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In this chapter, limited access order (LAO) and open access order (OAO) are used as a conceptual framework for analyzing two peacebuilding cases in Southeast Asia: the Philippines (Mindanao) and Myanmar. The main hypothesis is that the national dominant coalition (NDC) relies on patron–client relationships between national elites and their counterparts in subsidiary communities to control violence in LAOs. The chapter examines the importance of the three key doorstep conditions—the rule of law for elites, perpetually lived organizations in the public and private spheres, and consolidated political control of the organizations with violent capacity—for establishing control of the violence within the territory in these two cases. The chapter suggests that violence is more likely to be controlled when national elites can find it to their advantage to limit violence and make sustained social interaction possible in order to preserve their privileges and vested interests. The two case studies also demonstrate that “rents” (material benefits that the elites use to forge a consensus or to maintain the coalition among them) are used to limit violence and to coordinate the interests of powerful individuals and organizations.

In this chapter, we will review the evolution of Japan’s peacekeeping policy from the immediate aftermath of Japan’s defeat in 1945 to the enactment of the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act in 1992. In the first section, we will look at the historical background during the postwar period (in this book, the term “postwar” denotes the period in Japan from its defeat in World War II in 1945 to the end of the Cold War in around 1990), including the rise of anti-militarism, the hidden rearmament, the establishment of the de facto ban on overseas military dispatch, the rejection of the UN’s request for the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF’s) deployment to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) and the aborted plan to dispatch a minesweeper to the Persian Gulf. This section will also examine the Government of Japan’s legal standpoint about the possibility of SDF deployment to a UNPKO. In the second section, we will clarify how the Gulf Crisis/War in 1990–1991 made Japan abandon the taboo against overseas military dispatch. Then, we will review the course of the challenging lawmaking process of the PKO Act, which was finally passed in June 1992. Lastly, we will see the restrictions inserted into the PKO Act, such as the so-called Five Principles.

Participation in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia from 1992 to 1993 was the landmark case in the history of Japan’s peacekeeping policy as the first military contribution based on the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act, established in June 1992. However, lingering hostility in the field seriously troubled the deployment because it generated various problems, such as a serious gap between official policy and actual situation on the ground. The contradictions led to the shocking loss of two Japanese personnel on duty. Harsh reality of Cambodia generated the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF’s) informal adaptation of “robustness”—that is, de facto patrols—in the absence of formal legal authority. These bitter experiences sowed the seeds of the Government of Japan (GoJ) eventual pursuit of “robustness” 23 years later by the second Abe administration as part of the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation. The experience in Cambodia also led to the development of “integration” in Japan’s peacekeeping efforts, especially in terms of direct Japan Engineering Groups (JEG) support to local community through civil construction works. The local people appreciated both the JEG’s skills and their friendly attitude. This was a successful experience not only for the JEG, but also for the GoJ, which was laying the foundation for Japan’s pursuit of greater “integration.”

Here we will present two research questions: first, why did Japan suddenly discontinue a quarter-century history of troop contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) in 2017; second, is there any possibility of resuming large-scale military deployment. Hypothetically, we will argue that Japan’s retreat from South Sudan in 2017 should be regarded not as the revival of old anti-militarism but as a recent tendency of reluctance among the Global North countries, concerning the personnel deployment to the UNPKOs. Since the start in 1992, Japan had deployed only the limited personnel contribution under the strict constitutional ban. To overcome this situation, Japan had tried to trace the global trends of “robustness” and “integration”: the former encourages more proactive use of arms for peacekeepers to remove obstacles for the UNPKOs, while the latter promotes peacebuilding-like military roles along with the cooperation with civilians. In the late 2010s, however, Japan could no longer accommodate the recent international trends, mainly due to the increasing insecurity in the UNPKOs today. Likewise, the other Global North countries had also become hesitant for the personnel contribution to the UNPKOs. We will argue that Japan’s retreat falls in the common trend among the Global North countries.

