Search

It is not rare in philosophy and psychology to see theorists fall into dichotomous thinking about mental phenomena. On one side of the dichotomy there are processes that I will label 'unintelligent.' These processes are thought to be unconscious, implicit, automatic, unintentional, involuntary, procedural, and non-cognitive. On the other side, there are 'intelligent' processes that are conscious, explicit, controlled, intentional, voluntary, declarative, and cognitive. Often, if a process or behavior is characterized by one of the features from either of the above lists, the process or behavior is classified as falling under the category to which the feature belongs. For example, if a process is implicit this is usually considered sufficient for classifying it as 'unintelligent' and for assuming that the remaining features that fall under the 'unintelligent' grouping will apply to it as well. Accordingly, if a process or behavior is automatic, philosophers often consider it to be unintelligent. It is my goal in this paper to challenge the conceptual slip from 'automatic' to 'unintelligent'. I will argue that there are a whole range of properties highlighted by the existing psychological literature that make automaticity a much more complex phenomenon than is usually appreciated. I will then go on to discuss two further important relationships between automatic processes and controlled processes (C-processes) that arise when we think about automatic processes in the context of skilled behavior. These interactions should add to our resistance to classifying automaticity as unintelligent or mindless. In Sect. 1, I present a few representative cases of philosophers classifying automatic processes and behaviors as mindless or unintelligent. In Sect. 2, I review trends in the psychology of automaticity in order highlight a complex set of features that are characteristic, though not definitive, of automatic processes and behaviors. In Sect. 3, I argue that at least some automatic processes are likely cognitively penetrable. In Sect. 4, I argue that the structure of skilled automatic processes is shaped diachronically by practice, training and learning. Taken together, these considerations should dislodge the temptation to equate 'automatic' with 'unintelligent'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research has shown that increasing the number of turns that a route takes through the environment increases estimates of distance-the route angularity effect. This study tested implications of different memory-based explanations of the route angularity effect within a virtual setting. Participants maneuvered through virtual pathways of varying length that included zero, two, or seven turns. After each set of three paths, they estimated relative path lengths on an analog scale. Results demonstrated that both increasing memory load during navigation and making retrieval more difficult by interpolating another spatial task prior to estimation significantly increased the magnitude of route angularity effects. These results are consistent with the idea that the number of turns is categorically encoded and used as a memory heuristic when fine-grained memory for the route distance is degraded either at encoding or prior to retrieval. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

History of mathematics occupies itself describing processes of growth and development, whereas philosophy of mathematics is concerned with questions of justification. Both play an essential role within the educational context. But there is a problem because genuine historical studies necessitate ever greater particularity whereas mathematics and philosophy require generality and abstraction. The paper offers some methodological reflections about these matters together with two case studies from nineteenth century history of arithmetic and integration theory, respectively, which try to strike a balance between the directly opposed requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduces articles in published in the first 2001 issue of the periodical "Studies in Philosophy and Education,". Exploration of the theme of transforming and redescribing critical thinking; Questions raised about the critical thinker's effort to become objective and neutral at the expense of their emotions, imagination and intuition.

Argues that although distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. Key issues of interest; Analysis of pertinent topics and relevant issues; Implications on philosophical studies.

Two experiments investigated equivalence relations among auditory, visual, and tactile stimuli. In Experiment 1, three 6- and 7-year-old children learned conditional discriminations with auditory samples and tactile comparisons. In subsequent tests, they demonstrated that the conditional relations of the auditory and tactile stimuli were equivalence relations. Through cross-modal transfer, the classes also had extended to include novel visual stimuli that resembled the tactile stimuli in form and size. Experiment 2 reversed the role of the tactile and visual stimuli. After learning conditional discriminations with auditory samples and visual comparisons, the children demonstrated equivalence classes that included the training stimuli plus novel tactile stimuli that resembled the visual stimuli. One child in this experiment needed cross-modal training before the classes appeared. The experiments illustrate one way in which stimulus equivalence classes are extended and relate the paradigm of stimulus equivalence to studying perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A matching-to-sample procedure that engenders observation of two elements of a complex sample stimulus may establish equivalence relations among those elements. Studies that focus on complex stimulus control will help determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for equivalence class formation. Further studies in this area will benefit by blending the methods and concepts of stimulus equivalence research with those used in studies of conceptually related learning processes. The enterprise may also profit by reconsidering the role of compound stimulus control in the formation of equivalence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]