1. Longer Randomly Blinded RSA Keys May Be Weaker Than Shorter Ones.
- Author
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Hutchison, David, Kanade, Takeo, Kittler, Josef, Kleinberg, Jon M., Mattern, Friedemann, Mitchell, John C., Naor, Moni, Nierstrasz, Oscar, Pandu Rangan, C., Steffen, Bernhard, Sudan, Madhu, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Tygar, Doug, Vardi, Moshe Y., Weikum, Gerhard, Sehun Kim, Yung, Moti, Hyung-Woo Lee, and Walter, Colin D.
- Abstract
Side channel leakage from smart cards has been of concern since their inception and counter-measures are routinely employed. So a number of standard and reasonable assumptions are made here regarding an implementation of RSA in a cryptographic token which may be subjected to non-invasive side-channel cryptanalysis. These include blinding the re-usable secret key, input whitening, and using an exponentiation algorithm whose operation sequence partially obscures the key. The working hypothesis is that there is limited side channel leakage which only distinguishes very imprecisely between squarings and multiplications. For this typical situation, a method is described for recovering the private exponent, and, realistically, it does not require an excessive number of traces. It just requires the modulus to be public and the public exponent not to be too large. The attack is computationally feasible unless parameters are appropriately adjusted. It reveals that longer keys are much more vulnerable than shorter ones unless blinding is proportional to key length. A further key conclusion is that designers must assume that the information theoretic level of leakage from smart cards can be transformed into usable key information by adversaries whatever counter-measures are put in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2008
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