Search

The issue of economic growth has been the focus of great attention in the economics literature for a long period of time. Based on the model developed by Solow, neoclassical growth theory predicts differences in growth rates based on, among other factors, a country’s propensity to invest. Levine and Renelt find empirical support for this prediction. As a result, there have been numerous works that seek to identify the determinants of investment rates. From the myriad of variables that have been studied, there have been efforts to identify the ones that are more robustly associated with economic performance. This literature has a special value for antitrust law and economics because the factors that influence a firm’s decision to invest are directly related to the decision of entering a market. Not taking them into account can lead to error costs in enforcement interventions.

At present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.

Not all innovative processes rely on IP exclusive rights to incentivize and protect their content. While strategic considerations on the costs and convenience of IP enforcement generally play an important role, in specific sectors alternative norms and practices have proven more effective than exclusive rights in fostering progress by turning inclusivity into benefits, thus challenging IP protection at its core. At a first glance, the wide-ranging sector of digital data-driven innovations presents a twofold nature: on the one hand, they require remarkable investments, which likely call for a strict approach to IP rights; and on the other hand, they make interoperability and follow-up creations key factors of technological progress, thus valuing inclusivity in the enhancement of resource allocation and services.

A key issue for any dispute resolution mechanism is the question of effectiveness of decisions. This is ensured by the fact that these are not only final and binding (see paras. 469 et seqq.), but also legally enforceable if necessary.

Background Historically, police departments focused solely on criminal justice issues. Recently, there has been a dynamic shift in focus, with Law Enforcement professional groups assuming more responsibility for tackling mental health and distress-related issues (that may arise because of mental health related problems and learning disabilities) alongside Public Health departments. While Law Enforcement has become a ‘last line of support’ and an increasing partner in mental health support, there is partnership working between law enforcement, psychology, and health professions in training and mental health service delivery. The term vulnerability is frequently used across Law Enforcement and Public Health (LEPH) to identify those in need of these services. Effective vulnerability assessment is therefore expected to prevent unintentional harmful health and criminal justice consequences and manage the negative impact of such in cases where prevention is not possible. This scoping review aimed to identify how vulnerability is defined and assessed across LEPH organisations. Results Vulnerability is context-specific from a Law Enforcement perspective, and person-specific from a Public Health perspective. Definitions of vulnerability are at best fragmented, while models for assessing vulnerability lack uniformity across LEPH. The implications are two-fold. For “vulnerable groups”, the lack of an evidence-based definition and assessment model could prevent access to relevant LEPH services, exacerbating issues of multiple vulnerabilities, co-morbidity, and/or dual diagnosis. All could inadvertently enable social exclusion of vulnerable groups from political discourse and policy interventions. The lack of consistency regarding vulnerability may result in reactive crisis responses as opposed to proactive preventative measures. Conclusions This scoping review exposes the complexities associated with defining and assessing vulnerability from a LEPH perspective, which are perceived and prioritised differently across the organizations. Future research must bridge this gap. Building on the establishment of a definition of vulnerability within the empirical literature, researchers ought to engage with service users, LEPH staff, and those engaged in policy making to craft effective vulnerability definitions and assessment models. Only through evidence based, co-produced definitions and assessment models for vulnerability can we ensure that best-practice, but also meaningful and feasible practice, in vulnerability assessment can be achieved.

Clearly, the institutional design of a RTA does not constitute the only factor that determines the success of regional competition law enforcement. General enforcement difficulties related to economical, socio-cultural or political parameters have an essential impact. Yet the correlation between these prevailing circumstances and a certain institutional design cannot be neglected, as institutions do not constitute abstract and isolated constructs. Rather, institutions can be defined as a set of rules that set a standard of behaviour for the members of a society. On the other hand, organizations are groups of individuals that follow a common purpose in order to reach a common goal. Organizations, such as public agencies, are created in order to render these institutions effective and to enforce the set of rules. The interplay of both determines the framework of rules for members in a society. Institutions and their particular design are thus entwined with a society and its members: on the one hand they are defined by the society’s purpose and on the other hand they set the rules for the society.

For people in the street the process of making EU law is not sufficiently transparent. They have difficulties to understand its democratic legitimacy. As regards content they still today joke about the attempt of EU law to regulate the bending of cucumbers. Important parts of EU law have turned out to be overambitious, e.g. the Maastricht Criteria on Member State indebtedness, the Monetary Union and the Schengen/Dublin Union on migration. Some Parts of Union law are not applicable at all in some Member States—as a result there exist several Unions with membership that differs from Union to Union. The adoption of EU law is more and more replaced by intergovernmental solutions at Member States level, i.e. by traditional means of international public law. Whether the Commission as guardian of the Treaties in case of violation of EU Law takes steps for enforcement has become a matter of political opportunism. As a result people in the street have lost confidence in EU Law whereas the Commission keeps pressing for more EU law as if the many warning signs around did not exist.