In this chapter, we will examine the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF’s) participation in the UN missions in East Timor, or Timor-Leste in Portuguese. Here we pay special heed to the Japanese peacekeepers’ activities in the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor and the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor from the early to mid-2000s. These United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) aimed to support independence and statebuilding in East Timor by combining peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Similar to the case of Cambodia, the Japanese delegation put the greatest emphasis on engineering, which was a good fit with the goals of these UNPKOs. In East Timor, the Japan Engineering Groups engaged in civil engineering works, not only to support the UN missions but also as direct bilateral assistance to local residents in close collaboration with Japan’s ODA (the “All Japan” approach). Meanwhile, the strict constraints in the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act were highlighted again, especially in terms of the protection of Japanese nationals, when the SDF rescued Japanese citizens during a 2002 riot. In addition to military deployment, civilian police personnel also contributed to the United Nations Mission in East Timor in preparation for the referendum on independence in 1999. Similar contributions were made to resume statebuilding assistance to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste after the recurrence of violence in 2006.

The Japan Engineering Groups (JEG) deployment to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) from 2012 to 2017 exhibited consecutive aspects of “integration” and “robustness.” During the first two years, Japan’s method of “integration,” or the “All Japan” approach, fit well with UNMISS’s focus on statebuilding. It yielded various outcomes, not only in the restoration of facilities and infrastructure (e.g., road construction) but also in the nonengineering support provided to the locals (e.g., job training). With the outbreak of de facto civil war in December 2013, however, UNMISS’s top priority moved from statebuilding to Protection of Civilians (PoC), thereby intensifying inclinations toward “robustness.” Afterward, the JEG mostly focused on the construction of a PoC site, that is, a shelter for evacuated locals and internally displaced people. While security in South Sudan continued to deteriorate, the amendment to the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act as part of the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation enabled the Government of Japan (GoJ) to assign the JEG to partial security missions, such as the “coming-to-aid” duty. In the end, however, the GoJ abruptly withdrew the JEG in May 2017, thereby discontinuing the series of SDF deployments to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations since 1992.

In this chapter, we will examine Japan’s response to a complex crisis in Haiti, in which a natural disaster and civil unrest were compounded. Persistent insecurity and confusion in Haiti, albeit under the presence of an ongoing United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO), further deteriorated after the great earthquake in 2010. This challenge unexpectedly propelled Japan’s move toward closer “integration,” since several layers of civil-military cooperation rapidly developed to cope with the complicated emergency in post-earthquake Haiti. First, the Government of Japan (GoJ) deployed a civilian medical team and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) emergency medical assistance unit (hereafter, the SDF medical unit) under the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Act. Following the SDF medical unit’s JDR work, the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) carried on with medical assistance. Second, once emergency medical support ended, an SDF contingent was dispatched under the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act. The Japan Engineering Groups’ (JEG’s) engagement in reconstruction served as a useful opportunity for the GoJ to refine the “All Japan” approach, further encouraging Japan’s inclination toward “integration.” Meanwhile, the experience in Haiti shed light on the gap in the legal assumptions between the JDR Act and the PKO Act, since neither of them anticipated the protection of civil JDR teams in insecurity.

In this chapter, we will provide an overview of the evolution of Japan’s peacekeeping policy from the enactment of the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act in 1992 to the era before the return of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2012 (we will also briefly mention more recent issues where relevant). The chapter consists of three sections. First, we will outline Japan’s experiences with personnel contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) and other related activities. For this purpose, we will pay particular attention to Japan’s policy concept of International Peace Cooperation (IPC), in which UNPKO participation is embedded. Because the two variations of IPC (narrow vs. broad) coexist within the Government of Japan (GoJ) policy framework, we will evaluate its actual performance within these respective categories. Second, we will trace how Japan tried to follow the trends of “robustness” and “integration” from the early 1990s to 2012. Above all, we will investigate how the fifth item of the Five Principles, namely the restriction on the use of weapons only for self-preservation, caused practical problems for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) peacekeepers on the ground, widening the gap between Japan and the international standard. Lastly, however, we will summarize how political realignment and shifts in public opinion were related to the decline of anti-militarism, which once restrained Japan’s UNPKO participation.

