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The notion of the "Self" is one of the most critical issues in contemporary cognitive science. Whether the self is a single and independent real entity or a collection of constantly changing experiences has been at the core of debates between the substance theory and the illusion theory. Compared to the neglect of this issue in Western tradition studies, the meticulous practice of mindfulness/awareness in Eastern research traditions has long focused on this contradiction. This paper navigates the intricate dimensions of the "Self" by weaving together the Oriental framework of the five aggregates with the Middle Way, the principles of constructivism, and the empirical methodologies of experimental philosophy. This approach bridges the gap by synthesizing introspective first-person experiences with objective third-person scientific observations to enrich the understanding of self-constructivism. The implications of these findings extend into the practical realms of psychology and philosophy, offering a scaffold for future research to elucidate the multifaceted nature of the self further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Their important exegetical and philosophical disagreements notwithstanding, Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek, on the one hand, and Alyssa Bernstein, on the other, seem to agree that Kant's Categorical Imperative transcends the contemporary dichotomy between moral realism and ethical constructivism. My contribution is an attempt to further elaborate on the third, unique, conceptual option that they have identified. I employ the notion of an "enabling condition," introduced in epistemology and action theory by Jonathan Dancy, in order to show that the Categorical Imperative enables action and is enabled by action. The Categorical Imperative (as distinct from specific categorical imperatives and moral laws) is discussed as a structural, but still normative, coherence and consistence norm of practical reasoning. As such it is two things at the same time, namely, first, the most fundamental normative background condition of practical deliberation, choice, and action. Second, however, the mutual enabler-enablee-relationship between action and Categorical Imperative points in the other – "not-so-Kantian" – direction as well: individual practical deliberation, understood as the mundane phenomenon that penetrates the lives of agents, is the (existence) condition that enables the Categorical Imperative in normatively-structured action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I distinguish Local Constructivism (humans play a constitutive role in constructing some of the objects we have epistemic access to) from Global Constructivism (humans play a constitutive role in constructing all of the objects we have epistemic access to). I explicate and clarify Local Constructivism and show how the metaphysical concerns which motivate endorsing Local Constructivism about some objects (e.g. social objects, modal objects) differ from the epistemic and semantic concerns which motive endorsing Global Constructivism. I, then, examine the criticisms Realists typically present against Constructivism. I argue that, although these criticisms undermine Global Constructivism, Local Constructivism is immune to them. If one has anti-Realist inclinations, but wishes to avoid the morass anti-Realism usually falls into (aka: anti-Realist Boogeyman), one should endorse Local, rather than Global, Constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assertions about appearances license inferences about the speaker's perceptual experience. For instance, if I assert, Tom looks like he's cooking, you will infer both that I am visually acquainted with Tom (what I call the individual acquaintance inference), and that I am visually acquainted with evidence that Tom is cooking (what I call the evidential acquaintance inference). By contrast, if I assert, It looks like Tom is cooking, only the latter inference is licensed. I develop an account of the acquaintance inferences of appearance assertions building on two main previous lines of research: first, the copy raising literature, which has aimed to account for individual acquaintance inferences through the perceptual source semantic role; second, the subjectivity literature, which has focused on the status of acquaintance inferences with predicates of personal taste, but hasn't given much attention to the added complexities introduced by appearance language. I begin by developing what I take to be the most empirically-sound version of a perceptual source analysis. I then show how its insights can be maintained, while however taking anything about perception out of the truth conditions of appearance sentences. This, together with the assumption that appearance assertions express experiential attitudes, allows us to capture the acquaintance inferences of bare appearance assertions without making incorrect predictions about the behavior of appearance verbs in embedded environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asks whether (and how) our moral duties are created by others' non-compliance and whether we should fulfill them or not. For example, do we need to donate more of our income to eradicate world poverty because billionaires do not donate? If so, how much should we donate? In short, should we make up for others' defaulting on their moral duties – and if so, how and to what extent? Such situations are called non-ideal circumstances in political philosophy. With the increasing importance of non-ideal theories of justice and ethics, the question of how we should act in non-ideal situations has received more attention in the ethics literature in recent years. This article poses and addresses the question of whether we should take up the slack when others do not comply with their own moral duty. This article examines how consequentialism and contractualism might respond to non-ideal situations of taking up the slack and then defends a contractualist-constructivist approach to dealing with these situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivism as a distinct metaethical position has garnered significant interest in recent years due in part to