Search

Do we have a unified pre-theoretical concept of morality? This paper makes a start on the larger argument that we do not, by countering criticisms of virtue ethics on the ground that it does not adequately capture such a pre-theoretical concept. One criticism is discussed and met, namely that the reasons on which virtuous people act fail to have the special force of moral reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral options are permissions to do less than best, impartially speaking. In this paper, we investigate the challenge of reconciling moral options with the ideal of justifiability to each individual. We examine ex-post and ex-ante views of moral options and show how they might conflict with this ideal in single-choice and sequential-choice cases, respectively. We consider some ways of avoiding this conflict in sequential-choice cases, showing that they face significant problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The standard account of Kantian moral weakness fails to provide a psychologically realistic account of moral improvement. It assumes that moral strength is simply a matter of volitional resolve and weakness is a lack of resolve. This leaves the path to moral improvement unclear. In this paper, I reconstruct an alternative character-based account of Kantian moral weakness and strength. On this account, moral strength is the possession of sympathy and self-knowledge, key practical-epistemic virtues from Kant's Doctrine of Virtue, and moral weakness is a lack of these virtues. This identifies moral strength with a high degree of development, integrity, or fitness in one's character, and not merely an ability to somehow try harder. It also resolves an exegetical puzzle concerning the change of heart in Kant's Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While organizations today make extensive use of complex algorithms, the notion of algorithmic accountability remains an elusive ideal due to the opacity and fluidity of algorithms. In this article, we develop a framework for managing algorithmic accountability that highlights three interrelated dimensions: reputational concerns, engagement strategies, and discourse principles. The framework clarifies (a) that accountability processes for algorithms are driven by reputational concerns about the epistemic setup, opacity, and outcomes of algorithms; (b) that the way in which organizations practically engage with emergent expectations about algorithms may be manipulative, adaptive, or moral; and (c) that when accountability relationships are heavily burdened by the opacity and fluidity of complex algorithmic systems, the emphasis of engagement should shift to a rational communication process through which a continuous and tentative assessment of the development, workings, and consequences of algorithms can be achieved over time. The degree to which such engagement is, in fact, rational can be assessed based on four discourse-ethical principles of participation, comprehension, multivocality, and responsiveness. We conclude that the framework may help organizations and their environments to jointly work toward greater accountability for complex algorithms. It may further help organizations in reputational positioning surrounding accountability issues. The discourse-ethical principles introduced in this article are meant to elevate these positioning contests to extend beyond mere adaption or compliance and help guide organizations to find moral and forward-looking solutions to accountability issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a model of ideals-based accountability (IBA) which we have witnessed at work in several long-thriving family businesses. The owners and managers of these firms eschew individualism and materiality in the pursuit of ethical ideals such as supporting democracy and bettering the human condition. Although accountability is to these ideals, not for outcomes such as profitability or even reputation, IBA has resulted in outstanding reputations for some firms. We characterize IBA according to its missions, leadership, culture, and stakeholder relationships. We also contrast it with traditional forms of accountability and differentiate IBA from related stakeholder, stewardship, and CSR perspectives. Finally, we examine its manifestations within five long-lived family enterprises, in the process generating propositions to advance the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent work in political philosophy there has been much discussion of two approaches to theorizing about justice that have come to be called 'ideal theory' and 'non-ideal theory'. The distinction was originally articulated by Rawls, who defended his focus on ideal theory in terms of a supposed 'priority' of the latter over non-ideal theory. Many critics have rejected this claim of priority and in general have questioned the usefulness of ideal theory. In diagnosing the problem with ideal theory, they have frequently fingered for blame the idealization it involves. In this paper I focus on one particular, much-discussed idealization—full compliance—in order to defend it. Focusing on the assumption, I argue that Rawls's work is not ideal in the way that it is usually thought to be, is less ideal than is widely recognized, and became less ideal over time. I also argue that critics who in effect claim that it is not realistic enough simply fail to understand Rawls's central motivation. Finally, I defend the assumption by arguing that there is