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How does dual-use technology influence cooperation? This study explores how the development of nuclear latency (the technological precursors to nuclear weapons) affects U.S. cooperative overtures toward its possessors. We argue that the ambiguous nature of nuclear latency creates uncertainty about the intentions of its possessors and impacts cooperation. Using event data, we find that a state’s possession of overt lab-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities is significantly correlated with greater cooperative overtures from the United States toward that country. These overtures may serve as effective tools to counter nuclear proliferation among these states. Yet, when latent states engage in a concerted effort to keep their facilities secret, both at the lab and a more advanced “pilot” stage, this relationship is reversed. These results carry important implications for the impact of emerging, dual-use technologies on international security broadly.

Members of the non-proliferation regime give technical assistance to countries contemplating nuclear weapons. This is puzzling: it facilitates the behavior donors wish to stop, and other forms of concessions do not have this drawback. Why do it? I develop a model of uncertainty, bargaining, and nuclear proliferation. In it, assistance hastens acquisition time but also generates a signal about the recipient’s domestic nuclear proficiency. This allows donors to better calibrate other concessions to the recipient. In equilibrium, donors sometimes find the information worth sacrificing bargaining leverage for. However, despite providing information, assistance can cause proliferation if donors believe that the recipient is competent but observe a misleading signal indicating incompetence. This paper works toward understanding how scientific intelligence affects international negotiations, an underexplored subject matter for political scientists.

A number of proposals for reducing tensions with North Korea have discussed alterations to the program of joint military exercises (JMEs) that South Korea holds. North Korea has also repeatedly called for a reduction or secession of JMEs. Would limiting or halting JMEs be a useful concession for securing a reduction of tensions on the peninsula? We argue that JMEs do not deter North Korea but, instead, provoke provocative rhetoric and actions, demonstrating that North Korea views JMEs as a serious threat to its security. In this paper, we establish a relationship between JMEs and North Korea’s actions. In response to a JME, North Korea can issue warnings or threats as well as take costly signals such as conducting missile or nuclear tests. Using new data on JMEs and North Korean behavior, we find that North Korea systematically responds with aggression to South Korean JMEs. Moreover, we find that the intensity of North Korea’s responses to JMEs is driven by the severity of the threat particular exercises pose, indicating that North Korea responds to JMEs as serious security threats.

The bulk of literature on the security dilemma has examined the phenomenon within the context of rivalry between great powers of roughly equal strength (for instance, the United States-Soviet nuclear arms race). Yet no study has examined the implications of power asymmetry between a strong power and a weak one when they are facing the security dilemma in their interaction. This manuscript shall examine how the asymmetry of interaction in the United States-North Korean security dilemma has presented repeated obstacles for the United States in seeking the denuclearization of North Korea. The asymmetry of their rivalry has significant implications for how Washington and Pyongyang view one another in their interaction. This asymmetry has created challenges for Washington as well as Pyongyang, as illustrated through this empirical case study’s analysis of how successive United States White House administrations since 1993 have responded to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. In this regard, it is possible the asymmetry of their interaction has become so deeply internalized that North Korea is, effectively, past a “point of no return” insofar as its nuclear program is concerned.

How does the alliance between a client state and its nuclear ally influence support for proliferation in the client? Conventional wisdom suggests that when nuclear security guarantees are not credible, support for proliferation will be high, since a domestic nuclear capability offers an alternative source of deterrence. I introduce a new theory, which posits that highly credible security guarantees can backfire by causing some individuals to fear their ally might miscalculate—either by using nuclear weapons in an unnecessary preventative attack or by precipitous escalation of a crisis or conflict. Survey experiments conducted among representative samples of South Korean citizens in 2018 and 2019 support this theory, showing that increases in the credibility of the US nuclear security guarantee lead to increased support for nuclear proliferation among South Korean respondents.

