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Studies the role of civilian scientist-advisers in U.S. defense policy-making in 1966-1968. Effect of the McNamara Line, an electronic barrier or fence aimed at stemming the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam, on the importance of scientist-advisers; Dynamics of science-military relations.

In 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy decided that France should return to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) integrated military structure, which it had left in 1966. Sarkozy also restated the complete independence of the French arsenal, the policy of non-participation in NATO's nuclear mission: the nuclear exception. This article takes the view that this policy of nuclear exception is outdated and potentially damaging to French interests within NATO. This is so under two scenarios: (1) As long as American non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) are on European soil, NATO's nuclear posture will evolve without official French input. (2) If these nuclear weapons were to be removed from Europe, France would stand as the predominant nuclear power among the European Union states. Since the consequences of removal would impact French interests directly, it seems unwise for Paris to opt out of this debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the Libyan crisis has produced a decisive turning point in three interconnected dimensions of the transatlantic relationship. The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) proved to be ineffective in facing up to the Libyan crisis and needs to be rethought. The USA preferred to take a ‘back seat’ in handling the crisis and forced leading European powers to face up to their regional responsibilities and assume leadership of the Libyan mission, potentially offering a model for future allied operations. NATO, for its part, demonstrated that it is less of an alliance and more of a mechanism for the constitution of coalitions of the willing. It also struggled to overcome the mediocre forces of a small-time dictator. Key to the resolution of these three issues is the leadership role of France and the UK. Whatever the outcome, the signs are that we are facing a paradigm shift. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The EU's role in the recent Mali crisis offers a good opportunity to assess the consistency of the EU's Africa [Africa as used here refers to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)-the region of the EU's most extensive external policy] policy in the post-Lisbon era. Against the background of the EU's external policy objectives with special reference to SSA, this Article will particularly offer a comprehensive overview of the legal and policy dynamics of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This will be discussed especially with reference to how they relate to (in)consistency in implementation as illustrated in the EU's role in the recent Mali crisis. Although the EU initially made a decision to deploy an EU Training Mission to Mali, the EU did not activate the peacekeeping dimension of the CSDP as required at an advanced stage of the crisis. Instead, this gap was filled by France's unilateral military intervention in Mali. The EU's inertia in this regard raises the question of the consistency of its external policy instruments and policy objectives towards the region. Without excluding other possible contributing factors, the analysis submits that the 'partial' activation of the CSDP in Mali is mainly attributable to the constitutional specificity of the CSDP especially its lack of permanent and planning conduct structures. In any event, it is argued that these do not render the EU's role in Mali less inconsistent both in the light of the relevant EU external policy instruments and objectives towards SSA in general, and in the light of the CSDP objectives in particular. In general, the Article uses Mali as a case study to illustrate the extent and therefore the limits of the consistency of the EU's CSDP and its overall policy towards SSA especially post-Lisbon. Whilst acknowledging the current limits of the law in this context, the Article nevertheless argues that the dire implications of inconsistency for the effectiveness of the EU's policies and for the credibility of the Union make a search for practical, if not legal solutions, a political imperative. This is necessary especially if the EU wants to protect or indeed rebuild its credibility as an international actor in general, and as an effective partner for crisis management in SSA, in particular [The EU's credibility in much of the African Caribbean and Pacific states, especially SSA is reportedly already at an all-time low (Mackie J et al. in Policy Manag Insights ECDPM 2, )]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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On July 30 the European Union started its second largest military operation so far. However, for the EU, interventions abroad for security and peace are nothing new. The EU is involved in security interventions on three continents and in 11 missions. In parallel, the project of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is being advanced by the member states with battle groups, a European gendarmerie, and the Defence Agency. However, the more the EU extends its security policy engagement the more diffuse ESDP's political and strategic profile seems to be. In fact, at the end of 2003 the member states adopted the EU's first common security strategy, but even this document leaves a number of crucial issues unanswered, above all what EU military intervention would involve. A political and societal debate concerning what European Security and Defence Policy wishes to achieve, as well as its limitations and requirements, is urgent. The central question is the following: Is ESDP under the conditions of the twenty-first century defined primarily as a defense or as a political project? A juxtaposition of the concepts "offensive (self-) defense" and "human security" illustrates the conceptual and strategic alternatives facing Europe in security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In July 2006, the European Union deployed a military mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), comprising 2,400 troops from 19 contributing countries, under German operational command. EUFOR DRC'S mission was to provide support for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in DRC during the crucial period of the first free presidential elections to be held in over four decades. The mission marked a milestone in the development of the European Union's Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in that it demonstrated a new kind of EU capability as a global actor, and it introduced a number of significant innovations in the way the mission was conducted. Not only were the willingness to use dissuasive force in a location well beyond the EU's own borders and the key role played by German troops novel, but in terms of its methodology EUFOR broke new ground in the way a military force can be used in the context of protecting a civilian population and treating them as if they were citizens rather than an alien people. From being regarded on the ground as at best an ineffective initiative and at worst a partisan, neo-colonialist force, EUFOR succeeded in establishing itself as both neutral and credible. The use of human rights advisors, gender awareness, and an outreach programme which sought to engage local public opinion meant that the EUFOR mission implemented what could be called a Human Security approach. Measured against the five principles of Human Security outlined in the Barcelona Report on European Security Capabilities, the mission demonstrated a respect for human rights, a bottom-up approach, and effective multilateralism. Less