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The East China Sea (ECS) is one of the region's most significant and oft-times under-addressed potential flashpoints. In this article we take a holistic approach and reexamine the recent actions of East Asia's two most significant powers, China and Japan, in relation to this important body of maritime space, as well as those of the United States (US), as the incumbent regional hegemon. Specifically, we examine the efficacy of each. This highlights a dynamism in Chinese actions, as well as elucidating how the US and Japan have come to adopt policies that are of dubious efficacy as a means of alleviating or nullifying the escalation of unwanted tensions across the ECS. In so doing, we draw upon two key concepts, immobilism and confirmation bias, that help us to understand why the US and Japan are failing to achieve their assumed objectives of regional stability and the maintenance of the status quo. Ultimately, we argue that a combination of immobilism and confirmation bias in American and Japanese foreign policy, in response to the greater dynamism and adaptability of regional great powers such as China, has led to latent changes in the status quo that risk undermining stability across the ECS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the leadership capacity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote international relations in East Asia. It is stated that the ASEAN Secretariat is staffed by only 243 officials and operates on an annual budget of only 9,050,000 dollars, which weakens its capacity. It is stated that ASEAN's capacity to influence great power relations in Asia does not emerge from its institutional makeup, but from social relationships with its member-states.

This article seeks to critically assess the relevance of International Relations Theory (IRT) for East Asia International Relations (IR). After identifying the shortcomings of IRT in explaining East Asia IR, the article provides several ways to modify it with a goal to make it more suitable for East Asia IR. Its central claim is that the IRT's bias toward European experiences and great power politics generates unsatisfactory accounts for and inaccurate predictions about East Asia IR. This does not mean, however, that we should treat IRT as completely irrelevant and develop an indigenous theory of East Asia IR. Given that no single theory is complete and perfectly relevant across time and space and that many core concepts and key variables of IRT are also pertinent for East Asia IR, our efforts should instead be made to refine the existing IRT and make it more suitable for East Asia IR by problematising its major assumptions and central claims on the basis of East Asian experiences. This will save IRT from being a region-specific and a country-specific theory of IR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) value added and limitations regarding its ability to play a role in regional security in East Asia. It is stated that ASEAN's contributions to regional security and within ASEAN-plus arrangements are not uniform, and are dependent on the relationship and the arrangement. It is mentioned that China, the U.S., and many other ASEAN states were initially resistant to the idea of new, expanded regional arrangements.

Original power transition theory is extended by relaxing the restrictive assumption of the method of augmenting national power. The occurrence of war in East Asia from 1860 to 1993 is examined to see if the revised power transition argument holds for the conflicts in East Asia. Results show that conflicts in East Asia occur under the same general conditions that lead to war in the international system and that war is most likely when the dissatisfied challenger approximates the dominant power. The evidence also suggests that the role of alliances is crucial for mitigating or militating the risk of war, contrary to the standard power transition formulation. Because alliances play a central role in the risk of wars, the dangers of such a conflict in East Asia (or elsewhere) can be managed through skillful strategies of alignment and de-alignment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relation between capital accumulation, crisis and class struggle has been a central theme of CSE since its foundation, indeed it has been central to Marxism since Marx and Engels first addressed the issue in The Communist Manifesto in 1848. In the wake of the East Asia crisis, and perhaps on the eve of another wave of crises of global capitalism, it is worth returning to the ideas that Marx and Engels developed in addressing the first crises of global capital.[1] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looks at the United States' foreign policy towards East Asia. America's strategic and economic interests in East Asia; Justification of the continuing large-scale military presence in the region; Details on Washington's ongoing military commitment to South Korea; Drawbacks of the US' policies in East Asia.