What are the effects of strategic surprise on foreign policy? We apply mechanisms from cognitive psychology and foreign policy analysis — the hindsight bias and policy engagement — to theorize about how political leaders attribute blame for strategic surprises and the consequences for their foreign policies. We argue that leaders who are hardly engaged with policy matters related to a surprise will tend to believe that it should have been foreseen, attribute blame to domestic culprits and favour significant changes in foreign policy. Conversely, those more involved with policy planning will blame an adversary’s deception and resist policy change. We illustrate these hypotheses empirically by examining the cases of the Truman administration’s reaction to the 1949 Soviet nuclear test and the Johnson administration’s reaction to the 1967 Chinese thermonuclear explosion. Despite their similar international and domestic political environments, the two presidents reacted quite differently to the two surprises. Truman, who was weakly engaged with nuclear matters prior to 1949, authorized major policy changes and reorganized the Central Intelligence Agency. Conversely, Johnson’s deeper involvement in nuclear matters led him to attribute blame for the surprise to Chinese deception. He sought to use the 1967 test to advance his ongoing efforts to secure the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The findings suggest that the variables of policy engagement and the hindsight bias can predict how leaders’ foreign policies will respond to surprises regarding nuclear weapons proliferation and potentially other shifts in the balance of power.

Background:Ki-67 is an immunohistochemical stain used as a nuclear proliferation marker. It is nonspecific, and is expressed in all active phases of the cell cycle. Vulvar vestibular papules in women and pearly penile papules in men are benign fibrous papules on the genitals, are noninfectious, and do not require treatment. However, these lesions can be clinically confused with condylomata acuminata induced by human papillomavirus (HPV), which have medical and social implications.Objective:Because HPV infection is known to induce expression of proliferation markers, we propose that Ki-67 be used to differentiate condylomata acuminata from vulvar vestibular papules or pearly penile papules on pathologic examination.Methods:We reviewed a total of 26 lesions from 18 patients of previously pathologically diagnosed lesions, including condylomata acuminata (11 lesions), vulvar vestibular papules (10 lesions), and pearly penile papules (5 lesions). All slides were stained with Ki-67, reviewed, and categorized as positive or negative for Ki-67 staining by 1 investigator who was unaware of the original diagnosis.Results:Eleven out of 11 cases of condylomata acuminata were identified as positive for Ki-67 staining. Ten out of 10 cases of vulvar vestibular papules were negative for Ki-67. Five out of 5 cases of pearly penile papules were negative for Ki-67.Conclusion:Ki-67 is a reliable marker to pathologically distinguish benign vulvar vestibular papules in women, or pearly penile papules in men, from HPV-induced condylomata acuminata.

Do “nuclear umbrellas” create a moral hazard that can increase the risk of war? In this article, we investigate whether situations of extended deterrence in which a nuclear patron makes a defensive commitment to a nonnuclear client state can inadvertently increase the likelihood that a client will initiate a crisis with another state. Using data on the crisis behavior of states from 1950 to 2000, we estimate the impact of a nuclear umbrella on various crisis outcomes, including the initiation and escalation of militarized conflict. Interestingly, we find no evidence that such commitments increase the risk of war or even two-sided violence at lower levels. However, consistent with both the moral hazard logic and bargaining theories of war, we show that this appears to be because potential target states offer increased policy concessions to client states to avoid costly fighting. Thus, the link between nuclear umbrellas and moral hazard appears to be real, but it is reflected in the division of benefits rather than a greater likelihood of war. The results have important policy implications as the US contemplates extending its nuclear umbrella.

Scholars interested in researching nuclear security are increasingly expressing the fear that the “important questions” have already been answered. At the same time, recent studies highlight the po...

The causes and prevention of nuclear war are critical to human survival but difficult to study empirically, as observations of nuclear war do not actually exist in the real world. The literature on nuclear war has remained largely theoretical as a consequence. To circumvent the observational constraint, this article investigates the impact of proliferation with laboratory-based nuclear-option games that experimentally manipulate the number of players ( N) with a nuclear option. Results show that decisions are mostly peaceful in the dyadic N = 2 condition despite the existence of nuclear options with a relative first-strike advantage. However, a jump beyond N = 2 in the crisis interaction significantly sharpens the propensity to use the nuclear option. The findings highlight an avenue of research that evaluates mechanisms of nuclear war experimentally, moving research beyond the theoretical domain.

