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Many real-world decisions involving rare events also involve extreme outcomes. Despite this confluence, decisions-from-experience research has only examined the impact of rarity and extremity in isolation. With rare events, people typically choose as if they underestimate the probability of a rare outcome happening. Separately, people typically overestimate the probability of an extreme outcome happening. Here, for the first time, we examine the confluence of these two biases in decisions-from-experience. In a between-groups behavioural experiment, we examine people's risk preferences for rare extreme outcomes and for rare non-extreme outcomes. When outcomes are both rare and extreme, people's risk preferences shift away from traditional risk patterns for rare events: they show reduced underweighting for events that are both rare and extreme. We simulate these results using a small-sample model of decision-making that accounts for both the underweighting of rare events and the overweighting of extreme events. These separable influences on risk preferences suggest that to understand real-world risk for rare events we must also consider the extremity of the outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All commercial gambling games are constructed so that the gamblers will on average lose money over time. This fact is often communicated to gamblers on virtual gambling games as the "return-to-player." A return-to-player of 90% means that for every £100 bet, on average £90 is paid back out in prizes. In previous work, gamblers were better informed, and perceived a lower chance of winning, when this information was equivalently reframed as a "house-edge" of 10%, whereby the game keeps 10% of all money bet on average. This paper explores whether there are further risk communication advantages to using currency framing for the house-edge format, by directly stating the amount kept as: "This game keeps £10 for every £100 bet on average." Online gamblers (N = 1,007) reported their perceived chances of winning for hypothetical games with house-edges of either 0.5%, 7.5%, or 15%, presented as either percentages or currency units. Gamblers' perceived chances of winning were only minimally affected by this framing of house-edge information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three experiments assessed how appetitive conditioning in rats changes over the duration of a trace conditioned stimulus (CS) when unsignaled unconditioned stimuli (USs) are introduced into the intertrial interval. In Experiment 1, a target US occurred at a fixed time either shortly before (embedded), shortly after (trace), or at the same time (delay) as the offset of a 120-s CS. During the CS, responding was most suppressed by intertrial USs in the trace group, less so in the delay group, and least in the embedded group. Unreinforced probe trials revealed a bell-shaped curve centered on the normal US arrival time during the trace interval, suggesting that temporally specific learning occurred both with and without intertrial USs. Experiments 2a and 2b confirmed that the bulk of the trace CS became inhibitory when intertrial USs were scheduled, as measured by summation and retardation tests, even though CS offset evoked a temporally precise conditioned response. Thus, an inhibitory CS may give rise to new stimuli specifically linked to its termination, which are excitatory. A modification to the microstimulus temporal difference model is offered to account for the data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People regularly take prosocial actions, making individual sacrifices for the greater good. Similarly, people generally avoid causing harm to others. These twin desires to do good and avoid harm often align, but sometimes they can diverge, creating situations of moral conflict. Here, we examined this moral conflict using a modified dictator game. Participants chose how much money to allocate away from a recipient who was designated as an orphan, creating a sense of harm. This money was then reallocated to either the participant or a charity. People were strongly prosocial: they allocated more money away from the orphan for charity than for themselves. Furthermore, people left more money with the orphan when the harm was framed as a means (taking) than as a side effect (splitting). As is predicted by dual-process theories of moral decision making, response times were longer with the take action and were positively correlated with the amount taken from the orphan. We concluded that just as people take positive actions for the greater good, they are similarly more willing to cause harm when it benefits others rather than themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Encoding multiple cues can improve the accuracy and reliability of navigation and goal localization. Problems may arise, however, if one cue is displaced and provides information which conflicts with other cues. Here we investigated how pigeons cope with cue conflict by training them to locate a goal relative to two landmarks and then varying the amount of conflict between the landmarks. When the amount of conflict was small, pigeons tended to integrate both cues in their search patterns. When the amount of conflict was large, however, pigeons used information from both cues independently. This context-dependent strategy for resolving spatial cue conflict agrees with Bayes optimal calculations for using information from multiple sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When making decisions on the basis of past experiences, people must rely on their memories. Human memory has many well-known biases, including the tendency to better remember highly salient events. We propose an