First, this chapter will briefly review the contents of each previous chapter. Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_2 examined the historical background from the immediate aftermath of World War II to the establishment of the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act in 1992. Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_3 considered the evolution of Japan’s peacekeeping policy under the PKO Act from 1992 to 2012. Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_4 investigated the transformation of Japan’s peacekeeping policy under the second Abe administration, especially during the period from 2013 to 2017. Chapters 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_5, 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_6, 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_7, and 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_8 considered the cases of Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, and South Sudan respectively. Second, this chapter will analyze the consequences of Japan’s pursuit of the trends of “robustness” and “integration.” Third, we will consider possible explanations behind the withdrawal of the Japan Engineering Groups from South Sudan in 2017. Fourth, we will demonstrate that troop deployment to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) has become commonly difficult for the Global North countries, causing a shift in focus away from personnel contributions to more material UNPKO commitments. Fourth, this chapter will illustrate how the Global North is still trying to make personnel contributions to UNPKOs wherever possible. Lastly, we will discuss what Japan can do from now on in its peacekeeping policy, or more broadly its International Peace Cooperation commitment.

This chapter will consider the noteworthy changes in Japan’s peacekeeping policy under the second Abe administration (2012–2020), with special emphasis on the period between 2013 and 2017. Since its outset in the early 1990s, Japan’s peacekeeping policy had been gradually shaped by the trends of “integration” and the “robustness” in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs), but various problems remained unsolved, especially in terms of “robustness.” With the return of Prime Minister Abe at the end of 2012, reforms to follow the trend of “robustness” were carried out as part of his all-inclusive renovation of Japan’s security policy, namely the Peace and Security Legislation, to resolve numerous long-standing problems in the field. With this in mind, this chapter starts by considering new developments in Japan’s security policy as a whole before examining how these sweeping reforms transformed the quality of Japan’s peacekeeping, paying special attention to the newly added roles, such as the “coming-to-aid” duty. This chapter will also trace moves toward “integration,” especially regarding the “All Japan” approach.

This opening literature review connects hybrid calls and criticisms to the development of peacebuilding debates at large. First, it briefly presents some of peacebuilding’s ontological aspects, as they may be found both in academia and practice. With such a contrasting framework at hand, the following section explains some core arguments in the existing literature in favour of adopting hybrid peacebuilding. Lastly, voices are raised to show how hybridity has been criticised both within its own circles and by others. Showcasing the various aspects of peacebuilding, and hybridity specifically, this chapter sets the stage for a new set of discussions in the subsequent chapters.

This introductory chapter provides an overview, main objectives, key arguments and the significance of the study. This book is a result of collective efforts by those who are interested in advancing the discourse on hybrid peacebuilding in Asia in two aspects. First, by drawing on a diverse array of relevant theoretical perspectives gained from the discussion on complexity, identity and feminism, it aims to operationalise hybrid peacebuilding theory from various perspectives of Asia, which was designed to serve as a descriptive lens to elucidate the dynamic and interactive nature of the process of hybridisation. This attempt is concurrently administered by a critical effort to refine the typology of the ‘local mid-space gatekeepers’ proposed in Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia (Uesugi 2020). Second, by investing empirically the mechanism of hybridisation in the peacebuilding process in Cambodia and Mindanao, it seeks to demonstrate, without falling into the pitfalls of binary, how mid-space actors in these settings served or failed to serve as bridges to close cleavages in the conflict-affected society. These in-depth empirical findings are complemented by another set of case studies which focuses on two leading peacebuilding actors in Asia, China and Japan, to illustrate the need to expand the horizons of the research on hybrid peacebuilding to include the impact of non-Western approaches on the practice of peacebuilding.