This article draws on the conceptualisation of ‘discursive formation’ to examine the particular configuration of the ‘objects, subjects, concepts and strategies’ which constituted ‘nuclear proliferation’ between 2006 and 2012. While previous studies have mostly explored the discourse of nuclear proliferation through the analysis of newspaper texts, few have considered corpora from different sites or considered the changes, transformations and contradictions that take place when meanings are delocated from one site and relocated in another. Elements of poststructuralist discourse theory, critical linguistics and corpus linguistics are brought together to consider how events were constructed within two corpora: UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and newspaper articles published in prominent UK and US broadsheets. WordSmith Tools (Version 5) was used to analyse word frequencies, statistical patterns of keywords, word collocation profiles and concordance patterns. Results indicate that the most salient lexical items refer to actors, strategic actions and technologies. As these constituents of nuclear proliferation are delocated from the political sphere and relocated in the public sphere, three discursive strategies unfold: personalisation, normalisation or exceptionalisation, and reification.

The capacity to build nuclear weapons—known as “nuclear latency”—is widely believed to be important in world politics. Yet scholarly research on this topic remains limited. This paper introduces a new dataset on nuclear latency from 1939 to 2012. It discusses coding procedures, describes global trends, and compares the dataset with earlier efforts to measure nuclear latency. We show that nuclear latency is far more common than nuclear proliferation: 31 countries developed the capacity to build nuclear bombs from 1939 to 2012, and only 10 of those states went on to acquire atomic arsenals. This paper provides one empirical application of the dataset, showing how the study of nuclear latency can contribute to our understanding of international conflict. We provide preliminary evidence that nuclear latency reduces the likelihood of being targeted in militarized disputes. Having the capacity to build nuclear weapons, therefore, may provide deterrence benefits that we usually associate with possessing a nuclear arsenal.

This interview with Robert Jervis explores the early influences on his career, his time working with Thomas Schelling and Erving Goffman, that led to his path-breaking 1970 book, The Logic of Images in International Relations, and his more widely known (although according to Jervis himself less original) Perception and Misperception in International Politics. The rich and wide-ranging interview goes on to explore his views on the nuclear revolution, nuclear proliferation, security communities, US foreign policy, the theory–practice divide, the security dilemma and signalling and perceptions. It concludes with Jervis’ reflections on what are the fundamentals that any student and scholar of International Relations should know.

This paper provides a brief overview of the progress of political science research on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation and non-proliferation. Based on the findings of that literature, the author draws out some general lessons for today’s policymakers.

Why do countries deploy nuclear weapons abroad? Since 1945, more than twenty states have hosted foreign nuclear weapons on their territory, and five countries continue to do so today. These deployments have important consequences for international security, yet there is little systematic research about the factors that drive them. In this article, we develop three broad theoretical frameworks to explain why foreign nuclear deployments occur. Using a new data set of foreign nuclear deployments between 1945 and 2000, we find that two factors weigh heavily in driving these deployments: the protection of allies and the projection of military power. Nonproliferation motives, however, appear to play little role. The results carry important implications for our understanding of the causes of proliferation and the sources of nuclear posture.

The causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation have received a great deal of academic attention. However, nuclear weapons are rarely discussed in isolation in policy circles. Instead, nuclear weapons are relevant as part of a category of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that includes chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). Are the factors that drive CBWs proliferation similar to those that drive nuclear proliferation? What is the relationship between these weapons types? In this article, we explore whether nuclear weapons and CBWs serve as complements or substitutes. Using newly collected data on both CBWs pursuit and possession over time, we find that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons generally function as complements at the pursuit stage. In addition, countries that acquire nuclear weapons become less interested in pursuing other types of WMDs and are even willing to give them up in some cases.

Why do states make disingenuous treaty commitments? Under what conditions will countries refrain from entering cooperative agreements with which they do not expect to comply? This article addresses these questions by analyzing how states that are pursuing nuclear weapons treat the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The authors develop a distinction between two types of noncooperative behavior. The first is cheating while part of the NPT (predation) and the second is pursuing nuclear weapons outside of the treaty (abstention). The authors’ argument is that democratic proliferators are more likely to abstain because executives in democracies are domestically constrained to a greater degree than authoritarian leaders. Statistical tests in a sample of all countries with active nuclear weapons programs from 1968 to 2004 provide evidence in favor of our argument. Controlling for confounding variables and the factors that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons, the results show that states with greater constraints on executive authority are less likely to choose predation. Yet, electoral mandates do not appear to dissuade governments from making disingenuous treaty commitments. These findings have important implications for nuclear proliferation, the credibility of international commitments, and efforts to link domestic political institutions with international outcomes.

