1. Protocol Analysis with Time
- Author
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José Meseguer, Damián Aparicio-Sánchez, Catherine Meadows, Santiago Escobar, and Julia Sapiña
- Subjects
FOS: Computer and information sciences ,Soundness ,Computer Science - Logic in Computer Science ,021110 strategic, defence & security studies ,Computer Science - Cryptography and Security ,Syntax (programming languages) ,Computer science ,Programming language ,Process calculus ,0211 other engineering and technologies ,Protocol analysis ,02 engineering and technology ,Cryptographic protocol ,computer.software_genre ,Symbolic data analysis ,Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO) ,Satisfiability modulo theories ,0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering ,020201 artificial intelligence & image processing ,Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ,Protocol (object-oriented programming) ,computer ,LENGUAJES Y SISTEMAS INFORMATICOS - Abstract
[EN] We present a framework suited to the analysis of cryptographic protocols that make use of time in their execution. We provide a process algebra syntax that makes time information available to processes, and a transition semantics that takes account of fundamental properties of time. Additional properties can be added by the user if desirable. This timed protocol framework can be implemented either as a simulation tool or as a symbolic analysis tool in which time references are represented by logical variables, and in which the properties of time are implemented as constraints on those time logical variables. These constraints are carried along the symbolic execution of the protocol. The satisfiability of these constraints can be evaluated as the analysis proceeds, so attacks that violate the laws of physics can be rejected as impossible. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by using the Maude-NPA protocol analyzer together with an SMT solver that is used to evaluate the satisfiability of timing constraints. We provide a sound and complete protocol transformation from our timed process algebra to the Maude-NPA syntax and semantics, and we prove its soundness and completeness. We then use the tool to analyze Mafia fraud and distance hijacking attacks on a suite of distance-bounding protocols., This paper was partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MCIU under grant RTI2018-094403-B-C32, by the Spanish Generalitat Valenciana under grant PROMETEO/2019/098 and APOSTD/2019/127, by the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-17-1-0286, and by ONR Code 311.
- Published
- 2020