an important sense in which all theories of justice must assume full compliance. Such an assumption, I argue, is needed if we are to have a plausible basis on which to judge the normative attractiveness of a theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work motivates the Combined Model for Combining Ideals, which Larry Temkin introduces in "sketch" form in Rethinking the Good, and goes on to begin filling in the details of the sketch. It argues that the Combined Model for Combining Ideals is most plausible when there are upper and lower caps on the extent to which an ideal can add to or subtract from the overall goodness of an outcome, but the caps for different values can and should differ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on value congruence rests on the assumption that values denote desirable behaviors and ideals that employees and organizations strive to approach. In the present study, we develop and test the argument that a more complete understanding of value congruence can be achieved by considering a second type of congruence based on employees’ and organizations’ counter-ideal values (i.e., what both seek to avoid). We examined this proposition in a time-lagged study of 672 employees from various occupational and organizational backgrounds. We used difference scores as well as polynomial regression and response surface analyses to test our hypotheses. Consistent with our hypotheses, results reveal that counter-ideal value congruence has unique relations to employees’ trust in the organization that go beyond the effects of ideal value congruence. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of this expanded perspective on value congruence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conditionalists say that the value something has as an end-its final value-may be conditional on its extrinsic features. They support this claim by appealing to examples: Kagan points to Abraham Lincoln's pen, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen to Lady Diana's dress, and Korsgaard to a mink coat. They contend that these things may have final value in virtue of their historical or societal roles. These three examples have become familiar: many now merely mention them to establish the conditionalist position. But the widespread faith in such cases is, I believe, unjustified. This is because, surprisingly, the pen, the dress, and the coat cannot have final value. I argue that the problem is internal: these cases are ruled out by every conditionalist account of final value. Further, the problem with these well-known cases applies to most other supposed examples of extrinsic, final goods. Thus nearly all cases given to support the conditionalist view cannot succeed. I suggest a kind of diagnosis: I claim that these examples are best seen as instances of sentimental value, rather than final value. I close by providing a brief account of sentimental value and explain how it relates to instrumental, intrinsic, and final goodness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers hold that the probability axioms constitute norms of rationality governing degrees of belief. This view, known as subjective Bayesianism, has been widely criticized for being too idealized. It is claimed that the norms on degrees of belief postulated by subjective Bayesianism cannot be followed by human agents, and hence have no normative force for beings like us. This problem is especially pressing since the standard framework of subjective Bayesianism only allows us to distinguish between two kinds of credence functions-coherent ones that obey the probability axioms perfectly, and incoherent ones that don't. An attractive response to this problem is to extend the framework of subjective Bayesianism in such a way that we can measure differences between incoherent credence functions. This lets us explain how the Bayesian ideals can be approximated by humans. I argue that we should look for a measure that captures what I call the 'overall degree of incoherence' of a credence function. I then examine various incoherence measures that have been proposed in the literature, and evaluate whether they are suitable for measuring overall incoherence. The competitors are a qualitative measure that relies on finding coherent subsets of incoherent credence functions, a class of quantitative measures that measure incoherence in terms of normalized Dutch book loss, and a class of distance measures that determine the distance to the closest coherent credence function. I argue that one particular Dutch book measure and a corresponding distance measure are particularly well suited for capturing the overall degree of incoherence of a credence function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'The Scientific Method' as it has been portrayed in popular and introductory contexts has been declared a myth. The variation that one finds in introductory presentations of 'The Scientific Method' is explained by the fact that there is no canonical account among historians and philosophers of science. What, in particular, is wrong with 'The Scientific Method'? This essay provides a fairly comprehensive survey of shortcomings of 'The Scientific Method'. Included are corrections to several misconceptions that often accompany such presentations. Rather than treating 'The Scientific Method' as a useful approximation or an ideal, the myth should be discarded. Lessons can be learned for introductory pedagogical contexts from considering the