The concluding chapter summarises the findings of the previous chapters and presents their common assertions. The goal is to evaluate whether the existent gap between hybrid peacebuilding theory and its practice has been successfully closed. Building upon a complexity-informed framework of hybrid emergence, the mid-space actor typology is developed to link between an analytical framework and practical application. This volume has demonstrated that mid-space actors can provide viable focal points for establishing resilient and self-sufficient social institutions from within without dictating the content of such emergences. The case studies of Cambodia and Mindanao were examined to assess the on-the-ground operation of mid-space actors, and the cases of China and Japan illuminated how the conceptual framework of hybridity could improve contemporary peacebuilding models.

Chapter 1: Global Governance Principles & UN Implementation in Southeast Asia Chapter 2: A Critical Reflection on UNTAC's Contributions to Human Security Chapter 3: Post-UNTAC Legacy of Intervention and Human Security in Cambodia Chapter 4: UN Peace Operations in Timor-Leste: Questions of Legality and Legitimacy Chapter 5: Post-UNMIT Legacy of UN Intervention and Human Security in Timor-Leste Chapter 6: Lessons Learned and Policy Prescription

This chapter focuses on Japan’s approach to peacebuilding, and examines its ability to emerge as a hybrid peacebuilding facilitator. To test this potential, three cases of Japan’s engagement with mid-space actors are studied. By reviewing Japan’s flagship projects in Timor-Leste, Myanmar and Mindanao, the chapter shows that Japan holds the ability to establish trust-relationships with top/national leaders of the aid-recipient countries through its apolitical, request-based, non-intrusive and long-term commitment approaches that Japanese actors display. At the same time, Japanese actors operating at the local/bottom are able to develop relationships with mid-space actors through providing them with important know-how and resources. This practice has allowed Japan to engage with conflict-affected societies where and when access of other donors was denied, which gave Japan an advantage in supporting local bridge-building initiatives. In short, this chapter demonstrated how Japan could bridge between Western donors and aid-recipient countries in Southeast Asia. While several shortcomings of the Japanese approach such as the limited inclusion of stakeholders and unequal distribution of peace dividend are identified in this chapter, it concluded that Japan could emerge as a hybrid peacebuilding facilitator if these shortcomings were addressed.

This open access book explores common critiques in the literature of hybrid peacebuilding, especially the lack of connection between hybridity in theory and practice. Through using a complexity-informed framework, the foundation for introducing the mid-space actor typology is established. Mid-space actors as insider-partial mediators are perceived to be vital agents for peace processes in conflict-affected areas and thus can be important power brokers and focal points for outside actors. In this book, two insider views are examined through analysing mid-space actors in the peacebuilding process in Cambodia and in Mindanao, the Philippines. First, it explores the process of identity-building of Cambodian monks and how such a process enables or hinders the monks to bridge existing cleavages. Then, in the case study of Mindanao, the roles of civil society actors are considered. The next step is to introduce the outsider’s perspective on hybrid peacebuilding and how Asian peacebuilding actors such as China and Japan are engaging with mid-space actors who provide key bridges in peacebuilding.

This chapter assesses post-UNTAC intervention by the UN and the impact it has had on human security in Cambodia. Overall, the UN has been a major global legitimate actor, but its operational effectiveness varies and has been most limited by the politico-security dynamics that unfolded after the UNTAC departure. Part of the problem with UN governance is that the post-Cold War global system tends to place too much emphasis on the force of international law and social-economic aspects in the process of peacebuilding that it has been less effective in terms of addressing and transforming security politics within Cambodia. UN agencies, programmes, and funds have proved unable to reform and transform the dominant state institutions like the three branches of government and the armed forces.

