1. Turning the tables on Hume.
- Author
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Hansen, Casper Storm
- Subjects
- *
SKEPTICISM , *INDUCTION (Logic) , *INTUITION , *POSSIBILITY , *PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
Certain prior credence distributions concerning the future lead to inductivism, and others lead to inductive skepticism. I argue that it is difficult to consider the latter to be reasonable. I do not prove that they are not, but at the end of the paper, the tables are turned: in line with pre-philosophical intuitions, inductivism has retaken its place as the most reasonable default position, while the skeptic is called on to supply a novel argument for his. The reason is as follows. There are certain possibilities concerning the functioning of the world that, if assigned positive credence, support inductivism. Prima facie, one might think that the alternatives to those possibilities, if assigned similar or more credence, cancel out that support. However, I argue that it is plausible that reasonable credence distributions are such that the alternatives at most cancel themselves out, and thus leave the support for inductivism intact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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