Sharon Street's theory, Humean metaethical constructivism. According to Street's account, practical reasons are constructed by individual valuing entities. On this view, then, whether a particular reason applies to an individual is completely contingent upon what that individual actually values. In this article I argue for the recognition of multiple sources of practical reasons and values, including both individuals and communities. The resulting view, which I call layered constructivism, strengthens the constructivist project and begins to resolve some of the common critiques leveled against Street's Humean constructivism. To begin, layered constructivism retains many of the benefits of Street's approach, such as providing a naturalistic picture of normativity and maintaining a close tie between practical reasons and individual motivation. Moreover, the inclusion of collective sources of normativity and the importance of the resulting values for individuals is supported by recent empirical research on norms. Layered constructivism can also respond to the common concerns that Humean constructivism fails to adequately account for the immense influence our social lives have on our normative reasons and values, and that it entails an objectionable level of contingency. Finally, acknowledging the existence of differently constructed reasons helps us make sense of the pervasive human experience of navigating a variety of seemingly incommensurable normative reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We set forth what one may call a "constitutional reading" in opposition to the traditional widespread "constructivist reading" of the object of cognition. In the light of the so-called one-object view reading of Transcendental idealism, the object of cognition is nothing but the object that exists in itself insofar as it appears to our cognitive apparatus. The object exists mind-independently, while our cognition of the same object must be mind-independent. The constructivist reading mistakes the epistemological problem of how we come to cognize mind-dependently that what we represent ("the constitutional view") are mind-independent objects with the Berkelian ontological problem of how we construct objects out of an undifferentiated, unstructured manifold (the constructivist view) My diagnosis is as follows. The first reason is the traditional "two-worlds view" reading of Kant's idealism: if we take what exists in itself and the object of cognition as distinct things, then we must conclude that the object of cognition is a mind-dependent construction. Constructivist readers mistake the mind-dependent nature of our human cognition of objects for the putative mind-dependent nature of the known object. The second reason is overintellectualization. Constructivist readers mistake the objectifying syntheses of the imagination, below the threshold of self-consciousness, for cognitive conceptual operations by means of which we cognize (erkennen) the objects of cognition, or so I shall argue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ihde has developed what he calls a postphenomenology and a material hermeneutics of human-technology relations (in particular, he distinguishes between embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity and background relations), as well as a concomitant cultural hermeneutics that maps technologies' cultural embeddedness. As such he argues against an overly theoreticist approach to our predicament that he observes in both Ihde and Stiegler, irrespective of their empirical (Ihde) or transcendental (Stiegler) stance, and suggests a profoundly experiential approach, i.e., a philosophizing I from i experience rather than I about i it. Together with a select group of other philosophy of technology scholars, they set out to reflect upon points of convergence and divergence between their respective frameworks - postphenomenology in the case of Ihde and what may be called "techno-phenomenology" and "general organology" in the case of Stiegler - as well as on the near-future form that philosophy of technology should take, in a world struggling with multiple global crises - the planetary ecological crisis being the gravest and most challenging one. As Ihde declares at the end of his 2010 book I Heidegger's Technologies i : 'Philosophies of technology need to renew themselves constantly, just as the technologies themselves change' (Ihde [10], 139). [Extracted from the article]

It has often been claimed, e.g. by William James or Aldous Huxley, that mystical experiences across times and cultures exhibit a striking similarity. Even though the words and images we use to describe them are different, underneath the surface we find a common experiential core. Others have rejected this claim and argued that all experiences are intrinsically shaped by the mystics' pre-existing religious concepts. Against these constructivist objections, I defend the idea of a common core by arguing that even if all experience is interpreted through concepts, there could still be a common core. Those who reject the common core thesis usually argue that no distinction between experience and interpretation can be made since all experience is per se already interpreted. The notion of an uninterpreted experience is self-defeating. Drawing on current research on nonconceptual mental content, I argue (a) that experiences can have nonconceptual content; (b) that interpretation must be understood as conceptualization and (c) that conceptualization presupposes a raw mental content that is not conceptualized. This raw content is not experienced as nonconceptual. Rather, the nonconceptual, uninterpreted common core is an abstraction which shows itself only through reflection. Thus, the existence of a common core is compatible with the fact that all experiences are interpreted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers an overview of his book "Nietzsche's Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects." He attempts to provide a comprehensive account of Friedrich Nietzsche's material object metaphysics and claim that he is a constructivist. He describes Nietzsche's constructivist concept as flexible and is not limited into defending common sense ontologies but can adapt with the times.

