Search

In this paper we introduce hypersequent-based frameworks for the modelling of defeasible reasoning by means of logic-based argumentation and the induced entailment relations. These structures are an extension of sequent-based argumentation frameworks, in which arguments and the attack relations among them are expressed not only by Gentzen-style sequents, but by more general expressions, called hypersequents. This generalization allows us to overcome some of the known weaknesses of logical argumentation frameworks and to prove several desirable properties of the entailments that are induced by the extended (hypersequent-based) frameworks. It also allows us to incorporate as the deductive base of our formalism some well-known logics (like the intermediate logic LC, the modal logic S5, and the relevance logic RM), which lack cut-free sequent calculi, and so are not adequate for standard sequent-based argumentation. We show that hypersequent-based argumentation yields robust defeasible variants of these logics, with many desirable properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Formal models of scientific inquiry, aimed at capturing socio-epistemic aspects underlying the process of scientific research, have become an important method in formal social epistemology and philosophy of science. In this introduction to the special issue we provide a historical overview of the development of formal models of this kind and analyze their methodological contributions to discussions in philosophy of science. In particular, we show that their significance consists in different forms of 'methodological iteration' (Elliott 2012) whereby the models initiate new lines of inquiry, isolate and clarify problems with existing knowledge claims, and stimulate further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a survey of some recent results relating Dung-style semantics for different types of logical argumentation frameworks and several forms of reasoning with maximally consistent sets (MCS) of premises. The related formalsims are also examined with respect to some rationality postulates and are carried on to corresponding proof systems for non-monotonic reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]