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The prevalence of technology-embedded products, services, and cities, described colloquially as 'smart' technologies and 'smart' cities, has seen a spate of unprecedented growth in recent years. South Africa (SA) has not been left behind, with smartphones, smart watches, and smart voice-controlled virtual personal assistants such as Amazon's Alexa now frequently used. But while these technologies hold great promise to revolutionise homes, offices and cities, their adoption poses challenges to individual and collective interests and wellbeing. After demonstrating the legal and ethical difficulties brought about by the introduction of these technologies, this article explores whether SA legislation is sufficiently robust to address these challenges. While the current legislative landscape addresses certain crucial difficulties - such as the safeguarding of personal data by the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013 ('POPIA') - it is suggested that the position regulating other aspects of smart technology adoption is, in large part, fragmented and ill-equipped to deal with some of the more pressing legal and ethical questions. Our contention is that, not dissimilar to the issues arising from artificial intelligence-based technological adoption, the extant legislative and regulatory frameworks do not go far enough in addressing the many concerns emerging from recent novel technological design, development, and deployment. Not only do smart technologies give rise to unique challenges, so does their deployment within the Global South and in South Africa, in particular. We suggest that appropriate and effective regulatory reform measures be undertaken in SA to provide better ethical guidance and policy prescriptions buttressed by rigorous regulatory oversight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has raised interest in the application of e-health or d-health (digital health) innovations throughout the world. Many countries have rapidly developed, refined or retooled e-health solutions and existing legislation and guidelines to permit their swift implementation. It is anticipated that these events will stimulate sustained change in the interest in and use of e-health (e.g. telehealth, telemedicine, m-health (mobile health), e-learning and health informatics). The stance of the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) has hampered this response, initially even in the face of the pandemic. This article reviews recent events in SA, relevant World Medical Association statements and international COVID-19-related responses. It concludes that the HPCSA must acknowledge global experience, and provide SA with clear, evidence-based and clinically practicable guidelines that promote and sustain the use of telemedicine broadly, now and post COVID-19. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Telemedicine has the potential to assist in the provision of healthcare in South Africa (SA). This means of healthcare service provision involves patients, doctors and machines working together, with few constraints imposed by geography, or national or institutional boundaries. Although the practice is largely beneficial, certain legal and ethical challenges arise from the use of electronic healthcare services. Certain ethical challenges are identified as: the changing nature of the traditional doctor-patient relationship; standards of care; quality of care; privacy; confidentiality; data protection; accountability; liability; consent; record-keeping; data storage; and authentication. While various legal, regulatory and governance measures offer potential solutions and remedies for protection, ethical direction may be achieved through statutory bodies set up to promote and foster ethical compliance with normative healthcare standards. Recently, the Health Professions Council of SA (HPCSA) made an attempt to address the ethical issues by publishing a set of telemedicine guidelines. Despite this, issues around the practice of telemedicine remain unresolved. This article seeks to inform the development of a new ethical framework by addressing three distinct and relevant ethical issues: the fiduciary nature of healthcare and the changing nature of the doctor-patient relationship; privacy, confidentiality and the sensitivity of health data; and informed consent. It does so by proposing a broader and more nuanced solution to these ethical obstacles by identifying conceptual and operational difficulties within the existing HPCSA telemedicine guidelines, and advancing suggestions for reform. This speaks to a more highly integrated perspective that is culturally and contextually aware, and which affirms the need to strike a balance between individual rights protection and transformative, ethical, healthcare innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Letter by Thaldar and Townsend, following an article by the same authors (Thaldar D, Townsend B. Genomic research and privacy: A response to Staunton et al. S Afr Med J 2020;110(3):172-174. https://doi.org/10.7196/SAMJ.2020.v110i3.14431) and both commenting on an article by Staunton et al. (Staunton C, Adams R, Botes M, et al. Safeguarding the future of genomic research in South Africa: Broad consent and the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013. S Afr Med J 2019;109(7):468-470. https://doi.org/10.7196/SAMJ.2019.v109i7.14148); and response to article and letter by Staunton et al.

The Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013 (POPIA) promises a new dispensation of privacy protection for research participants in South Africa. In a recent article, Staunton et al. proposed that a purposive interpretation of POPIA would allow for the retention of the status quo of broad consent in the context of genomic research. In this response article, we analyse the argument presented by Staunton et al., and conclude that it fails to convince: firstly, because Staunton et al. do not present empirical data for their factual assumption that moving up the consent benchmark is likely to stymie research; secondly, because genomic research does not have a monopoly on the public interest, but shares it with the privacy rights of research participants; and thirdly, because POPIA was designed to promote the protection of privacy, not simply to preserve the status quo as found in existing policy instruments. In contrast to the position advocated by Staunton et al., we suggest that a purposive interpretation of POPIA is aligned with the plain meaning of the statute - namely that specific (not broad) consent is a prerequisite for research on genomic information.This article, which comments on an article by Staunton et al. (Staunton C, Adams R, Botes M, et al. Safeguarding the future of genomic research in South Africa: Broad consent and the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013. S Afr Med J 2019;109(7):468-470. https://doi.org/10.7196/SAMJ.2019.v109i7.14148), is followed by a letter by Thaldar and Townsend (Privacy rights of human research participants in South Africa must be taken seriously. S Afr Med J 2020;110(3):175-176. https://doi.org/10.7196/SAMJ.2020.v110i3.14450); and a response to the article and letter by Staunton et al. (S Afr Med J 2020;110(3):175-176. https://doi.org/10.7196/SAMJ.2020.v110i3.14450).