Conceptual constructive models are a type of scientific model that can be used to construct or reshape the target phenomenon conceptually. Though it has received scant attention from the philosophers, it raises an intriguing issue of how a conceptual constructive model can construct the target phenomenon in a conceptual way. Proponents of the conception of conceptual constructive models are not being explicit about the application of the constructive force of a model in the target construction. It is far from clear that how a conceptual constructive model exerts its constructive force on the constructed phenomenon of interest. Consequently, the function and the epistemic status of a conceptual constructive model are dubious at best. Making use of the conception of abstraction-as-aggregation, I argue that a conceptual constructive model can be used to construct the phenomenon of interest conceptually via a two-step process of abstraction: (1) abstracting away the lower-level details; and (2) aggregating the relevant information into a higher-level composite element. I contend that this process of abstraction, which is not playing the representational role as in a typical representational model, confers the constructive force on a model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents a critical discussion of Justin Remhof's book "Nietzsche's Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects" which specifically focuses on a version of the paradox of conceptualizability. He explores the two theses about material objects and construction which are constitutively dependent on social practices and are socially constructed. He presents the standard principle about the logic of the paradox of conceptualizability.

Like Kant, the German Idealists, and many neo-Kantian philosophers before him, Nietzsche was persistently concerned with metaphysical questions about the nature of objects. His texts often address questions concerning the existence and non-existence of objects, the relation of objects to human minds, and how different views of objects impact commitments in many areas of philosophy―not just metaphysics, but also language, epistemology, science, logic and mathematics, and even ethics. In this book, Remhof presents a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Nietzsche's material object metaphysics. He argues that Nietzsche embraces the controversial constructivist view that all concrete objects are socially constructed. Reading Nietzsche as a constructivist, Remhof contends, provides fresh insight into Nietzsche's views on truth, science, naturalism, and nihilism. The book also investigates how Nietzsche's view of objects compares with views offered by influential American pragmatists and explores the implications of Nietzsche's constructivism for debates in contemporary material object metaphysics. Nietzsche's Constructivism is a highly original and timely contribution to the steadily growing literature on Nietzsche's thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The status of constructivism as a metaethical or metanormative theory is unclear partly due to the lack of a clear semantics for central normative terms such as 'reason' and 'ought'. In a series of recent papers, Sharon Street has attempted to clarify the central commitments of constructivism by focusing on the idea of a practical point of view and what follows from it. We improve upon the informal understanding provided by Street and attempt to provide a semantics for 'ought'. Our semantics respects the core intuition of the constructivist that normative claims are made true because of our practical commitments as agents and also reflects the constructivist's commitment to the centrality of practical deliberation to normative truth. On our view, a normative claim of the form ⌜S ought to ϕ⌝ is true if ϕ is entailed from S's set of evaluative attitudes. We argue that a virtue of our definition is that it allows us to see precisely what is distinctive about constructivism as opposed to realism and expressivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

G. A. Cohen argues that Rawls's difference principle is incompatible with his endorsement of incentives inequality—higher pay for certain professions is just when that pay benefits everyone. Cohen concludes that Rawls must reject both incentives inequality and 'institutionalism'—the view that egalitarian principles, including the difference principle, apply exclusively to social institutions. I argue that the premises of Cohen's 'internal criticism' of Rawls require rejecting two important parts of his theory: a 'subjective circumstance of justice' and a 'shared conception of justice'. These are important parts of Rawls's 'constructivism'. Constructivism is the view that a conception of justice is the solution to a practical interaction problem and is solved in part by examining the facts of the problem. Thus, an upshot of my arguments is that this Cohen/Rawls dispute reduces to another dispute over 'constructivism'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most Kantian constructivists try to ground universal duties of interpersonal morality in certain interactions between individuals, such as communication, argumentation, shared action or the second-person standpoint. The goal of this paper is to present these, which I refer to as arguments from the second-person perspective, with a dilemma: either the specific kind of interaction that is taken as a starting point of these arguments is inescapable, but in that case the argument does not justify a universal principle of interpersonal morality. Or interaction does have a principle of interpersonal morality among its necessary conditions of possibility, but such forms of interactions are merely optional. I argue that proponents of arguments from the second-person perspective have failed to provide a convincing response to this dilemma and that this failure is systematic. This suggests that the success of Kantian constructivism depends on the success of arguments from the first person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the iterative conception, each set is formed out of sets that are, in some sense, prior to it. Because priority plays an essential role in explanations of why contradiction-inducing sets, such as the universal set, do not exist, the success of these explanations depends on our ability to make sense of the relevant priority relation. I argue that attempts to do this have fallen short: understanding priority in a straightforwardly constructivist sense threatens the coherence of the empty set and raises serious epistemological concerns; but the leading realist interpretations–ontological and modal interpretations of priority—are deeply problematic as well. I conclude that the purported explanatory virtues of the iterative conception are, at present, unfounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A response from author of the book "Mind and Body in Early China: Beyond Orientalism and the Myth of Holism" to its review by Jim Behuniak. Topics discussed include the theme of social constructivism in the book, role of French theorists in the definition of neo-Orientalism, and Behuniak’s failure in understanding the author's views on Chinese medicine in reference to the mind and body.

