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Given wuwei 無為 describes the life praxis of the sage and statecraft of the enlightened ruler while also denoting the comportment of the Dao 道—an alternating state of quiet dormancy and creative activity—are the standard translations of wuwei as "nonaction" or "effortless action" up to the task? They are not, it will be argued, in that they fail to convey the true profundity of wuwei. The objective of this essay is twofold: to show that wuwei is better understood as "abiding harmony" than nonaction, and to demonstrate this via a close reading of the Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (Master Lü's Spring and Autumn Annals) which makes wuwei the epicenter of its doctrine of "the Dao of the ruler." Indeed, the Lüshi Chunqiu's unique application of wuwei lies not only in its borrowing of Daoist and Legalist norms, but in having the ruler meet the following prerequisites: be without knowledge, keep the senses and heart-mind pure, be reliant on others, follow Yin 陰 and Yang 陽, and study the course of heaven and earth to know the ways of humanity. There is, therefore, more to wuwei than meets the eye. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jean-Paul Sartre and Jan Patočka claim to go beneath the phenomenal correlation between the subject and the world discovered by Husserl in order to account for it from a more fundamental plane. Their going below the "universal a priori of correlation" allows them to describe it more thoroughly. But we wish to show that Sartre's description remains dependent on a philosophical realism which prevents him from accounting for the genesis of the correlation. Patočka, however, achieves just this thanks to his conception of an originary appearing. To verify this thesis, we will investigate the status of the body in both authors, so far as a successful account of the body should ensure the connection between the original plane and the openness to the world characteristic of the subject. Recognizing this function in the body, we ask if either Sartre's or Patočka's philosophy grants to the body the place it deserves and suggest that only Patočka achieves this, while Sartre is prevented from doing so by his realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In chapters three and four of Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, and Feminism, Nancy Bauer attempts to divide the ontological explanations from Sartre and Hegel on the master/slave dialectic. She suggests that Sartre's ontology of the master/slave dialectic results in an explanation of the in-itself, the for-itself, and being-for-others as essentially immobile, pessimistic and rooted in a misogynistic perception that one must be master over the Other in order to obtain radical freedom. Bauer believes De Beauvoir to reappropriate the Hegelian view over the Sartrean view, leading to a more optimistic account in support of a more egalitarian feministic approach to the issues of self-consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I describe a distinctive kind of fear that is generated by a vivid recognition of one's mortal nature. I name it 'existential shock'. This special fear does not take our future annihilation as any kind of harm, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. One puzzling feature of existential shock is that it is experienced as disclosing an important truth, yet attempts to specify this revelatory content bring us back to familiar facts about one's inevitable death. But how can I discover something that I already knew? I argue that in our everyday lives, we are in the grip of deeply entrenched patterns of thought and feeling that prevent the knowledge of our mortality from being fully assimilated. Rather, we merely 'pay lip service' to the facts of our mortality. I propose that existential shock involves a distinctive mode of presentation of oneself as a mortal being, in a way that cuts through subtle layers of denial that govern our lives. I develop this thesis by utilizing and synthesizing ideas from several traditions, including the work of Samuel Scheffler, Mark Johnston, Martin Heidegger, and Jay L. Garfield. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we offer a new solution to the old paradox of nothingness. This new solution develops in two steps. The first step consists in showing how to resolve the contradiction generated by the notion of nothingness by claiming that the contradiction shows the indefinite extensibility of the concept of object. The second step consists in showing that, having accepted the idea of indefinite extensibility, we can have absolute generality without the emergence of the contradiction connected to the absolute notion of nothingness. The idea of indefinite extensibility allows us to have our cake (absolute generality) and to eat it too (avoid commitment to a contradictory notion of nothingness). