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The article delineates how actors invoke nationalizing accounts—accounts that turn local conditions, actions, and actors into national ones—in everyday talk. Taking the case of Japanese university scientists depicting their commercialization trajectories after the adoption of a set of policies that originated from the U.S., the article delineates how scientists stipulate what they do is Japanese. I outline the discursive practices through which they posit that the cause of others' actions, or of they themselves, derives from some kind of ethno-national distinctiveness. Interviews show how such nationalizing accounts were made through the inevitable gaps between local practices and formal global structures. Scientific and commercialization practices in Japan that deviated from the original form were explained not only through the institutional differences between the U.S. and Japan, but also through lay categories of "culture," ethno-psychology, and readily available tropes about Japanese history. In such nationalizing accounts, what the Japanese scientists did under these new, and explicitly global policies, was argued to be fundamentally Japanese because they were rooted in and caused by the ethno-national character. As new institutional theory suggests, a decoupling between formal rules and local contingencies is a hallmark of any institution. The article further shows that such decoupling could then be used as a resource for everyday nationalism. At least in some cases, the global adoption and the localization of a global form may create an opportunity to enact the nation, contributing to a discourse that posits that an imagined community is distinct and special, precisely as the world becomes more globalized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As in much of the world, the Coronovirus pandemic has dominated South Korean politics in 2020. Compared to other countries, Seoul's approach has been highly nationalist and politicized, as the ruling party lauded its pandemic response as the global standard and linked it to a larger, leftist-nationalist agenda. This "pandemic-leftist" discourse peaked around the April 15 midterm elections, but subsided the following month, as domestic and foreign setbacks arose. To explain, firstly, a competitive-nationalist race to flatten the infection curve encouraged the government to infringe on the civil liberties of infected patients, and society to stigmatize them. Other countries contained Covid-19 without such rights violations and stigma. Secondly, critics distinguished between the government's relative success in pandemic response and its general failures in economic and foreign policies. Instead of asking other countries to learn from one's country, each country would do well to learn from the experiences of others and to continually improve its own policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan and Germany were allies during World War II, and both countries committed crimes. Even though the Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany was unprecedented in history, Japan has also been found guilty of serious misdemeanours. Today, Germany acknowledges the magnitude of its responsibility and strives to deal with this legacy. However, in Japan, we find no consensus on dealing with the matter. Nonetheless, it would be short-sighted to conclude that Germany did a better job than Japan from the outset. In analysing the different approaches to remembrance culture in the two countries, we use the theoretical framework of civil religion to assess the impacts of the respective civil religions on the culture of commemoration. We hereby analyzed the structural factors as well as the influence of individual political behaviour. Immediately after the war, neither Germany nor Japan were interested in coming to terms with their past. Both countries were subject to Western integration, and both countries experienced remarkable economic growth. One of the major differences between both countries concerns civil religion. While Germany no longer relied on strong nationalism-based politics and instead pursued European integration, in Japan. Shintôism has continued to influence feelings of national belonging, making it more difficult to establish a critical dialogue with the past. Further differences are apparent: the Western origin of Japan's constitution, the conflicting international environment in Japan, the late regime change, differences in education and, most importantly, the impacts of generational change in Germany. The 1968 student generation strongly condemned Nazi aggression and demanded that the older generation face responsibility, which strongly contributed to a reappraisal of the past in the public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I analyze my border performances of becoming and being as an embodied text to explicate, elucidate, and elaborate culturally hybrid practices of intercultural transition. I pay close attention to unpack the material realities of my hybridity as I continue to live within and beyond queer (or non-heteronormative) Japan-US transnational borderland. In so doing, I aim to illustrate (dis)connections between my identity negotiation processes and the multiple significances of queer Asian/American male identity construction to disrupt the heteronormative modes of thinking about intercultural transitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of public opinion in Japan in directly influencing the Japanese government's decision to nationalize the Senkaku Islands in 2012. The public mood in Japan is becoming increasingly nationalistic. Although this does not immediately mean the return of militarism in the country, such a mood is especially evident with respect to China. The nationalization of the Islands took place within this nationalistic domestic environment. In the case of the nationalization, public opinion was channeled most notably through Tokyo Governor Ishihara. His plan to purchase the Islands and strong public support for his plan eventually forced the central government's intervention. Prime Minister Noda simply could not force Ishihara to give up his plan because going against such a popular politician who was enjoying strong public support would almost certainly have caused a strong public backlash and resulted in electoral punishment. On the other hand, Noda was also concerned that Tokyo's successful acquisition of the Islands would lead to severe criticism of his government for not properly protecting Japan's territorial integrity. There was also a more serious concern that Ishihara's control of the Islands might lead to a change of the status quo and thus dangerously provoke China. Therefore, Noda had no choice but to intervene and nationalize the Islands. If he was also seeking to mobilize public opinion in his favor, he was not entirely successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the role of nationalism in domestic politics in Japan since 2005 by contrasting the Koizumi and the Abe administration of 2012/2013. It argues that the Koizumi and Abe administrations have exploited nationalism as a means to consolidate political power, move away from faction-based politics toward populism-based politics to weaken factions within the political system with entrenched interests that are counter to or prevent bolder, necessary economic reforms to propel Japan out of 20 years of economic stagnation. