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The evolution of international production chains has facilitated the flow of industrial capital from developed countries into China. Multinational corporations in China apparently make huge profits through exploiting cheap labour, but they also exert pressure on their contractors to improve workers’ rights. International non-governmental organizations enter into the relationship with their moral force and global networks. The authority of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions was challenged, and new channels were offered in fighting for workers’ rights. But within the existing Chinese political system and labour-market system, their roles all remain limited; the protection and promotion of workers’ rights in China still demand a reform of the prevalent systems.

This article examines the Chinese perception of Russian foreign policy during the Putin administration by analysing Beijing's assessment of Russia's foreign policy objectives and its policy towards the U.S., as reflected in the official media and the authoritative publications of China's major security and foreign policy think tanks. Promoting multi-polarity and checks and balances against U.S. unilateralism has been a very significant consideration on the part of the Chinese leadership. Using the concept of the “strategic triangle”, the article demonstrates how changes in U.S.-Russian relations have probably become the most important variable in this push for multipolarity. In the past decade and a half, Sino-Russian relations have improved when Russia has become disappointed with the support it received from the U.S. There have also been periods of time when Russia has anticipated closer relations with the U.S. and thus neglected China's vital interests. The Chinese leadership, however, has exercised restraint at such times. There has been greater optimism in Beijing concerning Sino-Russian relations in recent years because of the expanding economic ties, Russia's increasing oil wealth and Putin's authoritarian orientation.

This article examines the issues related to the admission of mainland Chinese capital and enterprises into Taiwan triggered off by Taiwan's membership in the World Trade Organization, including the coordination of political views, the adjustments in policies, the revisions of statutes, and the setting up of administrative monitoring mechanisms in Taiwan. The issue of entry represents the interaction of economic and security interests on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and it reflects the Chinese leadership's united front offensive, the competition among the political parties in Taiwan, and the business community's articulation of its interests in the island. The analysis aims to illustrate legislative and other processes involved in the economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. These processes allow various parties concerned to set up obstacles that obstruct the desired economic exchanges. At the same time, the mutual economic interests, or at least the substantial economic interests on one side of the Taiwan Strait, constantly provide the momentum to overcome the obstacles. More importantly, the sophisticated business community can always find ways to overcome the obstacles in pursuit of their interests, for example, use of subsidiaries in tax havens.

A proactive strategy for the aging population was first proposed by the World Health Organization in 2002. Chinese authorities and experts in gerontology welcome the strategy, and they have already emphasized the need to safeguard the dignity of the elderly population and utilize their talents. There currently exists a shortage of expertise concerning the positive utilization of older persons, and attempts to implement such utilization must be monitored closely and may require preventive intervention. China's experts in gerontology therefore advocate new socioeconomic ideals regarding the elderly community, proposing refinement of statutes and policies to protect the rights of elderly people. Furthermore, the success of this proactive strategy demands social support, the mobilization of public opinion, and allocation of resources. It appears that the Chinese leadership has already laid a good foundation for this process.

Direct elections of residents committees in Shanghai cannot be claimed as an important experiment in political democracy. At best they are a legitimate organizational personnel reshuffle, and a successful one. The significance of exercising democratic rights is conspicuously absent. The Party organization and its agencies guided and controlled the entire electoral process, and there was general apathy among the residents. Some residents attempted to exercise their rights in the elections, but they were a minority and could not generate meaningful demonstration effects. Direct elections of residents committees did not involve competition between political programs and political proposals, and there was a lack of appeals, debates, confrontations, and compromises concerning the interests of the residents. In the building of grass-roots democracy in China’s cities, owners committees may have better potential.