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is death larger than life and does it annihilate life altogether? This is the basic question discussed in this essay, within a philosophical/existential context. The central argument is that the concept of death is problematic and, following Levinas, the author holds that death cannot lead to nothingness. This accords with the teaching of all religious traditions, which hold that there is life beyond death, and Plato's and Aristotle's theories about the immortality of the soul. In modernity, since the Enlightenment, God and religion have been placed in the margin or rejected in rational discourse. Consequently, the anthropocentric promethean view of man has been stressed and the reality of the limits placed on humans by death deemphasised or ignored. Yet, death remains at the centre of nature and human life, and its reality and threat become evident in the spread of a single virus. So, death always remains a mystery, relating to life and morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of nothingness occupies the thinking of a number of philosophers in the first half of the twentieth-century, with three of the most important responses being those of Henri Bergson, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Surprisingly, however, there has been little discussion of their specific comments on nothingness either individually or comparatively. This paper starts to remedy this by suggesting that, while Bergson dismisses nothingness as a pseudo-problem based in a flawed metaphysical understanding, Heidegger, in What is Metaphysics?, claims that metaphysics entails a covering of being meaning that Bergson's analysis actually depends on and so brings thinking to a questioning of being (=ontology). In turn, Heidegger's insight acts as the transitional point for Sartre who criticizes Bergson's description of nothingness to show that, following Heidegger, nothingness is a real ontological problem. From this insight, Sartre distinguishes between negativity, nothingness, and nihilation to show that the issue of nothingness is intimately connected to the freedom of human consciousness, which, by distinguishing between ontological and practical freedom, reveals that nothingness has ethical and political significance. By way of conclusion, a number of problems in Sartre's account are identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of Nothingness-Japanese mu or Chinese wú 無-is central both to the Kyoto School ( Kyōto gakuha 京都学派) and to important strands of Chinese philosophy. The Kyoto School, which has been active since the 1930s, is arguably modern Japan's most philosophically sophisticated challenge to Western thought. Further, as contemporary East Asia continues to rise in importance, East Asians and Westerners alike are beginning to consider anew the contemporary philosophical relevance of Confucianism, Daoism, and East-Asian Buddhism. These originally Chinese traditions were certainly important influences directly and indirectly on Kyoto School philosophy itself. At the very least, Kyoto thought and Chinese thought share foundational structural resemblances, especially regarding the concept of Nothingness. This study summarizes the concept of Nothingness in the Kyoto School and in Chinese philosophy, and then offers an evaluation of the contemporary relevance and general coherence of this concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the concept of time as it is laid forth in the Daoist text, the Zhuangzi 莊子. Arguing that authentic time lies with cosmogony and not reality as envisioned by humanity, the Zhuangzi casts off the ontology of the present-now in favor of the existentially creative negativity of Dao 道. As the pivot of Dao, nothingness not only allows us to side-step the issue of temporal directionality, it reflects the meontological nature of Daoist cosmology in general. Framing time in terms of the motion of nothingness, this paper concludes that the authentic time of Dao reveals itself through the principle of creation qua rest. Experiencing such temporal self-grounding, the sage becomes existentially awakened such that temporal ekstases becomes unfathomable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While all psychologically competent persons know that they will one day die, this knowledge is typically held at a distance, not fully assimilated. That is, while we do not doubt that we will die, there is another sense in which we cannot fully believe it either. However, on some rare occasions, we can grasp the reality of our mortal nature in a way that is seemingly revelatory, as if the fact is appreciated in a new way. Thomas Nagel calls this experience ‘the expectation of nothingness’. But how can I be shocked by what I already know? After illustrating this phenomenon via examples including Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich, I draw on the work of Thomas Nagel, Tamar Szabo Gendler, Mark Johnston and others to articulate and explain our typical state of believing-yet-not-believing in our inevitable death, and offer a hypothesis as to how this condition is occasionally overcome, so that we grasp our mortality in a more psychologically integrated manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his early essay on transcendence of the ego, Sartre attempted to follow Husserl's Logical Investigations and to draw the consequences of his phenomenological criticism of subjectivity. Both authors have emphasized the elusiveness of the self as a result of intentionality of consciousness. However, Sartre's analysis of ego led him quite far from Husserl's philosophical project, insofar as it was somehow already raising the question about the moral nature of the self, and was thus establishing the basis of the conception of moral consciousness that has been displayed later in Being and Nothingness. This article stresses the importance of such a turn in Sartre's philosophy, which reorients him from a strict description of consciousness toward a moral assessment of the structure of