Before God created did God have ideas in mind for particular things, kinds of things, properties of things, particular events, and laws of nature? At least since Augustine, theists have proposed differing answers. This paper is about a relatively recent theory, which holds that God constructs them when he creates the universe. James Ross, Brian Leftow, and Hugh McCann are its primary advocates. Since the shared features of their views do not pertain to the so-called "abstract objects" or to the "necessary truths" of mathematics and logic, let us call this "divine possibility constructivism" (DPC), differentiating it from the theistic activism of Christopher Menzel and Thomas Morris and from the voluntarism of René Descartes—both of which could otherwise be construed as "constructivist". According to Ross, Leftow, and McCann, God had nothing in mind before he created—which is to say that, before God created, God was not aware of possibilities for a universe. Rather, God's being aware of any such possibilities is grounded only in God's having constructed them ex nihilo. This paper shows that DPC is incoherent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While constructivism enjoys considerable popularity in higher education, both in Australia and internationally, it nonetheless takes a variety of forms. These different interpretations make it difficult to draw strong conclusions about constructivism as a whole. In this essay, we therefore take a psycho-philosophical approach: reviewing and assessing three major versions of constructivism (radical, psychological and social), from both pedagogic and epistemic standpoints. We find no damaging psychological evidence against moderate pedagogic interpretations of constructivism that encourage a focus on how students learn, noting only that these must still be grounded empirically. We find several convincing philosophical arguments against particular epistemic interpretations, however, and against strong pedagogical interpretations that eschew all teacher direction. We conclude by encouraging Australian higher educators to discard the problematic epistemic and psychological versions of constructivism. To expose students to genuine disciplinary inquiry within the academy, we must retain only those versions of constructivism that are philosophically and pedagogically defensible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers non-standard analysis and a recently introduced computational methodology based on the notion of ① (this symbol is called grossone). The latter approach was developed with the intention to allow one to work with infinities and infinitesimals numerically in a unique computational framework and in all the situations requiring these notions. Non-standard analysis is a classical purely symbolic technique that works with ultrafilters, external and internal sets, standard and non-standard numbers, etc. In its turn, the ①-based methodology does not use any of these notions and proposes a more physical treatment of mathematical objects separating the objects from tools used to study them. It both offers a possibility to create new numerical methods using infinities and infinitesimals in floating-point computations and allows one to study certain mathematical objects dealing with infinity more accurately than it is done traditionally. In these notes, we explain that even though both methodologies deal with infinities and infinitesimals, they are independent and represent two different philosophies of Mathematics that are not in a conflict. It is proved that texts (Gutman et al. in Found Sci 22(3):539-555, 2017; Gutman and Kutateladze in Sib Math J 49(5):835-841, 2008; Kutateladze in J Appl Ind Math 5(1):73-75, 2011) asserting that the ①-based methodology is a part of non-standard analysis unfortunately contain several logical fallacies. Their attempt to show that the ①-based methodology can be formalized within non-standard analysis is similar to trying to show that constructivism can be reduced to the traditional Mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Metaethics is often dominated by both realist views according to which moral claims are made true by either non-natural or natural properties and by non-cognitivist views according to which these claims express desire-like attitudes. It is sometimes suggested that constructivism is a fourth alternative, but it has remained opaque just how it differs from the other views. To solve this problem, this article first describes a clear constructivist theory based on Crispin Wright’s anti-realism. It then outlines an argumentative strategy that can be used to argue against constructivist views about practical reasons. The rest of the article explains how the outlined constructivist metaethical framework, reasons, and contractualism in normative ethics can still be used to create a new viable metaethical constructivist position about right and wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective moral facts are supposed to be independent from us, but it has proven difficult to provide a clear account of this independence condition. Objective moral facts cannot be overly independent of us, as even an objective morality would depend, in important respects, on features of us. The challenge is to respect these moral mind-dependencies without inappropriately counting too many moral facts as objective. In this paper, I delineate and evaluate several different versions of the independence condition in moral objectivity. I raise problems for these ways of formulating moral objectivity and then develop a better account of moral objectivity, one that avoids the pitfalls of other proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper situates the problem of defeaters in a larger debate about the source of normative authority. It argues in favour of a constructivist account of defeasibility, which appeals to the justificatory role of normative principles. The argument builds upon the critique of two recent attempts to deal with defeasibility: first, a particularist account, which disposes of moral principles on the ground that reasons are holistic; and second, a proceduralist view, which addresses the