shortcomings of the myth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Journal of Early Childhood is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Humanism and art - To what extent does art have a major role to play in twenty-first-century humanism? Greek philosophers believed that its purpose was ethical, serving to improve people by confronting them with evil and purging their passions. Nineteenth-century literature saw it as edifying and utilitarian, and for two centuries it was associated with the principles of goodness, truth, freedom and resistance to oppression, part of a general movement towards greater human solidarity based on shared experience. Literature and, more recently, cinema have been the most effective at defending human values. But the role of culture is not purely ethical: it also encourages a purely aesthetic reflection that has become the sole truth of creation. The aspiration to beauty reminds us that mankind is no ordinary species, but a reminiscence of the ideal objectified in works of art. The quest for the absolute is that of artists who draw on the lessons of history to come closer to the essence of spirituality and the cosmic centre of the world. Artistic vision is the ultimate vocation of humanity, achieving greatness and dignity in a constant quest for illumination, engaging in dialogue with the transcendent, and perhaps even transcending our own finiteness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how Dutch mothers' ideal family lives (traditional, adaptive or egalitarian) have been formed in interaction with other people, an assumption that is central to socialization theories. With nominal regression analysis of data from a representative survey in 2010 among 935 Dutch mothers, we analyse various social influences on a mother's current ideal family life. As hypothesized, the results show that a mother endorses a more egalitarian ideal family life if she recalls the gender role specific parental message 'you should work in order to be financially independent of others'. Additionally, if the respondent recalls a positively work orientated mother at the age of 12 years, she has now as an adult more egalitarian ideals compared to daughters who recall a more home orientated mother or who have no memories of their mothers in that respect. We also show that as expected in the hypotheses 3 and 4, that Dutch mothers who have perceived career support by her partner and from people at work have now more egalitarian ideal family lives. Mothers' current ideals are thus formed and further developed within prior social bonds. Moreover, mothers' ideal family lives seem not only dependent on their current labour market behaviour, but to some degree resistant to change. However, the results must be interpreted with care because of the cross-sectional research design and the use of retrospective questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the moral philosophical concept of non-ideal ought implies non-ideal accessibility, which the author defines as actions of agents based on past behavior, severe pathology and character. The author distinguishes the term 'ought' as a moral action of the agent not only to do what he should originally intends to do, but an action he might likely do given the circumstances. The moral consequences of failure to accomplish actions that should ought to be done are discussed.

Although there has been a resurgence of interest in virtue ethics, there has been little work done on how this translates into the political sphere. This essay demonstrates that the Confucian thinker Xunzi offers a model of virtue politics that is both interesting in its own right and potentially useful for scholars attempting to develop virtue ethics into virtue politics more generally. I present Xunzi's version of virtue politics and discuss challenges to this version of virtue politics that are raised by the Legalist thinker H an Fei. I show that not only is Xunzi's virtue politics capable of surviving the challenges raised by his contemporary, he offers an account that is in many ways both attractive and plausible, one that may usefully be brought into conversation with contemporary visions of virtue politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plato noticed a sizeable problem apropos of establishing his republic-that there was always a ready pool of zealous potential rulers, lying in wait for a suitable opportunity to rule on their own tyrannical terms. He also recognized that those persons best suited to rule, those persons with foursquare and unimpeachable virtue, would be least motivated to govern. Ruling a polis meant that those persons, fully educated and in complete realization that the most complete happiness comprises solitary study of things unchanging, would have to compromise their happiness for the wellbeing of their polis and of the people in it. Plato's solution, in effect that the aristoi would merely recognize their duty to sacrifice personal happiness for the happiness of the polis, has perplexed and continues today to perplex scholars. Like Plato, Jefferson recognized that there was always a pool of eager sharks, ready to govern. His republicanism, comprising a ward system and general education, was founded on the fullest participation of its citizenry, suitably educated and a governing aristoi. The true aristoi, the 'natural aristoi', are the intelligent and virtuous and that government is best which allows for a 'pure selection' of the natural aristoi into the