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The mental model theory postulates that the meanings of conditionals are based on possibilities. Indicative conditionals—such as "If he is injured tomorrow, then he will take some leave"—have a factual interpretation that can be paraphrased as It is possible, and remains so, that he is injured tomorrow, and in that case certain that he takes some leave. Subjunctive conditionals, such as, "If he were injured tomorrow, then he would take some leave," have a prefactual interpretation that has the same paraphrase. But when context makes clear that his injury will not occur, the subjunctive has a counterfactual paraphrase, with the first clause: It was once possible, but does not remain so, that he will be injured tomorrow. Three experiments corroborated these predictions for participants' selections of paraphrases in their native Spanish, for epistemic and deontic conditionals, for those referring to past and to future events, and for those with then clauses referring to what may or must happen. These results are contrary to normal modal logics. They are also contrary to theories based on probabilities, which are inapplicable to deontic conditionals, such as, "If you have a ticket, then you must enter the show." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We studied the effects of probabilistic cues, i.e., of information of limited certainty, in the context of an action task (GL: grip-lift) and of a perceptual task (WP: weight perception). Normal subjects (n = 22) saw four different probabilistic visual cues, each of which announced the likely weight of an object. In the GL task, the object was grasped and lifted with a pinch grip, and the peak force rates indicated that the grip and load forces were scaled predictively according to the probabilistic information. The WP task provided the expected heaviness related to each probabilistic cue; the participants gradually adjusted the object's weight until its heaviness matched the expected weight for a given cue. Subjects were randomly assigned to two groups: one started with the GL task and the other one with the WP task. The four different probabilistic cues influenced weight adjustments in the WP task and peak force rates in the GL task in a similar manner. The interpretation and utilization of the probabilistic information was critically influenced by the initial task. Participants who started with the WP task classified the four probabilistic cues into four distinct categories and applied these categories to the subsequent GL task. On the other side, participants who started with the GL task applied three distinct categories to the four cues and retained this classification in the following WP task. The initial strategy, once established, determined the way how the probabilistic information was interpreted and implemented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ontology of decision theory has been subject to considerable debate in the past, and discussion of just how we ought to view decision problems has revealed more than one interesting problem, as well as suggested some novel modifications of classical decision theory. In this paper it will be argued that Bayesian, or evidential, decision-theoretic characterizations of decision situations fail to adequately account for knowledge concerning the causal connections between acts, states, and outcomes in decision situations, and so they are incomplete. Second, it will be argues that when we attempt to incorporate the knowledge of such causal connections into Bayesian decision theory, a substantial technical problem arises for which there is no currently available solution that does not suffer from some damning objection or other. From a broader perspective, this then throws into question the use of decision theory as a model of human or machine planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]