1. AVERAGE SUBMODULARITY OF MAXIMIZING ANTICOORDINATION IN NETWORK GAMES.
- Author
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DAS, SOHAM and EKSIN, CEYHUN
- Subjects
- *
GRAPH theory , *APPROXIMATION algorithms , *GAME theory , *GAMES , *BIPARTITE graphs , *NEIGHBORS - Abstract
We consider the control of decentralized learning dynamics for agents in an anticoordination network game. In the anticoordination network game, there is a preferred action in the absence of neighbors' actions, and the utility an agent receives from the preferred action decreases as more of its neighbors select the preferred action, potentially causing the agent to select a less desirable action. The decentralized dynamics that are based on the synchronous best-response dynamics converge for the considered payoffs. Given a convergent action profile, we measure anticoordination by the number of edges in the underlying graph that have at least one agent in either end of the edge not taking the preferred action. A designer wants to find an optimal set of agents to control under a finite budget in order to achieve maximum anticoordination (MAC) on game convergence as a result of the dynamics. We show that the MAC is submodular in expectation over all realizations of the payoff interaction constants in bipartite networks. The proof relies on characterizing well-behavedness of MAC instances for bipartite networks, and designing a coupling between the dynamics and another distribution preserving selection protocol, for which we can show the diminishing returns property. Utilizing this result, we obtain a performance guarantee for the greedy optimization of MAC. Finally, we provide a computational study to show the effectiveness of greedy node selection strategies to solve MAC on general bipartite networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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