governing offices. Nonetheless, as Jefferson's own life shows, non-parochial governing meant being rent from domestic tranquility, being forced to leave behind one's personal affairs to decay, and being tossed willy-nilly into the coliseum of nonstop political wrangling. Why would anyone, particularly one wanting to be happy, wish to govern? Thus, Jefferson faced the same problem that Plato faced. How could a state be structured so that the wisest and most virtuous would be motivated to rule? In this paper, I argue that Jefferson, in full recognition of the problem of encouraging the most intelligent and virtuous to govern, the problem of public service, offers a solution that is remarkably Platonic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If instructional designers hold limited views about their practice they sometimes adopt formulaic routines that do not help them accomplish the goals they believe are important, or develop instruction of a quality envisioned by the field's innovative theorists. Fortunately, designers can avoid these unfavorable results in part by understanding and exemplifying the creative spirit of design. In this article the author examines the creative spirit of design, exploring its imaginative, creation-oriented, and inter-disciplinary character. The author also describes how the creative spirit can help instructional designers remain flexible and perceptive in their practice, and by so doing be better able to create effective and innovative instruction of a quality consistent with their ultimate ideals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stein Ringen's theory of democratic purpose cannot do the work expected of it. Ringen's own criteria oscillate between being too vague to be useful (i.e. 'freedom') or, when specified more fully, conflicting, so that almost all democracies will seem to be potentially at cross-purposes with themselves rather than their purposes or sub-purposes being mutually reinforcing. This reflects a bigger and more theoretical problem. Disagreement about the purpose of democracy is built into democracy itself. The whole point of many (perhaps all) of our democratic institutions is to arrive at conditionally legitimate decisions in spite of such disagreement. So-called regime bias, i.e. the tendency to assess democracies according to the form and stability of their institutions rather than their results or their ability to serve certain purposes, does not in fact arise from bias. It arises on the contrary from a determination to avoid the bias inherent in giving some-inevitably partisan-ideals of what democracies should do pride of place over others in a scheme of measurement or evaluation. And even a regime-based definition of democracy must itself make simplifying assumptions that elide possible normative controversies over how the democratic game is best played. Vindicating one's preferred set of democratic ideals against alternatives is a completely legitimate enterprise and lends richness to debates within and across democracies. But it is an inherently ideological and political enterprise, not a neutral or scholarly one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideals (or ideal values) help people to navigate in social life. They indicate at a very fundamental level what people are concerned about, what they strive for, and what they want to be affiliated with. Transferring this to a leader–follower analysis, our first study (n = 306) confirms that followers’ identification and satisfaction with their leaders are stronger, the more leaders match followers’ ideal leader values. Study 2 (n = 244) extends the perspective by introducing the novel concept of counter-ideals (i.e., how an ideal leader should not be) as a second, non-redundant point of reference. Results confirm that a leader’s match on ideal and on counter-ideal values have independent effects in that both explain unique variance in followers’ identification and satisfaction with their leader. Study 3 (n = 136) replicates the previous results in an experimental scenario study and provides evidence for the proposed causal direction of the underlying process. We conclude that counter-ideal values might be an additional point of reference that people use to triangulate targets above and beyond ideal values and discuss the implications of our findings for value research and management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to open a new line of debate about religion in public schools by focusing on religious ideals. The article begins with an elucidation of the concept ‘religious ideals’ and an explanation of the notion of reasonable pluralism, in order to be able to explore the dangers and positive contributions of religious ideals and their pursuit on a liberal democratic society. We draw our examples of religious ideals from Christianity and Islam, because these religions have most adherents in Western liberal democracies that are the focus of this article. The fifth and most important section “Reasonable pluralism and the inclusion of religious ideals in public secondary schools” provides three arguments for our claim that public schools should include religious ideals, namely that they are important to religious people, that they are conducive for the development of pupils into citizens of a liberal democracy, and that the flourishing of pupils as adults is advanced by encountering religious ideals. We also offer a more practical reason: religious ideals can more easily be included