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that while each politician has used nationalism to mobilize popular support for their respective administrations, Koizumi's use of nationalism was to achieve an economic agenda while Abe's use of nationalism has been used to achieve his political agenda which includes constitutional reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Chinese nation building in the post-Cold War era from the perspective of foreign policy. It focuses on the role of Japan and the United States as significant 'Others' in Chinese leaders' construction of three major variants of Chinese national identity: as a victim (past), as a developing country (present) and as a great power (future). The article argues that Japan occupies a primary place in the enactment of the past aspect of Chinese identity, while the US plays a major role in its present and, especially, future aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his anthology of socio-political essays, Evolution and Human Life, Oka Asajirō (1868-1944), early twentieth century Japan's foremost advocate of evolutionism, developed a biological vision of the nation-state as super-organism that reflected the concerns and aims of German-inspired Meiji statism and anticipated aspects of radical ultra-nationalism. Drawing on non-Darwinian doctrines, Oka attempted to realize such a fused or organic state by enhancing social instincts that would bind the minzoku (ethnic nation) and state into a single living entity. Though mobilization during the Russo-Japanese War seemed to evince this super-organism, the increasingly contentious and complex society that emerged in the war's aftermath caused Oka to turn first to Lamarckism and eventually to orthogenesis in the hopes of preserving the instincts needed for a viable nation-state. It is especially in the state interventionist measures that Oka finally came to endorse in order to forestall orthogenetically-driven degeneration that the technocratic proclivities of his statist orientation become most apparent. The article concludes by suggesting that Oka's emphasis on degeneration, autarkic expansion, and, most especially, totalitarian submersion of individuals into the statist collectivity indicates a complex relationship between his evolutionism and fascist ideology, what recent scholarship has dubbed radical Shinto ultra-nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Sino-Japanese relations are quite stable presently, it was as recent as 2004–2005 that the two nations slid into the worst bilateral quagmire in decades. When in 2007 Japan was China’s third largest trading partner and China surpassed the US to become Japan’s largest trading partner, what is eating these two otherwise very pragmatic traders? History, nationalism and face, enabled by recent changes in the strategic environment, are the factors that have been most salient in bringing about the plunge in Sino-Japanese relations in 2004–05 and though Sino-Japanese relations have been much better since, these factors hang like a storm front over Sino-Japanese relations today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Yasukuni Shrine resonates with talismanic symbolism for both its critics and proponents and that is precisely why it is so controversial within Japan and between Japan and its neighbors. Controversy over Yasukuni is rooted in the broader historical debate about war memory, responsibility, and reconciliation. Competing narratives about this past send mixed signals to neighbors and prevent reconciliation. Despite Prime Minister Koizumi’s six visits, Yasukuni is an awkward talisman and many Japanese, including conservatives, oppose these visits. The Shrine’s image has been cast and no amount of artful repackaging will obscure its indelible links with Japan’s discredited Imperial ideology and the costs it exacted. The Yasukuni dilemma involves shifting the focal point of official war remembrance away from the Shrine to a secular war memorial where people and officials can pay respect to the war dead free from political agendas and historical baggage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Yasukuni Shrine is a site of contested nationalist politics in Japan and in neighbouring countries. Within Japan the status of the Shrine exists in a tension between public and private and religious and secular meanings. These tensions are given a specific focus in the context of the visits to the Shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers. The history of such visits is discussed and analysed, with particular attention given to the causes and consequences of the visits by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro between 2001 and 2006. It is argued that the controversies over the visits in Japan and elsewhere are best understood in the context of ‘revisionist nationalism’ in Japan. The reactions and nationalist problematics of the PRC and Taiwan with regard to the Yasukuni Shrine are then elaborated and analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is in the throes of internationalization but what this means, nobody knows. Some say it is Japan's first step to true world status, while others insist it's just nationalism in disguise, yet another model of the world with Japan at the center. What nobody seems to have noticed is that internationalization in Japan is a profoundly gendered process. In the article the author suggests that the space of internationalization may be used by women to cross, both figuratively and literally, national boundaries in a subterranean praxis oppositional to the patriarchal nation-state. Japanese women have a history of intimacy with the West to call on in this contemporary project of defection. A number of women have served as informal bridges between the West and a modernizing Japan, including Tsuda Etsuko during the Meiji era, who used her study abroad experience to find the first institution for higher learning for women in Japan. Japanese female scholars and cultural critics are well aware of women's condition of social inauthenticity.