This chapter assesses the legacy of UN intervention by examining its impact on human security in the post-UNMIT Timor-Leste. The UN and other international actors left a positive legacy in various national institutions for democratic governance and natural resource management. However, their impact did not penetrate into politico-security and justice/reconciliation sectors. UN governance was dictated by idealistic approaches and leaned towards retributive justice, and it has been less effective in terms of addressing the immediate and real needs of the people on the ground. After the UNMIT departure, the Government in Timor-Leste redirected the course of action to improve security situations by implementing the policy of ‘buying peace’, through which issues of economic resource allocation and social justice were linked with security politics within Timor-Leste.

UNTAC was a limited success when assessed in terms of legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness. This operation would not have been launched had the UN Security Council, especially the five Permanent Members, not reached an agreement and would not have enjoyed as much legitimacy as it did if foreign governments (especially the nineteen foreign signatories) and the Cambodian people, especially the four armed factions, had objected to the proposed course of action. Comparatively, however, the degree of legality was far higher than that of legitimacy. The mission succeeded in organising and holding a national election but fell short of ensuring a fully free and fair election. The disarmament process was the greatest failure. Overall, the Cambodians enjoyed more freedom from fear and freedom from want than any time since the mid-1970s.

This chapter explores the theoretical framework of global governance and UN implementation of related principles through the mediums of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Measurements of the success of such operations introduced in this chapter include legality, legitimacy, and efficacy/effectiveness. Legality is presented from the perspective of both ‘positive’ international law, and the prescriptions of customary law. Legitimacy is examined in terms of international recognition, local ownership, and human-centred good governance. Efficacy is defined with regard to the stated goals of UN operations and how well they provide for the human security of all, but especially the most vulnerable. East Asian perspectives and conditions are also counterposed to the universal aspirations of the UN and liberal peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It concludes with a chapter overview.

The UN missions in Timor-Leste were a limited success when assessed in terms of legality, legitimacy, and efficacy. They would not have been launched had the UN Security Council not reached an agreement and would not have enjoyed as much legitimacy as they did if stakeholders such as the Timorese political elites, Indonesia, Portugal, and Australia had objected to the proposed mandates. Comparatively, however, the degree of legality was higher than that of legitimacy, and local legitimacy waned as Timorese elite felt uncomfortable with the usurpation of sovereignty by the UN. Despite the earlier mistakes and setbacks in 2006 of the UN intervention, the Timorese enjoyed more freedom from fear and want than any time since the declaration of independence in 1975.

This chapter develops a typology of ‘mid-space local bridge-builders’ who move across different cleavages in a conflict-prone society to facilitate dialogue among competing stakeholders. It employs relevant concepts such as gatekeepers and spoilers to connect the dots between the outcomes of peacebuilding and the roles and functions that ‘mid-space local bridge-builders’ can play in a peace process. Gatekeepers hold keys to three different gateways: (1) horizontal (between contending communities), (2) vertical (between the national/top leaders and the grassroots/bottom of the society) and (3) diagonal (between local and international actors) gates. Under certain circumstances and by performing specific intermediary functions, gatekeepers can bridge horizontal, vertical and diagonal gaps, effectively turning to ‘mid-space local bridge-builders’. This chapter argues that bridge-building is done through ‘relational dialogue platforms’ on which different stakeholders meet and shape the nature of hybrid peacebuilding, and it discusses the conceptual models for such platforms.

The birth of Timor-Leste as a country was midwifed by the ‘executive’ mandate of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). This was a ‘hybrid’ form of governance. On the one hand, ‘western’ or ‘liberal’ ideas such as democracy and civil society were brought into the system, on the other, ‘indigenous’ or ‘authoritarian’ forms of governance were kept intact. The UN executive authority allowed little room for local voices. At the same time, Timorese leaders shared ‘indigenous’ authoritarian traits and some maintained a ‘resistance’ mentality. In fact, such traits and mentality were upheld by the very approach used by the neo-trusteeship missions of the UN, as Timorese leaders continued to resist the usurpation of their sovereignty by the UN. In other words, the autocratic methodology of post-conflict international peacebuilding contributed the emergence of a neo-authoritarian regime in Timor-Leste.