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State medical marijuana programs have proliferated in the United States in recent years. Marijuana sales are now estimated in billions of dollars per year with over two million patients, yet it remains unlawful under Federal law, and there is limited and conflicting evidence about potential effects on society. We present new evidence about potential effects on crime by estimating an economic crime model following the general approach developed by Becker. Data from 11 states in the Western United States are used to estimate the model and test hypotheses about potential effects on rates of violent and property crime. Fixed effects methods are applied to control for state-specific factors, with adjustments for first-order autocorrelation and cross-section heteroskedasticity. There is no evidence of negative spillover effects from medical marijuana laws (MMLs) on violent or property crime. Instead, we find significant drops in rates of violent crime associated with state MMLs.

U.S. law enforcement against the sale and possession of marijuana has been estimated to cost close to $8 billion a year in criminal justice resources. Current enforcement is justified if it provides net benefits greater than alternatives such as a legal, regulated market for marijuana. Prior research suggests that current levels of drug enforcement may increase nondrug crime and hard drug use. Here, local rates of property crime, homicide, and nonmarijuana drug possession are estimated as a function of economic conditions, enforcement effectiveness, and arrests for possession or sale of marijuana. The data consists of a pooled sample of over 1300 U.S. counties (1994–2001). The results suggest that marijuana arrests are associated with increases in homicides, burglaries, motor vehicle thefts, and larcenies along with subsequent increases in hard drug arrests. These results raise significant questions about the merits of policies that focus on criminal justice approaches to marijuana control.

This paper evaluates the relationships among federal anti-drug law enforcement expenditures, education and treatment expenditures, and public health outcomes. The data include four types of spending: criminal justice system, interdiction and international intelligence, education in the community and workplace, and drug treatment. These data were combined with mortality rates for drug abuse, a public health outcome. The empirical findings support the hypothesis that resources allocated to drug prevention and treatment have benefited the public health. Conversely, a 10% reduction in enforcement expenditures is associated with a long-run reduction of approximately 3,000 deaths per year.

A demand-based model of public sector spending is used to identify the economic determinants of the relative size of government in the United States for the period 1949 to 1998. The government's share of GDP is hypothesized to be a function of income growth (Wagner's Law), relative prices for public sector output (Baumol/Beck hypothesis), and several demographic, cyclical, and budget variables. Although nondefense, noninterest government spending as a share of GDP has not grown in recent decades, the results support both income and price explanations of increasing government size. It is shown that the income and price effects are sensitive to the degree of disaggregation used to define government spending shares. Higher relative prices outweigh economic growth as a factor behind increasing shares for government consumption. Economic growth dominates the relative price effect for investment purchases. The two effects are similar for transfer payments.

Cross-sectional data are used to assess the effect of state-level economic conditions on state outcomes in the 1992 presidential election. The analysis provides evidence on the role of macroeconomic variables in models of national election outcomes and presents simulations to determine whether changes in economic circumstances might have reversed the election's result. It is argued that self-interested voters are more likely to prefer a new president if they are experiencing unemployment or income losses, or if they fear that economic conditions may lead to their own unemployment or inadequate income growth. Altruistic voters may seek a change to improve the economic positions of others. Whether specified as the current unemployment rate or as recent real per capita income growth, states with subpar economic performances are found to have significantly higher voter shares for Clinton. The simulations indicate that reasonable adjustments in state unemploy ment rates do not reverse the election outcome, whereas more rapid personal income growth during the year prior to the election results in a Bush victory.

Static and dynamic translog cost models for the aggregate U.S. state and local government sector are estimated for 1952 to 1985. Inputs are capital, labor, and a combined nondurable goods and other services input, which includes "privatized" services. Estimates show that capital and labor are complements and own-price inelastic. The nondurable-service input is a substitute for both labor and capital and has an own-price elasticity closer to unity. It is used relatively more as the sector expands. The results offer an explanation for the characterization of the government as a low productivity industry and show an economic rather than political motivation for the privatization of some public services.

Recent legislation has reduced federal tax rates and provided for indexation of the personal income tax against inflation. These changes are in part designed to reduce the relative size of government in the U.S. economy. Testing assump tions behind this proposition, this article examines the causal relation between revenue and expenditure changes in explainingfederal budget growth. Statistical causality tests reveal that revenue growth generally precedes expenditure growth, confirming that growth in revenue capacity stimulates budget expan sion rather than deficit reduction. A trivariate causal model including GNP, however, suggests that both demand and supply factors are responsible for the budget's growth.