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"It was the rise of Athens and the fear that it instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable" as Thucydides famously stated. But are we destined to hear echoes of "Carthago delenda est" [Carthage must be destroyed] from Beijing and Washington across the Pacific? With the tension notably on the rise in the issue-specific domains of the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, there is cause to delve deeper into the contemporary 'Thucydides Trap', as expounded by Graham Allison. This paper will focus on the latest developments of the ongoing Korean Peninsula Nuclear Crisis, post Six-Party Talks, as an issue-specific domain to evaluate the changing power dynamic between an established and a rising power. Here the Thucydides Trap and the challenges presented by policy makers in both China and the USA make special reference to the danger of being plunged into a hegemonic conflict. This analysis covers two trajectories: 1) following the conservative approach - balance of power and conditions of hegemony; and 2) concerning a balance of hierarchies - in which the two hierarchies run parallel to each other. Due to China's rising power in both military and economic fields, it simultaneously presages the relative decline of American power projection. Allison also reconfirms that an established power, in this case the USA, is challenged by a rising power, personified by China, concludes that the likelihood of war has substantially increased. Despite the fact of their growing geopolitical rivalry, both acknowledge the calculus of falling into the trap and realize that a major conflict would devastate their geopolitical positions. Put more directly, finding the great escape from this trap remains the central issue in the contemporary world, raising the conceptionally challenging question as to whether Allison's theoretical construction is heuristically sound. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to present a framework for understanding the impact of China's rise on the established international order with a special focus on the contradictions and dilemmas facing both China and the order around it. It suggests heuristic insights from two Chinese cultural and linguistic metaphysics in order to denote the dynamic and interactive relationship between the rise of China and the existing order in terms of both opportunities and challenges. The authors argue that both China and the existing order have been going through periods of 'sleeping in the same bed with different dreams', and now they are in the stage of 'riding tiger' in which both sides face dilemmas in their complicated and complex relationship. The paper concludes that the rise of China and the existing order will continue to be intertwined in a dialectic of waxing and waning, and flux and reflux. In order for each to find a regional and global role which the other will accept and support both sides will have to go through a considerable period of struggle, tension and adjustment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan Strait has often been referred to as one of the world's most dangerous hotspots and many dire predictions have been made about a military conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, likely involving the United States. Yet, despite several crises in the Taiwan Strait and numerous war speculations, there has been no major armed conflict between Beijing and Taipei since the 1950s. How do we explain the puzzle that an expected war across the Taiwan Strait did not happen after all? This paper first examines the explanations based on military balance of power. Having found the realist/rationalist explanations less convincing, however, this study explores the explanatory power of the 'ethnicity' factor. It suggests that when the Chinese society is no longer divided by ideological differences, the 'ethnicity' may provide a more convincing explanation of why a military conflict has not happened in the Taiwan Strait in the past four decades. This paper also considers several counterarguments, including the neo-liberal argument of economic integration as a driving force for peace in the age of globalization. The paper concludes with a discussion of some policy implications resulting from the 'ethnic peace' thesis and proposes that when actively promoted by the both sides, the Chinese ethnic identity is likely to be the most important strategic guarantee of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for many years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After noting the rise of geoeconomics in the post-Cold War era, the paper ascertains how the age of geoeconomics re-defines power and the rules of the balance of power game. Of particular significance is that a nation’s economic security eclipses its military security (or traditional national defense). In this context, I examine the meanings of the rise of a re-ascendant China for world politics in general and for Taiwan’s future in particular. Considering Taiwan’s heavy dependence on imported natural resources and its isolation and exclusion from vital international economic groupings, such as FTA’s. ASEAN, ASEM, and the 16-nation Asian super economic bloc in the marking. Finally, I take a prospective look at the prospect of a future cross-Strait integration between Taiwan and mainland China under the impact of the dictate of geoeconomics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An armed conflict between Taiwan and China is not unthinkable in the future. For historical, geographical, economic, and diplomatic reasons, Japan would not be able to stand on the sidelines. Relying on three major concepts—national interests, path dependence and balance of power, this paper explores Japan's three possible roles in the event of a cross-Strait conflict. First, Japan could pass the buck, staying out of the conflict as much as possible and providing at most logistical and intelligence support for an American military operation. Second, it could balance power, throwing its weight behind Washington against Beijing. Finally, it could play peacemaker. At the end of the article, the author discusses several key factors that would shape Tokyo's decision-making in the event of a cross-Strait conflict and assesses the relative probability of each option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Cambodia's backing of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Having explored bilateral historical ties, the author concludes that