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The bureaucratization of psychological science exacts intellectual costs that go beyond the sheer amount of time that is drained away from creative scientific activity. Additional administrative hurdles are now being generated in an attempt to ensure the replicability of psychological effects. A cognitive analysis of those hurdles shows that impairment of scientific creativity is a foreseeable consequence, owing to their frequent verbatim-processing focus and the negative emotional context in which they are embedded. We consider whether it is possible to enhance replicability without increasing bureaucratic obstacles and to enhance scientific creativity in the presence of such obstacles.

International audience; We claim that the models needed to describe scientific creativity (and, in particular, suitable to effectively detect it) have to be very sophisticated. Indeed, the process of creating original and predictive scientific theories is manifestly the most complex ever investigated by the human mind (There are also some paradoxical aspects in the action of a mind that is investigating its own way of functioning, but we are confident that it will be possible to avoid them). In mathematical physics one of the most complex state space structures is given by Fréchet Metric Manifolds. We conjecture that they will be needed to model the state of complexity of the mind of a scientist (However, we will not be surprised if an even more complex structure could be needed). The obtained models have a very important application: they are essential to design and rule the selection process that assigns a university chair (or a research grant). Recently some algorithms have been introduced to calculate some bibliometric indices. We claim that it is not reasonable to use them to evaluate the scientific quality of researchers, chair or grant holders, departments or whole universities. Instead, the only presently viable process must involve carefully designed procedures, similar to those used for forming juries. These procedures must be enforced to rule the formation and functioning of ad hoc peer committees entrusted to evaluate academic institutions and nominate professors, chairs or research grant holders. Bibliometrics and Scientometrics are too young as disciplines and therefore it is not possible yet, by means of the theoretical insight gained thanks to them, to design a more effective evaluation process. Only when game and artificial intelligence theories become sufficiently advanced will it become possible to efficiently replace selection peers committees (i.e. academic juries)

The aim of the present work is to analyze the interrelationship of cognition and emotion in the creative process of Carl Gustav Jung during the years 1906–1916, the period in which he sketched the basic ideas of his theory of the collective unconscious. The framework of this work is that of Howard Gruber, especially developed for carrying out psychological studies on scientific creativity, and designed for studying both the affective and cognitive aspects of the creative person, in order to recover the individual behind a work through the analysis of the three spheres in which she/he moves: private (personal documents, diaries), semi-private (discussions with close friends, face-to-face or by letter), and public (teachers, colleagues, etc.). Gruber attributes equal importance to all three; nevertheless, in this research the emphasis is placed on the semi-private sphere, as the connecting thread of the creative process, in that it is the most appropriate analytical space in which the cognitive and affective aspects are manifested in Jung. Therefore, its functioning is studied during the creative process, mentioning first its importance as the core of analysis in case studies, and moving on to analyze how it is projected toward the public sphere and toward the private sphere by means of inter-sphere connections.

Yanchar, Slife, and Warne (2008) recently contrasted core assumptions of the method-centered, scientific analytic reasoning approach to critical thinking that is dominant in psychology with their own alternative approach emphasizing integration of information from multiple perspectives. They contended that emphasis on the scientific analytic approach is associated with justification and neglects other strategies such as more open-minded and respectful dialogue that could promote innovation and theory development. This commentary on their article examines these claims in light of research on critical-thinking dispositions and scientific discovery. Their claims received mixed support, prompting recommendations for additional research and using the research evidence to revise the psychological claims of their alternative approach.

The Man in the White Suit is perhaps the major representation of a scientist in mainstream British films of the postwar period. The film was immensely popular at the time of its release in 1951 and continues to be influential today. This paper, which is part of an ongoing study of the image of scientists presented by the cinema during this period, analyzes The Man in the White Suit by comparing it with another film of the period, The Horse's Mouth, which presents an image of an artist, and two related film comedies. Many similarities can be seen between the characters of the scientists and the artists presented in these films. The reason for this, and the origin of the artist stereotype in the Romantic period of the early nineteenth century, are discussed. It is concluded that the stereotype of the artist is used as a model for the scientist because of the lack of familiarity with the nature of scientific creativity; artists and scientists may be treated similarly because both are seen as existing outside of the British class system. The question of whether the apparent innocence of the scientist in these films is seen as admirable or reprehensible is also discussed.

In order to determine the psychological influences contributing to scientific eminence, data from interviews, self-reports, peer ratings, observer ratings, and objective productivity measures were obtained on 99 full professors of physics, chemistry, and biology at major research universities in California. A structural model in which psychological factors were predicted to have a direct influence on both productivity and eminence and an indirect influence on eminence yielded a very good fit to the data. These findings support previous research on scientific creativity and eminence, and extend it by providing the first integrated structural model of scientific eminence.