the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Cioranian universe, language and time, both inextricably bound, both chillingly perverse, constitute icons of what is, contextually, an inexorable vision of the human condition. The pairing progenerates specters, phantasms of the void, pernicious and vacuous. It is at the perilous, indeed, the perfidious nexus of enunciation and endlessness-each dreaded, yet each ineluctable-that the dyad adopts an onerous cast. To the extent that discourse configures a cipher of perpetuity, and in that, conversely, any trace of eternity conjures a ceaseless extension of the word, of that very word which begets and embodies postmodern aporia, there lurks in consequence of discourse emitted a palpable trepidation, a confrontation with the ultimate precipice, the unconscionable, inscrutable continuity of nothingness. The deconstructive imperative overtakes the text, from which there is neither scriptural nor metaphysical exit. A curious dynamic, a tangled skein of haunting refrain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medical humanities purchases its presence on the medical side of university campuses by adopting as its own the ends of medicine and medical ethics. It even justifies its presence by asserting promotion of those ends as an ethical imperative, most of all to improve the caring in medical care. As unobjectionable, even praiseworthy, as this imperative appears, it actually constrains the possibilities for interpersonal relationship in the context of medical practice. Development of those possibilities requires openness of self to the existentially challenging ethical imperative to care also literally for nothing at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much ink has been spilled over how Lu Xun's (1881-1936) political views inform his creative writing and how politics and literature are mutually implicated, but the aesthetics of his tragic narratives remains marginal in literary studies. Often lauded as the father of modern Chinese literature, Lu Xun has not only made major contributions to the formation of literary realism but also put his unique vision of tragedy into practice. At the core of his tragic poems and narratives lie the tropes of solitude. The tragic is characterized, not by tragic incident, but by void thereof, by a state of speech-less solitude and nothingness ( xuwu). The aesthetic implications of such a tragic vision are twofold. The creation and consumption of literature in China during the first half of the twentieth century focused on questions of the nation and society, but Lu Xun's solitary characters in The Weeds ask fundamental existential questions while carving a space for a new genre of writing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his writings on the gaze and the body in Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre describes the ways in which bodies are exposed and vulnerable to the anonymous gaze of the other, and how they in the midst of their vulnerability depend entirely on being seen by the gaze for their meaning and their very being. Although it sometimes appears as quite depressingly restrictive, Sartre’s analysis of the gaze and his account of the body offer rich and important resources for recognizing the force of objectifying categories and meanings in the constitution of identities. This article suggests that Sartre’s almost remorseless descriptions of how the body is molded by the gaze of the other provide a productive point of departure for understanding the becoming of singular identities, as they are lived on the margins and in the intersections of established categories which determine them in often oppressive ways. Being marked by difference, whether sexual, ethnic, racial, or other, is in many ways being trapped by the objectifying gaze of the other in such a way that the ability to return the gaze and claim a subject position is deeply circumscribed. The article gives an account of Sartre’s analysis of the phenomenon of the gaze as the force which objectifies me before the other and of his description of the body as it is subjectively experienced as objectified. This “third ontological dimension of the body” captures the tensions inherent in subjectivity and brings to light its perpetual exposure to its own unknown exterior as it is seen and constituted by the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is an attempt to reconstruct and sum up philosophical interpretations of Stavrogin, the main hero of the classic Dostoevsky’s novel “The Devils”, given by the outstanding Russian religious thinkers in the twentieth century. The author emphasizes that, however different can be their philosophical premises, the discussed interpretations of Dostoevsky’s hero are compatible and complementary. Confronting and, above all, synthesizing different points of view, he tries to grasp the basic historiosophical, anthropological and religious ideas of Russian renaissance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the paper I argue that the great impact of empiricism on psychology and the enclosed dualist agenda traps psychological phenomena into subjectivism. By discussing the phenomena of nothingness in biological and cultural life it is argued that meaning must be considered as a phenomenon that represents both a fit and a misfit of the individual with the environment. By stressing the overall presence of nothingness phenomena it is argued how the reduced ontology of empiricism—and its blindness