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State School Nurse Consultants provide leadership and technical assistance in many areas related to safety, education, and well-being of students. One area of assistance includes health surveillance and disease prevention. During the pandemic, summer of 2020, the legislative co-chairs of the New Jersey State School Nurses Association advocated for a State School Nurse Consultant position at the New Jersey Department of Education. The story of their relentless pursuit of legislation that would support this position is shared in this article archiving one of the most tumultuous times in recent school nursing history. Successful passage of a law to establish the position of a State School Nurse Consultant was only the initial step in a life-lesson about advocacy, patience, and collaboration. Learn about the roses and thorns of school nursing legislative advocacy and consider joining your affiliates' legislative team! [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The number of seats in national legislatures around the world rarely changes. Yet, in Africa, a substantial number of countries have regularly increased the size of their legislatures, and these increases have become more common in recent years. Previous research on political offices in Africa's electoral autocracies has suggested that their numbers and increases are largely motivated by patronage and clientelist considerations. Is this also the case for national legislatures? Curiously, very little political science scholarship exists on legislature size, either in Africa or the rest of the world. Using a mixture of descriptive statistics to present a new database, as well as econometrics and three case studies, we find that legislative expansion can be linked to executive branch manipulation. Presidents have found it politically useful to expand the size of African legislatures to weaken and/or control it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The weak implementation of the House of Representatives', or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat's (DPR), function indicates stagnation in Indonesia's democracy. This fact is due to the party oligarchy's stronghold in the Jokowi government, which ignores the nature of public representation that should be carried out. The oligarchy controls the government and DPR's performance in establishing political compromises for every legislative policy with the government to facilitate the affairs of party oligarchs, who are also the members of the Jokowi government coalition. In addition, they engage in cartel politics to secure their respective power and material interests. This article examines the roles of party oligarchs in influencing the implementation of political functions in the DPR. Ironically, the coalition formed by the party oligarchy has helped the Jokowi government and the DPR to secure government policies and the economic and political interests of the oligarchic group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A formal partnership between a state-level umbrella association of educational administrators and one of its constituent associations, the association of gifted education administrators, has resulted in successful legislative and policy advocacy for gifted education. The formal partnership encouraged leaders of the gifted education professional community to identify as administrators and to collaborate with superintendents, principals, and other central office administrators. For the past three decades, this unique partnership has flourished and provides a model that other states can adapt to their context. In addition to the formal administrative association partnership, an informal partnership operates between two state gifted education associations (one focused on gifted education coordinators and administrators; the other focused on teachers and parents) and the umbrella organization of central office and building level educational administrators in the state. A key feature of the formal partnership is shared governance between the umbrella association and its 12 member associations, one of which comprises gifted education administrators. The informal partnership is linked by advocacy and policy development initiated by the salaried Legislative Advocate and a standing Legislative committee that includes the presidents of the state association for gifted education administrators and the president of the teacher and parent association. The benefits of the formal partnership and suggestions for initiating such a partnership in other states are discussed. The complexities of the informal partnership are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we analyze how legislator–voter relationships influence legislative organization. We argue that legislators who engage in clientelistic practices to gain votes will create much larger committee systems, with more committees, than legislators who engage in more programmatic practices. We test these arguments using an original dataset on the number of committees in the lower chambers of seventy-seven democracies throughout the world. Our analysis demonstrates that the number of committees is higher in legislatures with clientelistic practices than in legislatures with programmatic practices. The results provide a new understanding of how legislator–voter relationships influence legislative organization and lay the groundwork for a series of studies that examine how the clientelism-programmatic spectrum influences legislative organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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