problem of defeaters by distinguishing between provisional and strictly universal principles. The particularist view fails to establish that moral principles have no epistemological import, but it raises important questions about their role in practical reasoning. The proceduralist view fails to distinguish between reasoning by default and reasoning by principles, but it shows that normative principles have a structural justificatory role. The constructivist view recognizes that the moral valence of normative claims vary across contexts, but denies that this is because of holism about reasons. Rather, it defends defeasibility within a constructivist account of reasoning where universality serves as the matrix of judgment. The constructivist view vindicates the justificatory role of universal normative principles, and makes room for some ordinary sources of defeasibility, which are left unaccounted by competing views, and which depend on the agent’s own progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One natural way to argue for the existence of some subjective constraint on agents’ obligations is to maintain that without that particular constraint, agents will sometimes be obligated to do that which they lack the ability to do. In this paper, I maintain that while such a strategy appears promising, it is fraught with pitfalls. Specifically, I argue that because the truth of an ability ascription depends on an (almost always implicit) characterization of the relevant possibility space, different metaethical accounts take obligation to be constrained by different senses of ability. As a result, what initially looks to be a point of consensus—that ability constrains obligation—turns out to be a point of contention, and arguments with this at the foundation are much more likely to obscure, rather than resolve, metaethical disputes. Despite this, appeals to ability in metaethics aren’t doomed to be fruitless. On the contrary, if we can independently establish a particular sense of ability as the normatively relevant one, then we have good grounds for ruling out metaethical accounts that are inconsistent with it. In the final section, I make just such an argument. What seems right about the thought that ability constrains obligation is that an agent cannot be obligated to do that which her circumstances prevent her from doing. I argue that only a sense of ability that is both epistemically and motivationally restricted adequately respects the limits of agential control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two aspects of cognitive coupling, as brought forward in the Extended Mind Hypothesis, are discussed in this paper: (1) how shall the functional coupling between the organism and some entity in his environment be spelled out in detail? (2) What are the paradigmatic external entities to enter into that coupling? These two related questions are best answered in the light of an aetiological variety of functionalist argument that adds historical depth to the 'active externalism' promoted by Clark and Chalmers and helps to counter some of the core criticisms levelled against this view. Under additional reference to conceptual parallels between the Extended Mind Hypothesis and a set of heterodox theories in biology-environmental constructivism, niche construction, developmental systems theory-an argument for the grounding of environmentally extended cognitive traits in evolved biological functions is developed. In a spirit that seeks to integrate extended functionalism with views from cognitive integration and complementarity, it is argued (ad 1) that instances of environmental coupling should be understood as being constitutive to cognitive functions in either of two distinct ways. It is further argued (ad 2) that the historically and systematically prior environmental counterparts in that coupling are features of the natural environment. Language and linguistically imbued artefacts are likely to have descended from more basic relations that have an extension over the environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional sciences often bracket away ambiguity through the imposition of 'enabling constraints'-making a set of assumptions and then declaring ceteris paribus. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions or 'uceps.' Second order science reveals hidden issues, problems and assumptions which all too often escape the attention of the practicing scientist. These hidden values-precisely because they are hidden and not made explicit-can get in the way of the public's acceptance of a scientific claim. A conflict in understood meaning-between the scientist's restricted claims and the public's broader understanding of those same claims can result in cognitive dissonance or the equivalent of the Mori Uncanny Valley. Scientists often react to these differences by claiming 'incommensurability' between their restricted claim and the public's understanding. Second order science, by explicating the effects of variations in values assumed for these uceps and associated impacts on related scientific claims, can often moot these assertions of incommensurability and thereby promote greater scientific understanding. This article explores how second order science can address issues of public doubt regarding the scientific enterprise using examples from medicine, diet and climate science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we understand the notion of moral objectivity? Metaethical positions that vindicate morality's objective appearance are often associated with moral realism. On a realist construal, moral objectivity is understood in terms of mind-, stance-, or attitude-independence. But realism is not the only game in town for moral objectivists. On an antirealist construal, morality's objective features are understood in virtue of our attitudes. In this paper I aim to develop this antirealist construal of moral objectivity in further detail, and to make its metaphysical commitments explicit. I do so by building on Sharon Street's version of 'Humean Constructivism'. Instead of the realist notion of attitude-independence, the antirealist account of moral objectivity that I articulate centres on the notion of standpoint-invariance. While constructivists have been criticized for compromising on the issue of moral objectivity, I make a preliminary case for the thesis that, armed with the notion of standpoint-invariance, constructivists have resources to vindicate an account of objectivity with just the right strength, given the commitments of ordinary moral thought and practice. In support of this thesis I highlight recent experimental findings about folk moral objectivism. Empirical observations about the nature of moral discourse have traditionally been taken to give prima facie support to moral realism. I argue, by contrast, that from what we can tell from our current experimental understanding, antirealists can capture the commitments of ordinary discourse at least as well as realists can. