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This study examines the effects of international expansion on domestic growth in family firms (FFs) versus non-FFs. Integrating international business research into socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory, we argue that FFs seek to compensate for SEW losses (as implied by foreign direct investments) with SEW gains (associated with domestic growth). We claim that FFs are less prone to substitute home businesses with foreign activities and more likely to move back resources to foster domestic growth. Geographical diversification and modes of entry foster FFs' domestic growth to an even greater extent. A test conducted on Italian firms supports these hypothesized effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) offers a behavioral account of executive incentives, according to which the perceived threats to CEO wealth, that is, CEO risk bearing, influence a CEO's propensity to undertake innovation investments. While examining stock options extensively, the extant BAM research devotes relatively scant attention to other forms of incentives, such as stock ownership, that are conducive to one source of risk bearing, that is, employment risk. Furthermore, with an emphasis placed on the CEO, much BAM research neglects the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board. This study refines the BAM and empirically explores the countervailing forces exerted by the CEO and board ownership. It elucidates that while CEO ownership exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with innovation investment, board ownership weakens that relationship. An exploratory test on a sample of 108 Italian manufacturing firms provides support for the hypothesized effects. The refined BAM sheds further light on executive incentives through a behavioral lens, by elucidating the role of stock ownership and the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study develops a combined agency–resource dependence perspective and applies it to the study of interlocking directorates. It suggests that interlocking directorates may exert either a positive or a negative effect on subsequent firm performance, depending on the firm’s relative resources, power imbalance, ownership concentration, and CEO ownership. A test on a sample of 145 Italian companies provides support for hypothesized effects. This study suggests that integrating agency and resource dependence theories provides a higher-order explanation of firm performance and helps advance both agency and resource dependence theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]