extreme-outcome rule, whereby this memory bias leads people to overweight the largest gains and largest losses, leading to more risk seeking for relative gains than for relative losses. To test this rule, in two experiments, people repeatedly chose between fixed and risky options, where the risky option led equiprobably to more or less than did the fixed option. As was predicted, people were more risk seeking for relative gains than for relative losses. In subsequent memory tests, people tended to recall the extreme outcome first and also judged the extreme outcome as having occurred more frequently. Across individuals, risk preferences in the risky-choice task correlated with these memory biases. This extreme-outcome rule presents a novel mechanism through which memory influences decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We extend a Bayesian method for combining estimates of means and variances from independent cues in a spatial cue-combination paradigm. In a typical cue-combination experiment, subjects estimate a value on a single dimension-for example, depth-on the basis of two different cues, such as retinal disparity and motion. The mathematics for this one-dimensional case is well established. When the variable to be estimated has two dimensions, such as location (which has both x and y values), then the one-dimensional method may be inappropriate due to possible correlations between x and y and the fact that the dimensions may be inseparable. A cue-combination task for location involves people or animals estimating xy locations under two single-cue conditions and in a condition in which both cues are combined. We present the mathematics for the two-dimensional case in an analogous manner to the one-dimensional case and illustrate them using a numeric example. Our example involves locations on maps, but the method illustrated is relevant for any task for which the estimated variable has two or more dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The temporal-difference (TD) algorithm from reinforcement learning provides a simple method for incrementally learning predictions of upcoming events. Applied to classical conditioning, TD models suppose that animals learn a real-time prediction of the unconditioned stimulus (US) on the basis of all available conditioned stimuli (CSs). In the TD model, similar to other error-correction models, learning is driven by prediction errors-the difference between the change in US prediction and the actual US. With the TD model, however, learning occurs continuously from moment to moment and is not artificially constrained to occur in trials. Accordingly, a key feature of any TD model is the assumption about the representation of a CS on a moment-to-moment basis. Here, we evaluate the performance of the TD model with a heretofore unexplored range of classical conditioning tasks. To do so, we consider three stimulus representations that vary in their degree of temporal generalization and evaluate how the representation influences the performance of the TD model on these conditioning tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Timing deficits are characteristic of developmental and neurodegenerative disorders that are accompanied by cognitive impairment. A prominent theory of this interval timing posits an internal clock whose pace is modulated by the neurotransmitter dopamine. We tested two hypotheses about the pharmacology of interval timing in mice: (1) that general cognitive enhancers should increase, and cognitive disruptors should decrease temporal precision and (2) that acutely elevated dopamine should speed this internal clock and produce overestimation of elapsing time. C3H mice were tested in the peak procedure, a timing task, following acute administration of two putative cognitive enhancers (atomoxetine and physostigmine), two cognitive disruptors (scopolamine and chlordiazepoxide [CDP]), or two dopamine agonists ( d-amphetamine and methamphetamine). The first hypothesis received strong support: temporal precision worsened with both cognitive disruptors, but improved with both cognitive enhancers. The two dopamine agonists also produced underestimation of elapsing time—congruent with the slowing of an internal clock and inconsistent with a dopamine-driven clock. Our results suggest that interval timing has potential as an assay for generalized cognitive performance and that the dopamine-clock hypothesis needs further refinement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dual-system theories of human cognition, under which fast automatic processes can complement or compete with slower deliberative processes, have not typically been incorporated into larger scale population models used in evolutionary biology, macroeconomics, or sociology. However, doing so may reveal important phenomena at the population level. Here, we introduce a novel model of the evolution of dual-system agents using a resource-consumption paradigm. By simulating agents with the capacity for both automatic and controlled processing, we illustrate how controlled processing may not always be selected over rigid, but rapid, automatic processing. Furthermore, even when controlled processing is advantageous, frequency-dependent effects may exist whereby the spread of control within the population undermines this advantage. As a result, the level of controlled processing in the population can oscillate persistently, or even go extinct in the long run. Our model illustrates how dual-system psychology can be incorporated into population-level evolutionary models, and how such a framework can be used to examine the dynamics of interaction between automatic and controlled processing that transpire over an evolutionary time scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]