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In the domain of scratch card gambling, "pushes" refer to outcomes in which a prize is won that is equal to the cost of a scratch card game. Despite resulting in no net monetary gain, these outcomes are categorized as wins by lottery operators, effectively inflating published scratch card information (e.g., posted odds of winning). Additionally, the experience of obtaining a push shares similarities (e.g., the revealing of matching symbols) with the experience of obtaining a win and thus may be experienced similarly to wins by gamblers. Across four studies (N = 1502), we examined the impact of push outcomes on participants' perceptions of scratch card games. In Studies 1 and 2, participants reported feeling more likely to win, more excitement to play, and a stronger urge to gamble when presented with a scratch card that categorized push outcomes as wins compared to when presented a scratch card that did not categorize these outcomes as wins. In Study 3, participants experiencing a push outcome prior to a loss reported feeling more likely to win compared to those not experiencing a push outcome yet experiencing the same net monetary loss. In Study 4, push outcomes were found to elicit more excitement and a stronger urge to gamble compared to losses but less excitement and a weaker urge to gamble compared to wins. Overall, the present investigation suggests that push outcomes, a prevalent feature of scratch card games, can bias gambling-related judgments and increase the appeal of scratch card games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past work has demonstrated that presenting statistical information in a foreground–background icon array can improve risk understanding, reduce decision-making biases, and decrease the salience of low-probability risks. In the present study, we assess whether presenting readily available gambling information within a foreground–background icon array influences individuals' gambling-related judgments (e.g., their perceived likelihood of winning a prize). Across two experiments (N = 1151), we find that using icon arrays to present gambling information reduces the appeal of scratch card games. That is, participants presented with gambling information in a foreground–background icon array, as opposed to a non-graphical numerical format, reported feeling less likely to win a prize, less excitement to play, and less urge to gamble on a scratch card game presented in a hypothetical gambling task. Overall, we conclude that presenting gambling information in an icon array format represents a simple yet promising tool for correcting gamblers' often overly-optimistic perceptions and reducing the appeal of negative expected value scratch card games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The domain of gambling is rife with both diagnostic and non-diagnostic information. Previous studies examining scratch card gambling have demonstrated that people are often biased by intuitively appealing, yet non-diagnostic information (i.e., unclaimed prize information). The current study investigated how varying the presentation format of a diagnostic piece of information (i.e., payback percentage) could influence participants' use of this information when in conflict with unclaimed prize information. We hypothesized that when payback percentage information was presented in a graphical, as opposed to a numerical format, participants would be better at ignoring unclaimed prize information and correspondingly have their preferences become congruent with the true value of the presented scratch cards. In Experiment 1 (N = 201), with payback percentage presented in a numerical format, participants displayed a non-optimal preference for cards with greater numbers of unclaimed prizes and lower payback percentages. This preference was reversed in Experiment 2 (N = 201) when payback percentage was presented in a graphical format. In conclusion, the results of the current study demonstrate how judgments in a scratch card gambling domain can be improved by simply changing the presentation format of a single piece of information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does taxing cognitive resources improve people's choices in repeated binary prediction? Wolford, Newman, Miller, and Wig (2004, Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 221–228) found that a secondary verbal working memory task, which competed for cognitive resources with a repeated binary choice task, steered participants toward adopting the optimal strategy, namely, probability maximizing. By contrast, under single-task conditions, an inferior strategy prevailed, namely, probability matching. We conducted a preregistered direct replication of Experiment 1 in Wolford et al. (2004) with a sample of participants more than 5 times larger than the original sample. We did not find a statistically significant effect of cognitive load on strategy selection in repeated binary choice. Moreover, in many cases, Bayesian analyses, which were performed in addition to conventional methods of null hypothesis significance testing, yielded substantial evidence in favor of the absence of cognitive load effects on choice behavior. Thus, we found no reliable support for the claim that taxing cognitive resources leads to improved decision-making in repeated binary prediction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unclaimed prize information (i.e., the number of prizes still available to be won) is information commonly provided to scratch card gamblers. However, unless the number of tickets remaining to be purchased is also provided, this information is uninformative. Despite its lack of utility in assisting gamblers in choosing the most favourable type of scratch