Cambodia has pursued a bandwagoning policy with China for most of its post-colonial period since 1953. At present, Cambodia's bandwagoning policy with China has been manifested in the former's support of the latter's initiative. It begs a question as to why the kingdom has enthusiastically supported it. The article elucidates the motives behind Cambodia's bandwagoning policy on BRI applying John Spanier's three level of analytical framework. First, on the systemic level, it argues that China's bid to expand its influence, the change of balance of power in Southeast Asia, and the clean competition for influence between China and Japan in the Mekong Region have affected Cambodia's policy decision on the BRI. Second, at the nation-state level of analysis, Cambodia perceives BRI as another funding source of infrastructure projects, and a means to achieve its policy goal of becoming an economic hub in the region and to whip up domestic support of the ruling party. Finally, on the decision-making level, the backing of the BRI may stem from Prime Minister Hun Sen's pragmatic views of how to sustain his rule over the country. He might have viewed that economic growth would help to strengthen his ruling. The analysis concludes by identifying some negative repercussions Cambodia has encountered as a result of her support of the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the background of ever stronger linkages between the EU and China as well as their emphatically voiced objective to jointly shape the increasingly multi-polar world, the article at hand endeavors to address the question how a liberally informed EU and a politically distinctly illiberal China may actually come to cooperate, that is, "work together for a common purpose". To this end, this analysis reviews the past decade of EU-China normatively divergent, and even competitive encounters in Central Asia's security realm and, on this basis, delineates a possible future mode of EU-China interaction in and beyond Central Asia, illustrating what cooperation between normatively divergent powers could look like in a multi-polar age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The magnitude of China's energy needs and global energy acquisitions, and their recent emergence as key features of the international system, raise many sensitive questions: will China adapt to or reshape the international system as historically defined by the hegemonic West, and what is the role of its energy policy, politics, and resource nationalism in a possible new Great Game? While much of the current literature posits an either/or approach (China adapts to energy market or tries to redefine them as a part of a wider political plan), our hypothesis is that China is essentially a pragmatic actor who reacts to the forces in presence, rather than a revisionist power with a grand plan to realign the world order to suit its needs and satisfy some kind of pre-established grand vision. We posit that China goes beyond conformity with or resistance to the established energy market and the power relations they underpin: While local circumstances may be considered variables, its fixed objective is a stable international order and the pragmatic satisfaction of its energy needs in order to insure continued economic growth and general stability at home. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held on 15–21 October 2007 in Beijing, produced some interesting changes to the balance of power among different factional groups in Chinese politics. Compared to the balance of power among factional groups generated as a result of the Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP five years earlier, the four major factional groups had different experiences. In terms of power index, the Shanghai Gang, a factional group affiliated with Former General Secretary Jiang Zemin, declined substantially; the Qinghua Clique, graduates of the Qinghua University, also declined significantly; the Princelings, children of former high-ranking officials, however, increased a great deal; and the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group, a factional group closely associated with General Secretary Hu Jintao, witnessed substantial expansion. In terms of group cohesion index, both the Shanghai Gang and the Qinghua Clique shrank significantly; the Princelings increased somewhat; and the CCYL Group expanded substantially. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts to answer a new but important question in China’s foreign policy— how Beijing has wielded its soft power to construct its ideal of international order in the age of China’s rise. Before empirical analyses, this study tries to set up a conceptual framework on the relations between the idea of “harmonious world” and China’s soft power wielding in its rising process. Within this framework, this study examines a rising China’s foreign policies towards three targeted regions in the global south—Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. On the one hand, due to Beijing’s carefully-designed and soft power-based foreign policies, the global south has become an increasingly harmonious environment for Beijing to cultivate a favorable national image, exert its political influence on regional affairs, benefit its own domestic economic developments, etc. On the other hand, some problems such as the so-called “China’s New Colonialism” and the increased vigilance from the other powers have already began to challenge Beijing’s harmony in those regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes three models that explain for the peace in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. Discussion on the notion of geographic balance of power in the region; Examination on the notion of complexity of national interests in the post-Cold War era in the region; Nuclear deterrence in asymmetric power structure; Power relations between China and Russia and Japan and the U.S.; Regional security policy adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Focuses on China's policies concerning national security. Weapons modernization; Arms transfer; Arms control; Perceptions of evolving security environment in Asia; Constraints from security structure formed during the cold war.

Focuses on the United States-Russian military balance of power in the post-cold war Asia-Pacific region and the possible threat of China as a military power. Russian-American arms reduction programs; Assessment of the balance of power among superpower nations in the region; Defense modernization of China.