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This article argues that efforts by international donors, in particular the EU, to build the capacity of environmental NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina has less to do with fostering democratic stability and civil society, and more to do with establishing a new epistemic community. Among critics, the technocratic, apolitical and rather benign term ‘capacity building’ has become code for the transformation and undermining of ‘local’ knowledge, the disregard for existing ‘capacities’, the construction of new networks of experts and the importation of rationalities based on West European discourses and constructions of ecological risk, sustainable development and policy responses. Not surprisingly, the weaker the post-socialist state – legacies of ethnic conflict, the severity of economic collapse – the greater the extent to which capacity-building assistance seeks to transform policy communities, actors and networks. From the perspective of environmental mobilisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is argued that the limitations of environmental capacity-building assistance are due in large part to the failure of donors to distinguish between different ‘capacities’, and their insistence on prioritising the development of project grant expertise and organisational management know-how over and above other developmental needs. The article illustrates the extent to which environmental movement organisations either require very basic developmental assistance or need more bespoke support that will enable them to engage effectively in political and legal contestation with the state. The article concludes that while aspects of environmental capacity-building assistance are clearly having a positive impact, the rigidity of donor aid and the framework of project grants as the mechanism for delivering assistance are limiting the impact to a narrow elite of organisations, of which some are neither non-governmental nor linked to indigenous local environmental networks within civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this thematic cluster, we explore why and how democratic erosion in post-Communist Europe has led to widespread civic mobilization. We set out the goals and motivations of citizens who choose to protest in defense of liberal democracy. We also compare across cases what pro-democracy protestors believe they have achieved by protesting—and what kinds of changes they believe are needed to end or attenuate the democratic erosion that sent them into the streets. The different contributions to this special section highlight variation in the role of elections: while protestors in some countries expect electing a new government to bring substantial, positive change, protestors in other countries consider that long-term structural reforms are needed. Still other protestors choose to back an electoral boycott as a way to express their opposition to the regime. Even when protests do not achieve short-term goals, such as spurring policy reversals, policy reforms, or changes in government, protestors believe that they raise awareness in society about democratic processes and the role of citizens in them. We also explore how democratic backsliding has impacted the rights of the LGBTQ+ community, which has generally benefited from democratization over the last three decades in post-Communist Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]