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Power usually lowers stress responses. In stressful situations, having high (vs. low) power heightens challenge and lowers threat. Yet, even power-holders may experience threat when becoming aware of the responsibility that accompanies their power. Power-holders can construe (i.e., understand) a high-power position primarily as opportunity to "make things happen" or as responsibility to "take care of things." Power-holders construing power as responsibility (rather than opportunity) may be more likely to experience demands-such as taking care of important decisions under their control-as outweighing their resources, resulting in less challenge and more threat. Four experiments with subjective and cardiovascular threat-challenge indicators support this. Going beyond prior work on structural aspects (e.g., power instability) that induce stress, we show that merely the way how power-holders construe their power can evoke stress. Specifically, we find that power construed as responsibility (vs. opportunity) is more likely to imply a "burden" for the power-holder.

Before approaching situations, individuals frequently imagine "what would happen, if . . . ." Such prefactual thought can promote confidence and facilitate behavior preparation when the upcoming situation can benefit from forethought, but it also delays action. The present research tested how social power predicts prefactual thought when its benefits are clear versus ambiguous. Power enhances flexible behavior adaptation and action tendencies-presumably without much forethought. We therefore proposed that power diminishes prefactual thought, unless the situation suggests that such thought is adaptive (i.e., could benefit performance). Power-holders indeed generated less prefactuals than the powerless (Experiments 1 and 2), but only if benefits for performance were ambiguous rather than clear (Experiment 3). These findings indicate that social context factors related to confidence affect prefactual thought, and that power-holders' flexible adaptation to the situation sometimes elicits inaction (i.e., prefactual thought) rather than spontaneous action., (© 2014 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.)

Research on targets' affective reactions to social discrimination has not yet addressed self- and other-directed anger at the same time. Four studies tested the hypothesis that the perceived cause of negative feedback moderates the impact of social identification on self-directed anger. In Studies 1 and 2, high levels of social identification led to less self-directed anger when negative feedback was attributed to social discrimination but not when it was attributed either to other external causes or internally. In Study 3, a cross-lagged design showed that higher identification led to less self-directed anger when negative feedback was attributed to social discrimination but not the other way around. This effect was found using scenarios (Studies 1-3) and also when using the recollection of personal experiences to manipulate attribution (Study 4). These results indicate that following social discrimination, social identification protects the self and does not increase individual vulnerability.