card to play, we hypothesized that unclaimed prize information would bias participants' judgments within a scratch card gambling context. In Experiment 1 (N = 201), we showed that participants are influenced by this information such that they felt more likely to win, were more excited to play, and preferred to hypothetically purchase more of the scratch card with the greatest number of unclaimed prizes. In Experiment 2 (N = 201), we attempted to ameliorate this bias by providing participants with the number of tickets remaining to be purchased and equating the payback percentages of all three games. The bias, although attenuated, still persisted in these conditions. Finally, in Experiment 3 (N = 200), we manipulated the hypothetical scratch cards such that games with the highest number of unclaimed prizes were the least favourable, and vice versa. As in Experiment 2, participants still favoured cards with greater numbers of unclaimed prizes. Possible mechanisms underlying this bias are discussed. In conclusion, across three experiments, we demonstrate that salient unclaimed prize information is capable of exerting a strong effect over judgments related to scratch card games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The belief-bias effect is one of the most-studied biases in reasoning. A recent study of the phenomenon using the signal detection theory (SDT) model called into question all theoretical accounts of belief bias by demonstrating that belief-based differences in the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid syllogisms may be an artifact stemming from the use of inappropriate linear measurement models such as analysis of variance (Dube et al., Psychological Review, 117(3), 831-863, 2010). The discrepancy between Dube et al.’s, Psychological Review, 117(3), 831-863 (2010) results and the previous three decades of work, together with former’s methodological criticisms suggests the need to revisit earlier results, this time collecting confidence-rating responses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis, we reanalyzed a corpus of 22 confidence-rating studies (N = 993). The results indicated that extensive replications using confidence-rating data are unnecessary as the observed receiver operating characteristic functions are not systematically asymmetric. These results were subsequently corroborated by a novel experimental design based on SDT’s generalized area theorem. Although the meta-analysis confirms that believability does not influence discriminability unconditionally, it also confirmed previous results that factors such as individual differences mediate the effect. The main point is that data from previous and future studies can be safely analyzed using appropriate hierarchical methods that do not require confidence ratings. More generally, our results set a new standard for analyzing data and evaluating theories in reasoning. Important methodological and theoretical considerations for future work on belief bias and related domains are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Findings from two experiments indicate that probability matching in sequential choice arises from an asymmetry in strategy availability: The matching strategy comes readily to mind, whereas a superior alternative strategy, maximizing, does not. First, compared with the minority who spontaneously engage in maximizing, the majority of participants endorse maximizing as superior to matching in a direct comparison when both strategies are described. Second, when the maximizing strategy is brought to their attention, more participants subsequently engage in maximizing. Third, matchers are more likely than maximizers to base decisions in other tasks on their initial intuitions, suggesting that they are more inclined to use a choice strategy that comes to mind quickly. These results indicate that a substantial subset of probability marchers are victims of"underthinking" rather than "overthinking": They fail to engage in sufficient deliberation to generate a superior alternative to the matching strategy that comes so readily to mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown that probabifity judgments based on a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic information are less extreme than judgments based on the diagnostic information alone. Results of the present experiments suggest that this dilution effect holds only under a limited set of conditions. When judgments based on a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic information are compared with separately elicited judgments based on the diagnostic information alone, the dilution effect is consistently observed. When judgments based on the diagnostic evidence are revised in light of additional, nondiagnostic evidence, by contrast, the dilution effect is eliminated or even reversed (yielding a confirmation effect) depending on the type of nondiagnostic evidence under evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a multiple-cue probability learning task, participants learned to use six discrete symptoms (i.e., cues) to diagnose which of three possible flu strains a hypothetical patient suffered from. For some patients, information regarding the status of certain symptoms was not available. Various possible ways in which the missing cue information might be processed were distinguished and tested in a series of three experiments (Ns = 80,109, and 61). The results suggest that the judged probability of the outcome variable (i.e., flu strain) was assessed by "filling in" the missing cue information with a mean value based on previous observations, The predictions of other methods of processing missing cue information are inconsistent with the data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]