Search

Using abstract concepts is a hallmark of human cognition. While multiple kinds of abstract concepts exist, they so far have been conceived as a unitary kind in opposition to concrete ones. Here, we focus on Institutional concepts, like justice or norm, investigating their fine-grained differences with respect to other kinds of abstract and concrete concepts, and exploring whether their representation varies according to individual proficiency. Specifically, we asked experts and non-experts in the legal field to evaluate four kinds of concepts (i.e., institutional, theoretical, food, artefact) on 16 dimensions: abstractness-concreteness; imageability; contextual availability; familiarity; age of acquisition; modality of acquisition; social valence; social metacognition; arousal; valence; interoception; metacognition; perceptual modality strength; body-object interaction; mouth and hand involvement. Results showed that Institutional concepts rely more than other categories on linguistic/social and inner experiences and are primarily characterized by positive valence. In addition, a more subtle characterization of the institutional domain emerged: Pure-institutional concepts (e.g., parliament) were perceived as more similar to technical tools, while Meta-institutional concepts (e.g., validity) were characterized mainly by abstract components. Importantly, for what concerns individual proficiency, we found that the level of expertise affects conceptual representation. Only law-experts associated Institutional concepts with exteroceptive and emotional experiences, showing also a more grounded and situated representation of the two types of institutional concepts. Overall, our finding highlights the richness and flexibility of abstract concepts and suggests that they differ in the degree of embodiment and grounding. Implications of the results for current theories of conceptual representation and social institutions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concepts allow us to make sense of the world. Most evidence on their acquisition and representation comes from studies of single decontextualized words and focuses on the opposition between concrete and abstract concepts (e.g., "bottle" vs. "truth"). A significant step forward in research on concepts consists in investigating them in online interaction during their use. Our study examines linguistic exchanges analyzing the differences between sub-kinds of concepts. Participants were submitted to an online task in which they had to simulate a conversational exchange by responding to sentences involving sub-kinds of concrete (tools, animals, food) and abstract concepts (PS, philosophical-spiritual; EMSS, emotional-social, PSTQ, physical-spatio-temporal-quantitative). We found differences in content: foods evoked interoception; tools and animals elicited materials, spatial, auditive features, confirming their sensorimotor grounding. PS and EMSS yielded inner experiences (e.g., emotions, cognitive states, introspections) and opposed PSTQ, tied to visual properties and concrete agency. More crucially, the various concepts elicited different interactional dynamics: more abstract concepts generated higher uncertainty and more interactive exchanges than concrete ones. Investigating concepts in situated interactions opens new possibilities for studying conceptual knowledge and its pragmatic and social aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent work has shown that number concepts activate both spatial and magnitude representations. According to the social co-representation literature which has shown that participants typically represent task components assigned to others together with their own, we asked whether explicit magnitude meaning and explicit spatial coding must be present in a single mind, or can be distributed across two minds, to generate a spatial-numerical congruency effect. In a shared go/no-go task that eliminated peripheral spatial codes, we assigned explicit magnitude processing to participants and spatial processing to either human or non-human co-agents. The spatial-numerical congruency effect emerged only with human co-agents. We demonstrate an inter-personal level of conceptual congruency between space and number that arises from a shared conceptual representation not contaminated by peripheral spatial codes. Theoretical implications of this finding for numerical cognition are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Simon effect refers to the fact that, even though stimulus position is task-irrelevant, responses to a task-relevant stimulus dimension are faster and more accurate when the stimulus and response spatially correspond than when they do not. Although the Simon effect is a very robust phenomenon, it is modulated by practice or transfer from previous tasks. Practice refers to the modulation of the Simon effect as a function of number of trials. Transfer refers to the modulation of the Simon effect as a function of preceding tasks. The aim of the present study is to disentangle the role of practice and transfer in modulating the Simon effect and to investigate whether such modulation can be extended to a different response modality. Three experiments were conducted, which included three sessions: the Baseline session, the Inducer session and the Diagnostic session. The task performed in the Baseline and the Diagnostic sessions were comprised of location-irrelevant trials (i.e., they were Simon tasks). The task performed in the Inducer session required performing location-relevant trials (i.e., it was a spatial compatibility task with a compatible or an incompatible stimulus–response mapping). In the first and third experiments, participants were required to respond manually in all sessions. In the second experiment, the task performed in the Inducer session required manual response, while in the Baseline and Diagnostic sessions the tasks required ocular response. Results showed a reduced-Diagnostic Simon effect after both compatible and incompatible mapping in the Inducer session, regardless of whether response modality was the same or different. These results support the notion that the practice effect prevails over the transfer effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Influential lines of research propose dual processes-based explanations to account for both the cognitive cost implied in lying and for that entailed in the resolution of the conflict posited by Simon tasks. The emergence and consistency of the Simon effect has been proved to be modulated by both practice effects and transfer effects. Although several studies provided evidence that the lying cognitive demand may vary as a function of practice, whether and how transfer effects could also play a role remains an open question. We addressed this question with one experiment in which participants completed a Differentiation of Deception Paradigm twice (baseline and test sessions). Crucially, between the baseline and the test sessions, participants performed a training session consisting in a spatial compatibility task with incompatible (condition 1) or compatible (condition 2) mapping, a non-spatial task (condition 3) and a no task one (condition 4). Results speak in favour of a modulation of individual performances by means of an immediate prior experience, and specifically with an incompatible spatial training. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Simon effect, that is the advantage of the spatial correspondence between stimulus and response locations when stimulus location is task irrelevant, occurs even when the task is performed by two participants, each performing a go/no-go task. This effect, known as the joint Simon effect, does not emerge when participants sit outside each other's peripersonal space, thus suggesting that the presence of an active confederate in peripersonal space might provide a reference for response coding. The present study investigated whether this finding is due to the distance separating the participants and/or to the distance separating each participant and the other agent's response. In two experiments, pairs of participants performed a social detection task sitting outside each other's arm reach, with response keys located close to the participants or outside arm reach. When the response key was located outside the participant's arm reach, he/she could reach it by means of a tool. In Experiment 1, by means of a tool, participants could reach their response key only, while in Experiment 2, they could reach also their co-agent's response key. The joint Simon effect did not emerge when participants could not reach the co-actor's response, while it emerged when they could potentially reach the other participant's response using the tool, but only when turn taking was required. These results may be taken as evidence that the possibility to reach and act upon the co-actor's response key may be at the bases of compatibility effects observed in joint action contexts requiring complementary responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Number processing induces spatial attention shifts to the left or right side for small or large numbers, respectively. This spatial-numerical association (SNA) extends to mental calculation, such that subtractions and additions induce left or right biases, respectively. However, the time course of activating SNAs during mental calculation is unclear. Here, we addressed this issue by measuring visual position discrimination during auditory calculation. Thirty-four healthy adults listened in each trial to five successive elements of arithmetic facts (first operand, operator, second operand, equal and result) and verbally classified their correctness. After each element (except for the result), a fixation dot moved equally often to either the left or right side and participants pressed left or right buttons to discriminate its movement direction (four times per trial). First and second operand magnitude (small/large), operation (addition/subtraction), result correctness (right/wrong) and movement direction (left/right) were balanced across 128 trials. Manual reaction times of dot movement discriminations were considered in relation to previous arithmetic elements. We found no evidence of early attentional shifts after first operand and operator presentation. Discrimination performance was modulated consistent with SNAs after the second operand, suggesting that attentional shifts occur once there is access to all elements necessary to complete an arithmetic operation. Such late-occurring attention shifts may reflect a combination of multiple element-specific biases and confirm their functional role in mental calculation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The handle-to-hand correspondence effect consists of faster and more accurate responses when the responding hand is aligned with the handle side of an object tool, compared to when they lay on opposite sides. This effect has been attributed to the activation of affordances. Recent studies, however, claimed that it may depend on the spatial coding of the object on the basis of its visual asymmetry (location-coding account). Affordances are namely direct and meaningful relations between recognized objects and the observers' action system. Therefore, any manipulation that disrupts the body structure of object tools could potentially affect their identification and prevent the activation of affordances. The present study investigated the nature of the handle-to-hand correspondence effects by manipulating structural asymmetry and visual salience of object tools, while preserving their integrity that is, leaving unaltered the original possibilities to activate grasping affordances. Three experiments were run. Results were consistent with the location-coding account and claim for accurate control of visual asymmetries in object stimuli during investigation of affordance effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The handle-to-hand correspondence effect refers to faster and more accurate responses when the responding hand is aligned with the graspable part of an object tool, compared to when they lay on opposite sides. We performed four behavioral experiments to investigate whether this effect depends on the activation of grasping affordances (affordance activation account) or is to be traced back to a Simon effect, resulting from the spatial coding of stimuli and responses and from their dimensional overlap (location coding account). We manipulated the availability of a response alternative by requiring participants to perform either a unimanual go/no-go task (absence of a response alternative) or a joint go/no-go task (available response alternative) and the type of response required (button-press or grasping response). We found no handle-to-hand correspondence effect in the individual go/no-go task either when a button-press (Experiment 1A) or a grasping (Experiment 2A) response was required, whereas a significant effect emerged in the joint go/no-go task, irrespective of response modality (Experiments1B and 2B). These results do not support the idea that complex motor affordances are activated for meaningful objects, but are rather consistent with the more parsimonious location coding account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is somebody going to hurt us? We draw back. The present study investigates using behavioral measures the interplay between imitative and complementary actions activated while observing female/male hands performing different actions. Female and male participants were required to discriminate the gender of biologically and artificially