within public education than religious dogmas and rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term ‘knowledge economy’, like the term ‘globalisation’, has become a catchword in political and educational debate over the last decade or so, especially in debates upon educational policy where the role of education in preparing young people to take their part in the Knowledge Economy is often seen as paramount over other traditional schooling activities. It is said in such debates that the production of knowledge, information and skills, will become more valuable than traditional primary and secondary production. A lot is said about the knowledge required in the Knowledge Economy, and about how institutions, businesses, activities and human beings are to be ordered or structured in accordance with views of knowledge and new Management theories. But little is said of the young people expected to take their part in the knowledge economy. Do they have a choice? Is lying on a surfboard excluded from their life options? How will they be developed, trained or educated to take their part? Will they be committed to developing their selves in accordance with the model of the IT Knowledge Entrepreneur (hereinafter TIKE) presented as a model for education by policy makers in the Knowledge Economy? This article will argue against this latter notion of the development of the self, arguing that because knowledge is prioritised over ethics, there is both an inadequate notion of the self and the educational development of the self and, because of its implicit view only of ethics, an inadequate ethical and moral view of education [246 words]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's argument stating that Rossian duties match the moral convictions better than the rule-consequentialist principles. The author claims that the view of rule-consequentialists on whether the wrongness of acts is determined by the ideal principles for the earlier circumstances or by the ideal ones for the new circumstances is in conflict with the moral intuitions. The author further states that rule-consequentialism fails in the reflective equilibrium test of the rule-consequentialists.

This study analyzes the at-will employment doctrine using a tool that encompasses the complementarity of results-based utilitarian ethics, rule-based duty ethics, and virtue-based character ethics. The paper begins with a discussion of the importance of the problem followed by its evolution and current status. After describing the method of analysis, the central section evaluates the employment at-will doctrine, and is informed by Lord Acton’s dictum, “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” The conclusion explores the implications of the findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral rules provide the baseline for ethics, proscribing unacceptable behavior; moral ideals inspire us to act in ways that improve the human condition. Whatever the moral ideals for pure research, science has a practical side so it is important to find a moral ideal to give guidance to more applied research. This article presents a moral ideal for use-inspired research based on Norman Care’s idea of shared-fate individualism This ideal reflects the observation that all human lives, both present and future are tightly coupled and, as a result, research projects should be chosen, where possible, with the goal of service to others. Together with the ideals of the habit of truth and the gift economy, shared-fate individualism provides the basis for a humane ethics of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Julia Annas is one of the few modern writers on virtue that has attempted to recover the ancient idea that virtues are similar to skills. In doing so, she is arguing for a particular account of virtue, one in which the intellectual structure of virtue is analogous to the intellectual structure of practical skills. The main benefit of this skill model of virtue is that it can ground a plausible account of the moral epistemology of virtue. This benefit, though, is only available to some accounts of virtue. Annas claims that Aristotle rejects this skill model of virtue, and so the model of virtues as a skill that Annas endorses for the modern virtue theory is Socratic.This paper argues that while Aristotle rejects the Socratic model of virtue as a skill, he does not reject the model of virtue as a skill altogether. Annas has mischaracterized Aristotle’s position on the skill model, because she has not recognized that Aristotle endorses a different account of the structure of skill than the one put forth by Socrates. In addition, recent research on expertise provides an account of skills very much at odds with the description of skills offered by Annas, but similar to the account endorsed by Aristotle.Contrary to Annas, not only is the skill model of virtue compatible with a neo-Aristotelian account of virtue, but it also appears that basing a skill model of virtue on a Socratic account of virtue is likely to prove unsuccessful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the different type of conflicts encountered when moral values conflict. Conflicts may arise due to the occurrence of two obligations at the same period. It explores the importance of identifying the prima facie duties to be able to determine the duties to be accomplished. Moreover, conflicting rights, ideals and virtues are some of the factors that complicates the decision of fulfilling an obligation.