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the conceptual frameworks that have underscored the social scientific study of Jewish identity and experiments with a methodological and analytical approach that aims to respond to contemporary social trends. Beginning with a historical account of the concept's emergence in the study of American Jews, we consider the ways in which scholars and their research subjects have co-constructed the concept of Jewish identity. Based on our analysis of qualitative interviews with fifty-eight post-boomer American Jews, we propose that Jewish identity be understood primarily as a relational phenomenon that is constructed through social ties, rather than as a product of individual meaning-making or assessments of social impact. We set our exploratory findings in conversation with some of the most influential and widely cited qualitative studies of Jewish identity in the past to examine the implications of that conceptual shift for scholars and scholarship on Jewish identity in the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on two questions: (1) Is understanding intimately bound up with accurately representing the world? (2) Is understanding intimately bound up with downstream abilities? We will argue that the answer to both these questions is 'yes', and for the same reason-both accuracy and ability are important elements of orthogonal evaluative criteria along which understanding can be assessed. More precisely, we will argue that representational-accuracy (of which we assume truth is one kind) and intelligibility (which we will define so as to entail abilities) are good-making features of a state of understanding. Interestingly, both evaluative claims have been defended by philosophers in the literature on understanding as the criterion of evaluation. We argue that proponents of both approaches have important insights and that, drawing on both their own observations and a few novel arguments, we can construct a more complete picture of understanding evaluation. We thus posit the theory of there being Multiple Understanding Dimensions. The main thing to note about our dualism regarding the evaluative criteria of understanding is that it accounts for the intuitions about cases underlying both previously held positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including meta-ethical constructivism, willful ignorance, and moral progress.

Michael Dummett presents a modus tollens argument against a Wittgensteinian conception of meaning. In a series of papers, Dummett claims that Wittgensteinian considerations entail strict finitism. However, by a 'sorites argument', Dummett argues that strict finitism is incoherent and therefore questions these Wittgensteinian considerations. In this paper, I will argue that Dummett's sorites argument fails to undermine strict finitism. I will claim that the argument is based on two questionable assumptions regarding some strict finitist sets of natural numbers. It will be shown that strict finitism entails none of these assumptions. Hence, the argument does not prove that the view is internally incoherent, and consequently, Dummett fails to undermine the Wittgensteinian conception of meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constitutivists explicitly emphasize the importance of self-reflection for rational agency. Interestingly enough, there is no clear account of how and why self-reflection plays such an important role for these views. My aim in this paper is to address this underappreciated problem for constitutivist views and to determine whether constitutivist self-reflection is normatively oriented. Understanding its normative features will allow us to evaluate a potential way that constitutivism may meet its purported metaethical promise. I begin by showing why constitutivism, as exemplified by Korsgaard's and Velleman's respective views, takes self-reflection to be a constitutive feature of rational agency. Closer examination of this claim suggests three underappreciated problems for the constitutivist's apparent reliance on self-reflection. First, we have no picture of the specific role that self-reflection plays. Second, it is unclear in what sense it is a requirement for full-fledged agency and, thereby, for self-constitution. Third, it is not clear whether it has any necessary normative features, even given the often cited moral normativity associated with constitutivism. In §1, I will address the first and second questions. §2 will be dedicated to considering the third question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The introduction summarizes the main arguments formulated in the six papers of this special issue on Constitutivism and Kantian Constructivism in Ethical Theory. We highlight the unifying theme addressed in the essays, i.e., the question of whether constitutivism is able to fulfill the promise of providing an account of normativity starting from relatively slender assumptions, including the avoidance of realist presuppositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central element of constitutivist accounts of categorical normativity is the claim that the ultimate foundation of the relevant kind of practical authority is sourced in certain tasks, features, and aims that every person inevitably possesses and inescapably has to deal with. We have no choice but to be agents and this fact