By definition, science meets the public in a space which is public. This paper rests upon the assumption that this space has been considerably extended, and continues to differentiate. Imparting scientific knowledge is highly dynamic, and has led to a process of socially distributed knowledge through which an increasing number of heterogeneous sites in society are being created where knowledge is produced. Five public spaces are presented, ranging from the space of individual scientific creativity drawing upon cultural representations available in society, to a space in which ethno-scientific knowledge and practices encounter scientific ones, followed by the space in which the process of professionalization of expert knowledge and standards interlinks with protoprofessional knowledge and standards. The last two public spaces of encounter, the market and the hybrid space of public forums, are perhaps the most familiar. While the concrete patterns of interaction take very different forms, ranging from cooperative or reinforcing to confrontational, it is claimed that the boundaries separating the public from science are becoming more fluid. As a result, not only the public's knowledge of science, but also scientific and technological knowledge, are transformed through these structures.

Discovery was not admitted into the epistemological arena until quite recently owing to its conception as a psychological-not epistemological-enterprise (Reichenbach, 1938/1961). However, more recently it has come to be realized as crucial to the scientific process itself (Royce, 1988; Shames, 1988) and sufficiently structured so that its epistemological status cannot be gainsaid (Lugg, 1985). Its epistemological status thus secure, two things become immediately apparent: first, the epistemology of discovery implicates psychological activity and, second, it is more than merely ironic that intentionality has been rendered unwelcome in the psychological laboratory. After all, intentionality is not merely implicated in scientific creativity, that is to say, in the act of discovery, it also serves to demarcate the various manifestations of science, `taxonomically' conceived (Habermas, 1971, 1989). It is argued that discovery can be understood in terms of a psychofigurational model which is grounded on an understanding of `radical' metaphor which, in turn, is most likely apprehended by those possessed of an `exegetical' aptitude. On this view, discovery is a non-voluntaristic enterprise which implicates unconditional, non-purposive intentionality (Meiland, 1970) in the case of empirical-analytic science. On the other hand, the historical-hermeneutic and critical sciences have a more factitious character which implicates a purposive form of intentionality.

One key assumption of the psychology of science is that psychological factors make certain interests, talents, and abilities more likely and others less likely (Feist, 2006). The line of argument that Simonton (2009, this issue) puts forth—integrating and uniting the meta-literatures on dispositional and developmental influences on scientific and artistic creativity—is not only consistent with this assumption from the psychology of science, but it is also a breeding ground for a host of testable hypotheses and calls for future empirical investigations. Given Simonton's own extraordinary levels of scientific creativity, indeed it would be interesting to turn his ideas back on him to see how his science is a product of his own developmental and dispositional experiences. We'll leave that, however, for future biographers and psychologists of science.

This paper examines relations between the work habits of academic scientists and measures of scholarly eminence and productivity. Data for 549 facult' members in three disciplines in U. S. universities are examined in order to test previous arguments on the topic. Results are presented which are consistent with the hypothesis that associations between work habits and scholarly output vary with the level of predictability or routine in research work. To the extent that this level is a consequence of the underlying pattern of social integration in a scientificfield, these results imply that an understanding of scientific creativity andproductivity presupposes an understanding of patterns of social integration in science.

Finally, and what may be a fitting end for this recounting, there is a quotation of Francis Bacon's that gives a poetic interpretation of creativity in the scientist: "A scientist is neither an 'ant,' storing what it finds lying about ready-made, nor a 'spider,' spinning a web out of what its entrails secrete. He is a bee, visiting innumerable flowers and collecting the nectar it finds in them; but storing not this nectar in its crude state but the honey into which it turns."

Using peer nominations, 65 physical scientists were classified as either creative and productive, productive but not creative, or non-creative and non-productive. Each scientist was then interviewed to determine his information-receiving behaviors and attitudes. Results indicate that creative scientists are distinguished from other scientists in their use of people as sources of information and that they receive information from a wider field' of disciplinary areas.

AUTHOR Frederiksen, Norman; And Others TITLE Development of Provisional Criteria for the Study of Scientific Creativity. INSTITUTION Educational Testing Service, Princeton, N.J. SPONS AGENCY Graduate Record Examinations Board, Princeton, N.J. REPORT NO ETS-RM-3 PUB DATE Feb 73 NOTE 10p.; Paper presented at annual meeting of American Educational Research Association (New Orleans, Louisiana, February 25-March 1, 1973)