This paper considers ethical decision making by blending three streams of related research: cognitive moral development of the decision maker, rational choice theory and a subjective expected utility model. Ethical dilemmas can be defined as situations where moral certainty is compromised by rational cognition. In this paper, the authors assume that some people use a morality-first perspective and others a rationality-first perspective. Ethical scenarios were written and used to test hypotheses derived from this perspective. The instrument developed was shown to be in need of further refinement. Results are discussed in terms of relationships between participant-characteristics variables overall and subscale responses to the ethical scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectification theory has linked self-objectification to negative emotional experiences and disordered eating behavior in cultures that sexually objectify the female body. This link has not been empirically tested in a clinical sample of women with eating disorders. In the present effort, 209 women in residential treatment for eating disorders completed self-report measures of self-objectification, body shame, media influence, and drive for thinness on admission to treatment. Results demonstrated that the internalization of appearance ideals from the media predicted self-objectification, whereas using the media as an informational source about appearance and feeling pressured to conform to media ideals did not. Self-objectification partially mediated the relationship between internalized appearance ideals and drive for thinness; internalized appearance ideals continued to be an independent predictor of variance. In accordance with objectification theory, body shame partially mediated the relationship between self-objectification and drive for thinness in women with eating disorders; self-objectification continued to be an independent predictor of variance. These results illustrate the importance of understanding and targeting the experience of self-objectification in women with eating disorders or women at risk for eating disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author reflects on the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and asks the question whether human race is constantly progressing. The author's attempt to show in what way Immanuel Kant's response to the French Revolution is of a piece with Theodore Adorno's response to G. Auschwitz is intended to frame a very brief reflection on responses to the events of September 11. He says that perhaps nothing was more stark that day-or more important to reflect upon-than the divergence in affective responses to the attacks. While many people in the United States and elsewhere reacted in horror, thousands were celebrating in the streets of occupied Palestine and no doubt elsewhere. For some the actions of the terrorists bore comparison with the Holocaust; in both cases, though incomparable in scope, innocent people were sent to their death by fanatics. But others reacted with something very much like enthusiasm; for them it was indeed like witnessing the French Revolution. Just as Kant saw no contradiction between moral condemnation of the revolutionaries' actions and affective sympathy for their ideals, so many found it important to distinguish between the terrorist acts, which they condemned unequivocally, and the presumed ideals of those who carried out the attacks, ideals with which they sympathized.

On the basis of the Weber, Jaspers, and Arendt style 'ideal types' of the manager as Eichmann, Richard III, and Faust it is explained how under strong organizational pressures to obey orders and further organizational ends, different types of managers cooperate with organization behavior that harms people. On the basis of Arendt's and Tillich's action philosophies, the manager as Institution Citizen with the courage to be both as oneself and as a part is presented as alternative, contrast, and resistance model to the other 'ideal types', particularly to the Eichmann 'ideal type'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary perspectives on consciousness provide us with a powerful metaphor for the corporate planning process; although organisations ultimately differ, in systems terms, from organisms. Like consciousness, planning has survival value and confers operational advantages. Whereas individuals' actions may be guided by conscience, in pursuit of ideals, corporate acts often lack these qualities. It may be that no diffuse planning process is capable of accommodating ideals and ethical standards, they are 'beyond' Corporate Consciousness. Therefore, the pursuit of corporate objectives will often conflict with individuals' ideals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents information about the science of religion. Most of the folks that the author has known are either in science and atheists or agnostics, so he is always been in the minority. As one lives in a time of extremism, he is careful not to talk about his faith in the laboratory for fear of being lumped in with fundamentalists. However the time as the lone "believer" has made him wonder whether science is hostile to religion. Religion and science are by nature, antithetical ideals -- one requiring proof, the other, faith.