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We investigate the impact of the financial cycle on fiscal policy by estimating fiscal multipliers for different types of government spending that are contingent on two states determined by the financial cycle. To obtain our estimates, we extend the threshold VAR method from a single country to a panel of high-income countries. Our results indicate that the multiplier for government investment is affected by the state of the financial cycle: while the initial impact is positive for both states, in an upturn it turns negative, while in a downturn it remains positive. In the case of government consumption, the multiplier does not seem to significantly depend on the financial cycle. However, jointly conditioning on the financial and business cycles produces multipliers of government consumption which vary over the states of both cycles. This contrasts with the results for government investment which are left essentially unchanged by the joint conditioning on the four states defined by both cycles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper demonstrates that endogenous fluctuations are possible in the market for loans. In the context of a three-period overlapping generations economy, the deposit rates offered to lenders are found to exhibit complex dynamics when financial intermediaries mediate borrowing and lending. Constant relative risk aversion of savers is found to generate a first-order nonlinear equation in the deposit rates. Concavity and convexity assumptions of production and savings functions are found to generate a type of dynamic relationship between the loan rates that is well known in the literature for generating complex dynamics. While the main analysis is conducted with general functions, an example is provided to support the theory presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Behavioral biases may influence bank decisions when granting credit to their customers. This paper explores this possibility in an experimental setting, contributing to the literature in two ways. First, we designed a business simulation game that replicates the basic decision-making processes of a bank granting credit to clients under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Second, we implemented a series of short tests to measure participants' overconfidence and risk profile according to prospect theory and then conduct an experimental implementation of the simulation game. We find that higher levels of overprecision and risk seeking for gains (mostly attributable to distortion of probabilities) foster lower prices and higher volumes of credit, and reduce quality. The most consistent result is that distortion of probabilities affects the ability to discriminate between the quality of borrowers according to objective information, fostering strategies of lower loan prices to lower quality clients. The external validity of the results is also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We assess the relation between asset reliability and security prices. Concerns about asset reliability are increasing with the move to fair value accounting in general purpose financial reports. We provide pertinent evidence from credit markets. A key benefit of using credit market data to explore the capital market implications of asset reliability is the theoretical basis of Duffie and Lando (Econometrica 69(3):633-664, ). They show that asset reliability (measurement) concerns should be concentrated in short-term credit spreads. Thus a focus on credit term structure can facilitate a cleaner identification of the impact of asset reliability on security prices. We find that asset reliability issues, attributable to SFAS 157 disclosures of Level 2 and, especially, Level 3 financial assets for a set of US financial institutions over the period of August 2007 to March 2009, are a significant determinant of short-term credit spreads and the shape of the general credit term structure. Our findings are robust to a variety of control variables and research design choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We outline a parsimonious empirical model to assess the relative usefulness of accounting- and equity market-based information to explain corporate credit spreads. The primary determinant of corporate credit spreads is the physical default probability. We compare existing accounting-based and market-based models to forecast default. We then assess whether the credit market completely incorporates this default information into credit spreads. We find that credit spreads reflect information about forecasted default rates with a significant lag. This unique evidence suggests a role for value investing in credit markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last decade has seen rapid growth in trading of credit instruments on secondary markets. The ensuing availability of a rich set of credit market data has created a novel environment for testing a variety of financial economic theories. In this discussion, we provide a simple framework for linking asset pricing research using equity and credit market data and offer some suggestions for future archival empirical research aiming to establish relations between financial information and credit markets. Credit instruments are intrinsically linked to equity instruments. The strength of this link varies temporally and cross-sectionally in measurable ways that can, and should be, used to guide future empirical research linking information to credit markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent financial crisis has provoked a raft of contending claims as to whether the cause of the crisis is better attributed to market failure or political failure. Such claims are predicated on a presumption that markets and polities are meaningfully separate entities. To the contrary, we argue that contemporary arrangements create an entangled political economy that renders theorizing based on separation often misleading. Within this alternative framework of entangled political economy, we illuminate both the recent Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) and the New Deal's National Recovery Administration (NRA). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes a mechanism designed to induce commercial banks to increase their willingness to extend loans in an economic environment characterized by increased uncertainty and diminished expectations. This mechanism is a new tool for the conduct of monetary policy to combat recessions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. policies to promote home ownership and other banking regulatory decisions helped to create a highly leveraged international market for mortgage-based securities. Declines in the price of housing, consequently, had major effects on the balance sheets and portfolios of financial institutions throughout the world. The political response to the financial crisis has been rapid and large. In general, differences in the effectiveness of government policies show the advantage of standing institutions at crisis management relative to innovative legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using local market employment rates as our measure of economic performance, we find a positive and significant correlation between the average annual level of employment in a local market and the level of SBA guaranteed lending in that local market. Furthermore, the intensity of this correlation is much larger in low-income markets. Indeed, our results suggest that this correlation is positive and significant only in low-income markets. This result has important implications for public policy in general and SBA guaranteed lending in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We model credit contracting and bidding in a first-price sealed-bid auction when bidder valuation and wealth are private information. An efficient separating equilibrium exists only if the wealth levels of both bidder types are sufficiently different. If not. high-valuation bidders signal by borrowing more and using less of their wealth - this is inefficient as wealth is a cheaper source of funds. An increase in the amount of borrowing required to signal does not necessarily decrease seller expected revenue. In contrast to separating equilibria, high-valuation bidders adopt pure strategy bids in pooling equilibria. Conditions are identified under which the lower bound on winning bids is higher in pooling than separating equilibria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several European countries base their anti-usury laws on the definition of interest ceilings. Underlying this approach is the identification of high interest rates with the usurious nature of the relative credit contract; hence usury is nothing more than a particularly onerous credit contract. The present paper contradicts this traditional view by presenting a general micro-founded model of credit contracts that arrives at a few conclusions, before in a static and then in a dynamic contest. Firstly, it demonstrates the specificity of the usury contract with respect to the bank contract, pointing up the particular nature of those who supply and demand usurious credit. Secondly, it demonstrates that in environmental situations with little protection of property rights and a propensity to illegality, the decision of a borrower to turn to a usurer may be efficient from the Pareto standpoint and thus not the result of a rationing equilibrium in the bank credit market, as is commonly thought. Thirdly, it deduces from this the insubstantial link between 'interest rate level and the usurious nature of the contract.' Hence two consequences for policy: (a) it is more effective to combat usury by improving the laws and law enforcement to better protect property rights, rather than introduce rate ceilings; and (b) in any case, the usury market can be reduced but not eliminated, since it is a meeting place for particular borrowers and lenders of funds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]