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As epitomised by the 2016 Communication outlining a ‘Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats’, the European Union (EU) is increasingly involved in tackling destabilisation challenges ranging from disinformation to energy disruptions and cyberattacks. This chapter examines EU response to hybrid threats by looking at two types of policy instruments. The first one, the fight against disinformation, is a ‘soft’ type of response that the EU has increasingly adopted since 2015 as an answer to misinformation campaigns that have targeted it by a variety of actors, including Russia and the self-proclaimed Islamic State. The second one is a more traditional, ‘hard’ form of action, namely, the planning and implementation of sanctions and restrictive measures. Not only are strategic communication and sanctions key to countering hybrid threats. As this chapter illustrates, both policy instruments require especially close cooperation across military and civilian public actors and between the public and the private sector. Hence, strategic communications and sanctions are crucial cases in the study of EU responses to hybrid threats and the importance of a comprehensive approach in effectively countering them.

The evolution of sanctions from comprehensive to targeted has favored the inclusion of for-profit actors in the policy process. Sanctions are used to deal with security challenges and while the role of for-profit actors in the provision of public goods has been investigated, less has been said about their role in the provision of security. This chapter investigates the role of for-profit actors in the implementation of sanctions. More specifically, this chapter suggests a typology of regulatory environments that facilitates explaining and understanding the behavior of for-profit actors in implementing targeted sanctions. By looking at the quality of instructions provided by state authorities and their capacity to monitor the implementation of such decisions, the chapter argues that overcompliance, uneven and lack of compliance are more likely in certain regulatory environments rather than in others. The theoretical framework is tested on the case study of the restrictive measures of the EU. The data for this research was collected through semi-opened interviews and focus groups held in Brussels from 2013 to 2015.

The evolution of sanctions from comprehensive to targeted has favored the inclusion of for-profit actors in the policy process. Sanctions are used to deal with security challenges and while the role of for-profit actors in the provision of public goods has been investigated, less has been said about their role in the provision of security. This chapter investigates the role of for-profit actors in the implementation of sanctions. More specifically, this chapter suggests a typology of regulatory environments that facilitates explaining and understanding the behavior of for-profit actors in implementing targeted sanctions. By looking at the quality of instructions provided by state authorities and their capacity to monitor the implementation of such decisions, the chapter argues that overcompliance, uneven and lack of compliance are more likely in certain regulatory environments rather than in others. The theoretical framework is tested on the case study of the restrictive measures of the EU. The data for this research was collected through semi-opened interviews and focus groups held in Brussels from 2013 to 2015.