is responsible for the norms and principles that condition our agency-related activities to have anunconditional normative grip on us. Critics of constitutivism argue that it is exactly because of itsinescapability that agency is a powerless source of normative authority. I investigate why our intuitionsconcerning the appeal to inescapability point into such contrary directions. Why do we feel the attraction ofgrounding categorical normativity in phenomena that not even the skeptic can ignore, on the one hand, butseem to hold dear the principle that 'ought implies need not,' on the other? Instead of fully developing thethird, neutral, way of conceptualizing the relationship between inescapability and normativity that theimpasse between constitutivists and their critics suggests, this paper diagnoses the disagreement at hand.That agency is inescapable does neither guarantee nor rule out its status qua source of categoricalnormativity. Both camps of the debate overlook this option and depict their opponents as adhering to animplausible perspective of how appeals to inescapability and unconditional normativity are related. Sincethe debate relies on a false dichotomy it is not surprising that its participants so often talk past each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic - whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard's transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate by defending a robust conception of construction, which names a distinctive view of practical reasoning as transformative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don't state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear. Despite the growing literature on Kant's moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant's answer to this apparent dilemma is. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's response to a comment on his book review on Edward Slingerland's book "Mind and Body in Early China: Beyond Orientalism and the Myth of Holism." Topics discussed include body-mind relations, criticism of Slingerland's comments stating the author as a postmodern neo-Orientalist and social constructivist, and Slingerland's focus on gaining attention from Chinese philosophers.

In the article, mathematicians Absalom and Consuela present their views on ethical aspects of mathematics. Topics discussed include difference in opinion between the two related to ethical implications of mathematical knowledge; explanation in support of mathematical ethics by Consuela such as mathematical proof to validate problems, refinement and development of mathematical concepts, and social constructivism as mathematical philosophy; and counter arguments of Absalom on the same.

The primary aim of the present study is to extend discussions of navigating an emerging transgender or gender nonconforming (TGNC) identity during youth and young adulthood in a society in which TGNC identities remain invisible and marginalized. Participants include 13 racially/ethnically diverse TGNC young adults ages 18-29 in the United States. Constructivist grounded theory methods were used to collect, analyze, and interpret data. Navigating a TGNC Identity in the Dark emerged as a journey from initial recognition of an existing, but unidentifiable, difference toward awareness and acceptance of a TGNC identity. Analyses revealed six themes associated with navigating identity: Moving from Uncertainty to Knowing, Recognizing Self in Others, Finding Me, Explaining Work, Struggling for Authenticity, and Evolving Self-Acceptance. Narratives highlighted the complex journeys toward authenticity that included pervasive oppression. Findings from my study can be used to inform clinical work aimed at supporting TGNC individuals as they recognize and make meaning of their TGNC identities. Moreover, findings underscore the importance of increasing the level of visibility and affirmation of a range of TGNC identities and experiences in dominant institutions (e.g., media, schools, health care) in the lives of youth as a way to facilitate self-understanding and acceptance at earlier ages and with fewer obstacles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Universalist' moral principles have fallen into disfavour because too often they have been pretexts for unilateral impositions upon others, whether domestically or internationally. Too widely neglected has been Kant's specifically Critical re-analysis of the scope and character of rational justification in all non-formal domains, including the entirety of epistemology and moral philosophy, including both justice and ethics. Rational judgment is inherently normative because it is in part constituted by our self-assessment of whether the considerations we now integrate into a candidate judgment have been integrated as they ought, so as to form a cogent, justifiable judgment. Constitutive of this self-assessment is that rational judgments must be based upon considerations which can be communicated to all others, such that they too can assess them as sufficiently cogent justification; also constitutive of this rational self-assessment is that we actually engage with others who do assess our judgments. Kant's Critical principles rule out in principle any unilateral imposition upon others, whether in cognition or morals. Using Kant's Critical principles and methods in connection with 'practical anthropology' and the enormously important domain of acquired rights and obligations shows how Kant had already justified fundamentally universal principles of justice which can be institutionalised in variously distinctive cultures, and which form the proper bases for our acquired, specifically social rights and obligations, including those of friendship and community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today's children grow up surrounded by computers. They observe them, interact with them and, as a consequence, start forming conceptions of how they work and what they can do. Any constructivist approach to learning requires that we gain an understanding of such preconceived ideas and beliefs in order to use computers as learning tools in an effective and informed manner. In this paper, we present five