reciprocate actions made today. What mechanisms can maintain cooperation with the future? To answer this question, we devise a new experimental paradigm, the 'Intergenerational Goods Game'. A line-up of successive groups (generations) can each either extract a resource to exhaustion or leave something for the next group. Exhausting the resource maximizes the payoff for the present generation, but leaves all future generations empty-handed. Here we show that the resource is almost always destroyed if extraction decisions are made individually. This failure to cooperate with the future is driven primarily by a minority of individuals who extract far more than what is sustainable. In contrast, when extractions are democratically decided by vote, the resource is consistently sustained. Voting is effective for two reasons. First, it allows a majority of cooperators to restrain defectors. Second, it reassures conditional cooperators that their efforts are not futile. Voting, however, only promotes sustainability if it is binding for all involved. Our results have implications for policy interventions designed to sustain intergenerational public goods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to detect hydraulic and geochemical impact on the groundwater directly above the CO 2 storage reservoir at the Ketzin pilot site continuous monitoring using an observation well is carried out. The target depth (446 m below ground level, bgl.) of the well is the Exter formation (Upper Triassic, Rhaetian) which is the closest permeable stratigraphic overlying formation to the CO 2 storage reservoir (630–636 m bgl. at well location). The monitoring concept comprises evaluation of hydraulic conditions, temperature, water chemistry, gas geochemistry and δ 13C values. This is achieved by a tubing inserted inside the well with installed pressure sensors and a U-tube sampling system so that pumping tests or additional wireline logging can be carried out simultaneously with monitoring. The aquifer was examined using a pump test. The observation well is hydraulically connected to the regional aquifer system and the permeability of about 1.8 D is comparatively high. Between Sept. 2011 and Oct. 2012, a pressure increase of 7.4 kPa is observed during monitoring under environmental conditions. Drilling was carried out with drilling mud on carbonate basis. The concentration of residual drilling mud decreases during the pump test, but all samples show a residual concentration of drilling mud. The formation fluid composition is recalculated with PHREEQC and is comparable to the literature values for the Exter formation. The gas partial pressure is below saturation at standard conditions and the composition is dominated by N 2 similar to the underlying storage reservoir prior to CO 2 injection. The impact of residual drilling mud on dissolved inorganic carbon and the respective δ 13C values decreases during the monitoring period. The pristine isotopic composition cannot be determined due to calcite precipitation. No conclusive results indicate a leakage from the underlying CO 2 storage reservoir. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outcome of evolutionary processes depends on population structure. It is well known that mobility plays an important role in affecting evolutionary dynamics in group structured populations. But it is largely unknown whether global or local migration leads to stronger spatial selection and would therefore favor to a larger extent the evolution of cooperation. To address this issue, we quantify the impacts of these two migration patterns on the evolutionary competition of two strategies in a finite island model. Global migration means that individuals can migrate from any one island to any other island. Local migration means that individuals can only migrate between islands that are nearest neighbors; we study a simple geometry where islands are arranged on a one-dimensional, regular cycle. We derive general results for weak selection and large population size. Our key parameters are: the number of islands, the migration rate and the mutation rate. Surprisingly, our comparative analysis reveals that global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration for a wide range of parameter conditions. Our work provides useful insights into understanding how different mobility patterns affect evolutionary processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]