Search

Governments often use curfews as counterinsurgency measures. Do such state actions affect citizens' political preferences? We argue that citizens' responses depend on their group alignment. Citizens who are aligned with the government are more likely to interpret state actions as serving their interests and reward the governing parties as a result. Citizens who are aligned with the insurgent movement, however, are likely to interpret these same actions as targeted and disengage from politics: they have no reason to reward the governing parties and may also be fearful of expressing support for the parties affiliated with the insurgent movement. We find support for this argument with survey data from Turkey, fielded before and during curfews. When exposed to curfews, Turks generally increase their support for the governing party. However Kurds do not increase their support for the governing party or the opposition; instead, we present strong evidence that they withdraw their support from the Kurdish opposition and become more hesitant to express any political preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that the geographic distribution of power across different levels of government influences citizens' attachments to alternative collective groups. In federal states where authority is shared between the center and regions, individuals are more likely to have attachments to multiple groups. We present evidence for the impact of state structure on collective attachments using the case of supranational European identity. We show that in countries where state structure empowers sub-state governments, individuals manifest stronger attachments to a supranational European community than they do in unitary states. This study indicates that when we examine individuals' attachments to a collective group, the political-institutional context in which these individuals are embedded is an important factor to consider. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the factors that help EU member states to secure favourable bargaining outcomes? Although existing research highlights the importance of the member states' 'political power', scholars tend to equate this with their voting power. In this paper, I argue that proposal-making power associated with the EU presidency helps the member states to obtain preferable negotiation outcomes. Analysis of the cross-state allocation of the EU budget from 1977-2003 shows that holding the EU presidency during the time of allocation decisions brings financial benefits to individual member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between territorial representation and fiscal redistribution in the European Union. Given that small states are over-represented in both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, simple models of legislative vote-buying predict that over-represented member states will be favored in the distribution of EU transfers. We examine this proposition for each manifestation of the EC or EU since 1977 with data on agricultural, regional development, and total net transfers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]