to relations and transformations out of which meaning grows—should be overcome. In human cultural life, transformations are constitutive and ongoing changes are being produced to make sure that continuity as well as discontinuity will happen. The analysis of especially one case—the removal of an Amish school after a shooting episode—serves to prove how meaning grows out of cultural processes as people produce their own conditions of life. From a cultural-ecological point of view, analyzing meaning at the level of individual phenomenology, hence, means analyzing the ‘total psychological situation’ (legacy of Kurt Lewin). This may for instance include analyzing how people live, what they consider important and worth preserving, what must be changed, what are their core values and how do institutional arrangements contribute to keeping up that which is valued or to changing that which is not, etc. Meaning may be viewed the lived-out experience—the domain of self-generativity in human life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I develop a phenomenology of falling ill by presenting, interpreting and developing the basic model we find in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (). The three steps identified by Sartre in this process are analysed, developed further and brought to a five-step model: (1) pre-reflective experience of discomfort, (2) lived, bodily discomfort, (3) suffered illness, (4) disease pondering, and (5) disease state. To fall ill is to fall victim to a gradual process of alienation, and with each step this alienating process is taken to a new qualitative level. Consequently, the five steps of falling ill have not only a contingent chronological order but also a kind of logical order, in that they typically presuppose each other. I adopt Sartre’s focus on embodiment as the core ground of the alienation process, but point out that the alienation of the body in illness is not only the experience of a psychic object, but an experience of the independent life of one’s own body. This facticity of the body is the result neither of the gaze of the other person, nor of a reflection adopting the outer perspective of the other in an indirect way, but is a result of the very otherness of one’s own body, which addresses and plagues us when we fall ill. I use examples of falling ill and being a patient to show how a phenomenology of falling ill can be helpful in educating health-care personnel (and perhaps also patients) about the ways of the lived body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to present for the first time a more systematic account of Edith Stein’s views on death and dying. First, I will argue that death does not necessarily lead us to an understanding of our earthly existence as aevum, that is, an experience of time between eternity and finite temporality. We always bear the mark of our finitude, including our finite temporality, even when we exist within the eternal mind of God. To claim otherwise, is to make identical our eternity with God’s eternity, thereby undermining the traditional Scholastic argument, which Stein holds, that there is no real relation between the being (and, therefore, (a)temporality) of God and the being of human persons. Second, I will argue that Stein excludes the category of potentiality from her discussion of death as a relation between the fullness or actuality of being and nothingness. In fact, death is more a relation between possibility/potentiality and nothingness than a relation between actual fullness and nothingness. What Stein describes as fullness ought to be read as potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of epistemology. Nietzsche is concerned with the anthropology of our lives and languages and how they relate to each other. He attempts to analyze in a systematic manner the resonances and concatenations of meaning which language must contain. For Nietzsche, humans are caught both by the phantasmic fetishes their language creates and in that world which their language engenders, maintains and is engendered by. Discussing the epistemology of nihilism the article says that the hidden linguistic imperatives of categories which men now live under force them towards nothingness. The article also concedes that Nietzsche's understanding is not dissimilar from Karl Marx's in its analysis of the discontents of bourgeois civilization. But whereas the logic of dialectical history permits revolution, the logic of the genealogical does not. For Nietzsche, bourgeois men are driven only into the void and the cunning of history is reduced to an empty laugh.

The article offers the author's insights regarding the metaphysics of death in Georges Bataille and Jean Baudrillard's expenditure and communication. It notes that Bataille describes all communication as criminal, transgressive, and an act of suicide. The author believes that communication is transgressive, and cites that it presupposes the negation of individual and collective projects. It also explores the criticism of Baudillard to the metaphysic of primary expenditure.

The article offers the author's insights on nothingness that holey defects and holey material including vacancies, porosity and aerogels are mode of that are familiar to materials researchers. He says that some vacancies produce color centers such as alkali halides and electrons trapped at vacancy sites. He mentions that another class of holey material are aerogels that benefit from the integration of nothing.