colored hands that displayed both individual (grasping) and social (giving and punching) actions. Biological hands evoked automatic imitation, while hands of different gender activated complementary mechanisms. Furthermore, responses reflected gender stereotypes: giving actions were more associated to females, punching actions to males. Results have implications for studies on social stereotyping, and for research on action observation, showing that the mirror neuron system resonates in both an imitative and complementary fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies demonstrated that the sequential verification of different sensory modality properties for concepts (e.g., BLENDER- loud; BANANA- yellow) brings about a processing cost, known as the modality-switch effect. We report an experiment designed to assess the influence of the mode of presentation (i.e., visual, aural) of stimuli on the modality-switch effect in a property verification and lexical decision priming paradigm. Participants were required to perform a property verification or a lexical decision task on a target sentence (e.g., 'a BEE buzzes', 'a DIAMOND glistens') presented either visually or aurally after having been presented with a prime sentence (e.g., 'the LIGHT is flickering', 'the SOUND is echoing') that could either share both, one or none of the target's mode of presentation and content modality. Results show that the mode of presentation of stimuli affects the conceptual modality-switch effect. Furthermore, the depth of processing required by the task modulates the complex interplay of perceptual and semantic information. We conclude that the MSE is a task-related, multilevel effect which can occur on two different levels of information processing (i.e., perceptual and semantic). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two experiments investigated whether the triadic interaction between objects, ourselves and other persons modulates motor system activation during language comprehension. Participants were faced with sentences formed by a descriptive part referring to a positive or negative emotively connoted object and an action part composed of an imperative verb implying a motion toward the self or toward other persons (e.g., 'The object is attractive/ugly. Bring it toward you/Give it to another person/Give it to a friend'). Participants judged whether each sentence was sensible or not by moving the mouse toward or away from their body. Findings showed that the simulation of a social context influenced both (1) the motor system and (2) the coding of stimulus valence. Implications of the results for theories of embodied and social cognition are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present study we considered the two factors that have been advocated for playing a role in emotional attention: perception of gaze direction and facial expression of emotions. Participants performed an oculomotor task in which they had to make a saccade towards one of the two lateral targets, depending on the colour of the fixation dot which appeared at the centre of the computer screen. At different time intervals (stimulus onset asynchronies, SOAs: 50,100,150 ms) following the onset of the dot, a picture of a human face (gazing either to the right or to the left) was presented at the centre of the screen. The gaze direction of the face could be congruent or incongruent with respect to the location of the target, and the expression could be neutral or angry. In Experiment 1 the facial expressions were presented randomly in a single block, whereas in Experiment 2 they were shown in separate blocks. Latencies for correct saccades and percentage of errors (saccade direction errors) were considered in the analyses. Results showed that incongruent trials determined a significantly higher percentage of saccade direction errors with respect to congruent trials, thus confirming that gaze direction, even when task-irrelevant, interferes with the accuracy of the observer’s oculomotor behaviour. The angry expression was found to hold attention for a longer time with respect to the neutral one, producing delayed saccade latencies. This was particularly evident at 100 ms SOA and for incongruent trials. Emotional faces may then exert a modulatory effect on overt attention mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several studies using spatial cueing paradigms have demonstrated that observing gaze direction may trigger a reflexive visual orienting in the direction of the other person’s gaze. Recently, it has been reported that facial expression may enhance the reflexive orienting of attention to gaze stimuli. However, some researchers have also suggested that, rather than facilitating attentional orienting away from the face, emotional expressions may, in fact, delay or prevent orienting. In the present study we investigated the effects of facial expression and gaze direction on a visual orienting oculomotor task to test whether an angry face may or may not interfere with visual orienting. Participants performed an oculomotor task in which they had to make a saccade towards one of two lateral targets, depending upon the colour of the fixation dot which appeared at the centre of the computer screen. The instruction dot remained visible for 50 ms and then disappeared. At different time intervals (stimulus onset asynchronies, SOAs: 50, 100, 150 ms) following the onset of the instruction cue, a real face (gazing either to the right or to the left) was presented at the centre of the monitor. Gaze direction could be congruent or incongruent with respect to the instruction and target location. Facial expression was also manipulated. In half of the trials the diverted gaze (i.e., congruent or incongruent) appeared with an angry expression, whereas in the other half the face had a neutral expression. Participants were instructed to saccade either to the target on the left or to the target on the right (the targets were visible throughout the trial), as indicated by the instruction dot, while completely disregarding the face because it was irrelevant for the task. Eye movement recordings on correct trials showed that saccades congruent with the direction of the distracting gaze had shorter latencies than incongruent ones. However, the time-course of this effect varied depending on the facial expression. With a neutral expression, the congruency effect was found only at the shortest SOA (50 ms). On the contrary, for the angry face the congruency effect occurred at the longer SOAs. These findings suggest that gaze direction (even when task-irrelevant) is capable of interfering with the orienting of visual attention, and that faces with an angry expression may hold attention and affect its orienting longer than a neutral expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]