Are there serious political-security conflicts between Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India that could affect deepening relations? The strengthening of ASEAN and India’s cooperation has already bore fruit with the implementation of the ASEAN–India free trade area. However, political security relations have not been fully examined especially if there are possibilities of potential conflicting policy directions. This article aims to contribute to further understanding of ASEAN and India’s political and security relations through ASEAN’s non-traditional security priorities in assessing potential threats to the region. There are indeed policy areas where ASEAN and India do not see eye to eye such as on issues of nuclear proliferation and human rights. However, because of the mutuality of interest between them, potential conflicts can be resolved.

This article examines the causation and extent of interstate crisis escalation among two conflictual dyads, namely Greece–Turkey and India–Pakistan. It draws from the International Crisis Behaviour dataset to present a new sub-dataset of 12 interstate crises involving the two dyads in the period 1987 to 2002. While crisis behaviour in Greece–Turkey has frequently been analysed within the context of two major regional organizations (NATO and the EU), Indian–Pakistani crises have been studied within the perspective of nuclear proliferation. To examine the linkage between these features and interstate crises, the article operationalizes the security dilemma and the diversionary theory of war through a probabilistic model. Using Ragin’s (2000) comparative qualitative analysis, it demonstrates that both the security dilemma and diversionary theory explain crisis escalation, although the latter covers more cases with a smaller margin of error. Moreover, the article demonstrates that Greek–Turkish crises have generally escalated to relatively low levels of conflict (threat of war or show of force), while Indian–Pakistani crises have spiralled to higher levels of confrontation (use of force). In both dyads, nuclear weapons and regional organizations have shaped the boundaries of possible escalatory action. The EU and NATO have contributed to mitigating crisis escalation and the use of force between the Aegean neighbours, while unintentionally encouraging low intensity confrontations; meanwhile, in South Asia, nuclear weapons in combination with fragile domestic regimes have exacerbated crises, particularly in the form of state-sponsored unconventional warfare.

When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively little scholarly research has considered when and why countries target nuclear programs. The authors argue that states are likely to attack or consider attacking nuclear facilities when they are highly threatened by a particular country’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Three factors increase the salience of the proliferation threat: (1) prior violent militarized conflict; (2) the presence of a highly autocratic proliferator; and (3) divergent foreign policy interests. The authors test these propositions using statistical analysis and a new data set on all instances when countries have struck or seriously considered striking other states’ nuclear infrastructure between 1941 and 2000. The findings lend support for the theory and very little support for the alternative explanations. States are not deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation and concerns about international condemnation do not appear to influence the willingness to strike. Ultimately, states are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country’s acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.

The role of India in the Korean War is relatively little known either in Korea or India. For a student of Indian Studies in Korea and a student of Korean Studies in India of our time, a study of the role of India in the Korean War might provide one more useful perspective to understand the relations between Korea and India. So, it is worthwhile to analyze the subject, especially on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Korean War and suggest that India needs to provide its disinterested objective vision as it did during the Korean War, and help in resolving the complex issues of the Korean peninsula such as North Korea's nuclear proliferation problem etc. Even before the Korean War India played a crucial role for the independence of the whole of Korea, and after the War it provided medical assistance on humanitarian grounds instead of sending its armed force to South Korea under the UN command. Later it sent the Indian Custodian Force as the Chairman of NNRC, which initially was resented by South Korea but whose task was later appreciated by it.

Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heightens the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, the authors find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status without much affecting whether states fight.

Studies of nuclear proliferation share five serious problems. First, nuclear programs' initiation and completion dates are ambiguous and difficult to code, but findings are rarely subjected to sufficient robustness tests using alternative codings. Second, independent variables overlook important factors such as prestige and bureaucratic power and often use poor proxies for concepts such as the nonproliferation regime. Third, methodologies and data sets should be tightly coupled to empirical questions but are instead often chosen for convenience. Fourth, some findings provide insights already known or believed to be true. Fifth, findings can ignore or gloss over data crucial for policy making and wider debates. This article reviews new quantitative research on nuclear proliferation, noting improved analysis and lingering problems. It highlights the 1999 Kargil war to explore dangers of relying on stock data sets and the need for research on statistical outliers. It concludes with a future research agenda aimed at correcting problems and a cautionary note regarding hasty application of quantitative results to policy making.

