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This paper contributes to the literature on entrepreneurship and economic geography by identifying factors that determine the attractiveness of a site in a metropolitan area, as the basis for the emergence of high-tech firms' spatial concentration. The econometric model provides distinct advantages over the largely descriptive approaches that have been dominant in the point pattern analysis literature for clusters. We focus on the role of two types of knowledge spillovers on a firm's location choices: (1) those that arise from collocating with other companies from the same industry, and (2) universities' knowledge spillovers. A model is estimated using data on firm births in high and medium–high-technology manufacturing industries, during 2000–2016 in Madrid. Our results show that the main source through which firms benefit from knowledge spillovers is through proximity to firms in the same industry and not from universities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gugl and Zodrow (Natl Tax J 68:767-802, 2015) derive a general condition for (in)efficient public-input provision under production-tax financing. Their condition is described in terms of log modularity of production technology. This paper shows that in the case of 'factor-augmenting' public inputs, the Gugl-Zodrow condition can be characterized in terms of the technical changes caused by public-input provision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Signature requirements are often used as hurdles to prevent overuse of direct democratic instruments such as citizen initiatives. We evaluate the causal effect of lowering signature requirements on the number of observed citizen initiative petitions. Based on municipal-level data for Germany, we make use of changes in signature requirements that occur at specific population thresholds to build an identification strategy using a regression discontinuity design. We find that reducing the signature requirement by 1 % point increases the probability of observing an initiative petition in a given city-year by 8-10 % points. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fiscal rules are mentioned as instruments to commit political actors on long-term fiscal sustainability. However, fiscal rules may have stronger effects on projected than on realized fiscal outcomes because of window-dressing measures or because they alter the bargaining situation in the budget process. In our analysis for Swiss cantons, fiscal rules significantly lower the probability of projected and realized deficits with the former effect being twice as large. Projections are generally over-pessimistic but fiscal rules increase the probability of accurate projections. Thus, fiscal rules seem to substitute for finance ministers' over-pessimistic projections intended to reign in fellow ministers and legislatures (100 words). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a data set that covers all Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1979-2005, this study performs an empirical analysis of the economic determinants of mayors' decisions to run for another term in office. The literature on the subject is mainly centered on the United States and, as far as we know, there are no papers addressing the economic factors influencing those choices. Probit panel estimations show that local economic conditions matter more than the national or regional economic environment. The results also confirm that political variables are important and that they influence the likelihood of seeking reelection in much the same way as they affect vote and popularity functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The richest neighborhoods in the unincorporated suburbs have a stronger incentive to form a new city to escape the redistribution that is occurring there. Wealthy families also may desire to establish a new city if this enables the provision of government services that middle income voters would not fund. With three different measures of household well being-based on educational attainment, income, and home values-we consistently found that the relatively wealthier neighborhoods were more likely to be part of a new city by the end of the decade. Population density also played a big role [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends the tax competition analysis of public inputs to the case where the number of regions that compete for business investment is endogenous. To determine the number of competing regions, a fixed cost of regional development is introduced into the Zodrow-Mieszkowski model of public-input provision. It is shown that allowing for region entry does not affect the analytical results of inefficient public-input provision under tax competition. This paper also shows that the equilibrium number of competing regions is inefficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of the interplay between the two objectives of equity and efficiency for national policy-makers in charge of regional policy is becoming topical once again in regional economics. This paper first reviews this issue theoretically and looks at recent literature contributions to show that, although many advances have been made, little attention has been paid to the effects of regional structural differences on the trade-off between the two objectives. Then, to demonstrate that differences between the regions of which a country is composed may influence the results of the models, a new simple short-run two-country four-region model is introduced to study the trade-off (differentiating for different regional productivity and different strengths of agglomeration economies—which are innovatively modelled on the demand side). In this short-term model, the national policy-maker can affect entrepreneurship through the set-up costs of firms. Similarly to the traditional literature, for countries composed of identical regions, spatially dispersed allocations of public support to production are more efficient with low agglomeration economies whereas spatially concentrated allocations are more efficient with high agglomeration economies. As the regions become different, however, unbalanced allocations of public support to the most advanced region become more efficient even in the case of relatively weak agglomeration economies, until, when regions are sufficiently different, the most efficient allocation of public support to production is always concentrated in the most advanced territories. If some sort of compensating mechanisms were available, in the short-run the policy-makers could decide to support the competitiveness of the already more-productive regions and transfer income to the lagging ones. All these issues are studied with reference to southern Italy (“Mezzogiorno”) and eastern Germany (former DDR) in order to show not only the similarities with the model’s predictions but also the many differences, resulting from the far greater complexity of actual development processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The level of revenues pocketed by a government during the fiscal year often deviates from that projected by this government in its budget. Despite a flourishing literature on, for example, the technical or procedural determinants of such forecast errors, little is yet known about how political stratagems may affect forecast errors. In the present paper, we analyse whether differences in the level of government fragmentation are useful in explaining local government tax revenue forecast errors—controlling for various other factors. Using data on 242 Flemish municipalities for the period 1992–2002, we find that two-party governments are more optimistic than single-party governments. In contrast to our initial expectations, governments with at least three parties are significantly more careful (or less optimistic) in their revenue projections than single- or two-party governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When both vertical and horizontal externalities are at work in a federation, they generally distort levels of taxation in opposite directions. This article is an extension of the Keen and Kotsogiannis (Am Econ Rev March: 363–370, 2002) model. It focuses on state tax policy when states provide an industrial public good increasing firms’ marginal productivity rather than a residential public good intended to households. We find that some results related to whether equilibrium state taxes are likely to be too high or too low are much more complex when state-provided industrial public goods are considered. First, we show that in the presence of industrial public goods, a dominant vertical externality may result in state tax rates being too low (and not too high as it is the case with residential public goods). Second, we find that under certain conditions, horizontal and vertical externalities may point in the same direction and reinforce each other towards tax rates being too high or too low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, it is shown that integrated tariffs can be used to extract the consumer’s surplus when there are a lot of connections supplied so that the law of large numbers applies in the estimation of the consumer’s willingness to pay. The time validity limitations of tickets are explained by a nonlinear pricing approach. Links between optimal pricing in local public transport and network characteristics are highlighted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]