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The present work focuses on the three central moments of Kant’s practical philosophy (the third antinomy of the transcendental dialectic, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the beginning of the second Critique) by establishing the concept of “moral insight” as its guideline. Our objective is both negative and positive: first, we aim to deconstruct the view that Kant relapses into dogmatism in the KpV due to his use of the concept of the “fact of reason”, which offers immediate evidence for the moral law; second, we aim to show that Kant’s philosophy has developed in a way that led Kant to the conclusion that a deduction along the lines of the KrV would be inadequate for practical reason. Kant effectively recognizes throughout his intellectual path that the notion of “moral insight” demands a new approach, which was first attempted in the Groundwork but only achieved its conclusive form in the second Critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]