Regional integration is a dynamic process in the first place. RTAs and their competition laws do not represent rigid legal constructions, but constitute dynamic systems that need to adapt to changing circumstances. This in particular applies to a regional competition law, because ideally with the emergence of domestic competition law structures, also cultural and political awareness and commitment towards competition law will increase. Therefore, the question is whether the legal systems of the WAEMU, the AndeanC and the CARICOM are generally capable of (quickly) adapting to changes. Have the competition law systems of the WAEMU, the AndeanC and the CARICOM changed over time? In a second step one should then evaluate whether the regional competition policies were introduced at a “good” moment and whether changes to the regional competition law system led to efficiency gains.

The question of whether competition law implementation and enforcement constitutes a relevant concern for developing countries is certainly legitimate. In fact, it was a common view that the implementation of competition laws in developing countries in the first place was not a sovereign decision of these countries, but one that was obtruded by the pressure of foreign international institutions. In the absence of liberalized markets in developing countries, there was little incentive to support the introduction and development of competition laws. Rather, the enactment of competition laws was in some instances made a precondition by the developed world for economic cooperation and trade with developing countries. This perceived imposition, occurring in the context of local markets marked by strong state intervention, constituted and still constitutes a hurdle to effective competition law enforcement in developing countries.

The institutional design of and the interplay between the competent competition law authorities and other bodies of law that are involved in regional competition law enforcement is of crucial importance in order to understand enforcement processes in the WAEMU, the AndeanC and the CARICOM. One thus has to identify the actors that participate in the enforcement process in the narrow sense, in particular the decision-making process. Moreover, one should also consider and evaluate the impact and reach of possible controlling mechanisms by other organs, such as judicial review or mandatory cooperation mechanisms.

Based on a comparison and analysis of regional competition law enforcement in the WAEMU, the AndeanC and the CARICOM, one can identify certain “competition constraints” that impact regional competition law enforcement. In accordance with the slogan “one size does not fit all”, the experiences described in this study demonstrate that these competition constraints do not constitute parameters that will never change, but constitute interrelated and dynamic factors that cause different outcomes in different RTAs. As an attempt to summarize the results of the previous analysis, eleven broad policy recommendations regarding the degree of centralization or decentralization of regional competition law enforcement can be formulated.

Regional integration is often automatically associated with the concept of supranationality. However, while supranationality might have constituted a key driver in the European competition and general economic system, it is not an indispensable condition for a regional competition law regime’s success. Moreover, the concept of supranationality can materialize in different forms, reflecting different degrees of integration and centralization. As the interplay of regional bodies, substantive law and enforcement competences has shown, inter-governmentalism and supranationality do not appear as alternative forms of regional integration, but cumulative factors that shape the overall design of an agreement. Yet, the existence of both factors also bears potential for conflicts and calls for a balancing act. A regional competition law system in particular has to provide for mechanisms and principles that resolve conflicts that might arise from an ambiguous allocation of competences.

In order to draw conclusions on the vertical allocation of competences, the enforcement in the narrow sense of regional competition law is of vital importance. Enforcement is a multi-layered process, which at each stage might attribute competition law competences to different entities.

Having defined the elements that shape the degree of centralization or decentralization of competition law enforcement in the WAEMU, the AndeanC and the CARICOM, the next section will draw general conclusions and discuss the implications for the institutional design of competition law enforcement in developing countries. This mainly raises two questions: (1) Which implications result from a specific institutional design of competition law enforcement? The answer to this question will be given for the specific “dimensions” of competition law enforcement in an RTA. (2) What are the conditions in the sense of “competition constraints” that determine the efficacy of a certain institutional competition law enforcement design?

Before evaluating the different degrees of centralization or decentralization, this section sheds some light on the main difficulties and incentives for the implementation of national competition law structures and regional competition law enforcement that arose in the context of a regional competition law system.

Irrespective of the strong influence of the European competition law system, the WAEMU, the AndeanC and the CARICOM have adopted different institutional designs, ranging from a decentralized system, in which member states and national competition law authorities are vested with most competition law enforcement competences (e.g. CARICOM) to a centralized system, in which the main focus of competition law enforcement remains regional (e.g. WAEMU).