such conceptions that children reportedly form about computers, based on an interdisciplinary literature review. We then evaluate how persistent these conceptions appear to be over time and in light of new technological developments. Finally, we discuss the relevance and implications of our findings for education in the contexts of conceptual pluralism and conceptual categorisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two primary aims of the present study were: (1) to test the constructive pessimism hypothesis in relation to pro-environmental behavior, and (2) to clarify the relationship between pro-environmental behavior and anthropocentric values. Specifically, we focused on the idea that pessimistic anticipation of the future might facilitate actions aimed at avoiding an undesirable future, and that it may also be effective for reducing the pessimistic outlook about the future (i.e., 'constructive pessimism'). Results of structural equation modeling using questionnaire survey data obtained in Tsukuba City, Japan (n = 300) confirmed that pessimistic anticipation of future subjective well-being facilitated pro-environmental behavior in the present. We also confirmed that both ecocentric and anthropocentric values facilitated pro-environmental behavior. Results suggest that psychological factors surrounding pro-environmental behavior, including constructive pessimism, should be taken into consideration in developing better policy interventions to facilitate such behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Systems thinking provides insights into how ideas interact and change, and constructivism is an example of this type of systemic approach. In the 1970s constructivism emphasised the development of mathematical and scientific ideas in children. Recently constructivist ideas are applied much more generally. Here I use this approach to consider beliefs and their role in conflicts and the conditions needed for reconciliation. If we look at Reality in terms of how we construct it as a human cognitive process, we recognise two things. First, that we cannot go beyond our senses and thoughts to what exists independently of us, and second, if we construct what we know we have to take responsibility for this. This inevitably focuses our thinking on the relation we have with the physical and social world, we are a part of the universe rather than apart from it. This paper argues that accepting and understanding these limits of human knowing together with our interconnectedness provide opportunities to understand conflicting positions. To resolve conflict, people with opposing viewpoints have to be prepared to understand each other. That is a challenge because our own reality plays a vital role in our lives, for everything from personal survival to social support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stereotypes of social construction suggest that the existence of social constructs is accidental and that such constructs have arbitrary and subjective features. In this paper, I explore a conception of social construction according to which it consists in the collective imposition of function onto reality and show that, according to this conception, these stereotypes are incorrect. In particular, I argue that the collective imposition of function onto reality is typically non-accidental and that the products of such imposition frequently have non-arbitrary and objective features. These conclusions are interesting in and of themselves since they debunk important aspects of our socially constructed conception of social construction. Yet, additionally, they have important implications for the viability of mathematical social constructivism since resistance to such constructivism is frequently grounded in the observation that mathematics is non-accidental, non-arbitrary, and objective. As a secondary focus, I explore these implications in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the book "Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy" by Bernard Williams is presented. It argues that Kantian constructivism provides the resources to adequately address moral objectivity. It mentions that moral objectivism is the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics or morality is universally valid, without any further semantic or metaphysical claim. It examines the relation of objective features of moral claims with the subjective experience of moral agents.

I provide an explicit formulation of empirical adequacy, the central concept of constructive empiricism, and point out a number of problems. Based on one of the inspirations for empirical adequacy, I generalize the notion of a theory to avoid implausible presumptions about the relation of theoretical concepts and observations, and generalize empirical adequacy with the help of approximation sets to allow for lack of knowledge, approximations, and successive gain of knowledge and precision. As a test case, I provide an application of these generalizations to a simple interference phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central feature of ordinary moral thought is that moral judgment is mind-independent in the following sense: judging something to be morally wrong does not thereby make it morally wrong. To deny this would be to accept a form of subjectivism. Neil Sinclair () makes a novel attempt to show how expressivism is simultaneously committed to (1) an understanding of moral judgments as expressions of attitudes and (2) the rejection of subjectivism. In this paper, I discuss Sinclair's defense of anti-subjectivist moral mind-independence on behalf of the expressivist, and I argue that the account does not fully succeed. An examination of why it does not is instructive, and it reveals a fundamental dilemma for the expressivist. I offer a suggestion for how the expressivist might respond to the dilemma and so uphold Sinclair's defense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This reply to Gash's (Found Sci ) commentary on Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech (Found Sci ) answers the questions raised and at the same time opens up new questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]