satisfactory in Human Security terms were the weakness of its mission and the lack of coherence with other EU initiatives in the country, despite the presence of two civilian missions undertaking police and security sector reform and the European Commission's substantial donor program. The lack of follow-through impaired the military mission's ability to link short-term »rapid reaction« measures and long-term assistance, or »crisis management« and conflict prevention. Although the mission has provided the EU with benefits in terms of lessons learned -- including demonstrating the viability of a Human Security approach -- a parallel conclusion is that the EUFOR DRC mission represented a clearer gain for the EU than for DRC and its citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shortly after coming to power in 2007, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced his willingness to ‘normalise’ France's relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). His aim was to reverse a central tenet of Gaullist foreign and security policy which, since General de Gaulle's 1966 decision to withdraw France from NATO's integrated military command, had relied on the country's ‘specific’ status in the Atlantic Alliance. While there had been unsuccessful attempts – under Presidents François Mitterrand in 1990–1991 and, most notably, Jacques Chirac in 1995–1997 – at such normalisation over the previous two decades, Sarkozy's move proved successful and, in 2009, France again became a fully integrated NATO member. Despite hints that he would ‘review’ this decision and perhaps reverse it or at least correct it, his successor, François Hollande, has decided to maintain the status quo. This article seeks to offer an explanation for Sarkozy's decision and to analyse why it was successfully carried out. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his report to the president of the French Republic in November 2012 assessing France's return into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) military command structure, Hubert Védrine, the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted that France had no interest in leaving it again. His recommendations called for renewed action within the Alliance and the emergence of a European pillar. The timing should have been perfect, with France's draft White Paper on defence and security about to be published. However, at a time when budget cuts prevail, are these recommendations applicable and do they amount to more than just paying lip-service? This article focuses on a one-year period, from November 2012 to the latest debates around the Military Programming Law, reminiscent of Pierre Mendès-France's famous quote that governing is all about making choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses French views of transatlantic and European defence from the late 1940s to France's ‘return’ to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2009. It argues that, while until the early 1950s the French Government viewed transatlantic and West European security cooperation as mutually reinforcing enterprises, by the end of that decade French decision-makers had developed conflicting perceptions of transatlantic and European defence. During the 1960s, the dominating political discourse in the Fifth Republic portrayed relations between Atlantic and European solidarity as a ‘zero-sum’ game: What was good for the Alliance was bad for Europe and vice versa. President Charles de Gaulle advocated the creation of a European ‘Third Force’, although links with NATO were never outright severed. During the 1970s and early 1980s, a ‘zero-sum’ attitude to Atlantic and European defence consolidated although as the Cold War came to a close, Mitterrand started a selective but steady re-engagement with the Alliance. By the late 1990s, during the presidency of Jacques Chirac, France was once again ade factofull member of NATO, although full reintegration was completed only in April 2009. This paper suggests that France's return to ‘NATO’ marked no dramatic U-turn in French security policy; rather it was the result of a gradual and steady evolution, which was triggered by the crisis of the East–West structure of international politics during the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the wake of WWII, the historical legacy of the last 65 years has led the Europeans to organise their defence in the transatlantic framework through NATO, and in the European Union (EU) through Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defense Policy. Despite the reiterated wish to make the two organisations complementary, this has not been achievable so far because of their different natures and formats. While the US ally has been moving its strategy to the East (Asia-Pacific), the Europeans have been urged to take on a larger part of their security burden. This cannot be achieved by individual nations, however, and pushes for deeper integration of European defence (namely pooling and sharing). The enhancement of European capabilities within the EU is likely to be the only way to keep up the transatlantic partnership in the twenty-first century, and France has a key role to play towards this objective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an introduction to this special issue dealing with topics related to France's military and defense policies and their relationship with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) including post-Cold War analysis of the shifts in France's position, the Iraq War, and France's role in the European Union's strategic defense culture.

This paper explores the policy choices of Germany and Japan for contributing to international security and stability in Afghanistan. Both countries have been closely involved with Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 2001. It is argued that the policy choice of Japan with a low military element and high civilian element differs significantly from the German military centered approach. An analysis of the goals and motives behind the foreign policy choices reveals that in Germany the military involvement has been justified with humanitarian reasons, national self interests and the right to 'unlimited' sovereignty. This logic has ultimately led to the acceptance of civilian casualties and participation into offensive counterinsurgency operations. It is suggested that elite driven discourses have determined foreign policy strategy. In the case of Japan the paper claims that the conservative LDP elite had been pushing for intensified military involvement which materialized in the dispatch of military vessels to the Indian Ocean and ground forces to Iraq. Similar to Germany these moves towards gaining international reputation were rooted in domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Could a growing transatlantic rift regarding the use of military force outside Europe propel the political break-up of Canada? The first part of the paper argues that, in addition to its liberal-democratic values, Canada's bicultural national identity accounts for much of its Atlanticist international security policy. The second part of the paper examines the prevalence of this Atlanticist strategic culture in the face of two contemporary cases of transatlantic (dis)unity, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to assess the potentially disruptive nature of transatlantic discord on Canada's political unity. It finds, somewhat counter-intuitively, that transatlantic unity - rather than disunity - could more probably generate national unity crises in Canada in the event of continuing 'out-of-area' military operations undertaken by NATO allies. This is mainly because of a growing tendency among Quebec's sovereignist political elites' to mobilise Quebecers' distinct attitudes regarding overseas military expeditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]