Why do nuclear weapons spread? Using new data on sensitive nuclear transfers, this article analyzes the determinants of nuclear proliferation. The author first describes a simple logic of the technical and strategic advantages that potential nuclear proliferators can gain by importing nuclear materials and technology from more advanced nuclear states. The author then shows that sensitive nuclear transfers are an important determinant of nuclear proliferation. In broader terms, the author find strong support for a supply-side approach to nuclear proliferation. States that are better able to produce nuclear weapons, due to either international assistance or domestic capacity, are more likely to do so.

This article evaluates whether the length of time states have nuclear weapons influences their behavior and the behavior of opponents in militarized disputes. Using multiple statistical models and illustrative cases, the article shows that, while acquiring nuclear weapons makes states significantly more likely to reciprocate militarized challenges and have their challenges reciprocated, over time, the effect reverses. In contrast to a static understanding of nuclear weapons, this variation in outcomes over time highlights the difficulties presented by nuclear proliferation.

Authors’ Note: We are grateful for generous financial support from the Department of Political Science at the University of California at San Diego, the Government Department at Georgetown University, the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, and the Project on Managing the Atom and the International Security Program both at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Journal of Conflict Resolution Volume 53 Number 2 April 2009 151-160 © 2009 SAGe Publications 10.1177/0022002708330039 http://jcr.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation

This article assesses the pros and cons of Amitai Etzioni's security first grand strategy. It argues that such a grand strategy is not much less ambitious than the Bush doctrine that it seeks to replace. The article is especially critical of Etzioni's proposals for forcible deproliferation. Rather than a security first grand strategy, the article defends a stability-first grand strategy that relies on the Westphalian state system, nuclear deterrence, the United Nations, and a U.S. grand strategy of measured restraint.

The Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance has encountered the most turbulent period in the history of the bilateral relationship. The apparent decline of the relationship worsened with the developing North Korean nuclear crisis after October 2002 and the election of new leadership in South Korea. Gaping differences are appearing over key issues, which adversely influence the bilateral relations. This article argues that there are two underlying reasons that have brought about these differences—identity crisis and deficiency in mutual understanding. Variations in state identity can affect the national security interests or polices of states, and Seoul and Washington have shown different identities, especially with respect to Pyongyang. While alliance is a moving target that needs continuous attention and adaptation, the two countries failed to catch up with each other's changes. This article investigates and highlights the gaping alliance differences and proposes some remedial measures for a better future of the bilateral alliance.

Nuclear weapons proliferation is a topic of intense interest and concern among both academics and policy makers. Diverse opinions exist about the determinants of proliferation and the policy options to alter proliferation incentives. We evaluate a variety of explanations in two stages of nuclear proliferation, the presence of nuclear weapons production programs and the actual possession of nuclear weapons. We examine proliferation quantitatively, using data collected by the authors on national latent nuclear weapons production capability and several other variables, while controlling for the conditionality of nuclear weapons possession based on the presence of a nuclear weapons program. We find that security concerns and technological capabilities are important determinants of whether states form nuclear weapons programs, while security concerns, economic capabilities, and domestic politics help to explain the possession of nuclear weapons. Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs, but the NPT has not deterred proliferation at the system level.

India finalized its nuclear command structure and formalized its nuclear doctrine in January 2003, nearly five years after coming out of the nuclear closet and openly declaring itself as a nuclear-weapon state. While a clearly enunciated nuclear doctrine and command structure are seen by some as essential in enhancing regional stability and assuaging the concerns of the international community, its implications for the civil-military relations in India remain far from clear. Strategic imperatives and political pressures concerning civil-military relations seem to be pulling Indian nuclear policy in opposite directions. This article examines Indian nuclear doctrine and command structure with an attempt to decipher its implications for the future of civil-military relations in India with respect to the management of its nuclear arsenal.

Fears of rogue states, withdrawal of cold war-era security guarantees, a falling technological threshold, and availability to terrorist organizations ensure that nuclear weapons proliferation remains a central security issue and that developing an adequate theory of proliferation ranks high on the agenda. A data set on nuclear proliferation is constructed that identifies three different stages on the path to the weaponization of nuclear weapons technology. Hazard models and multinomial logit are used to test theories of nuclear proliferation. Results suggest that nuclear weapons proliferation is strongly associated with the level of economic development, the external threat environment, lack of great-power security guarantees, and a low level of integration in the world economy.

This article contrasts the quality of security afforded by evolving community values in Latin America with the alleged virtues of security founded on nuclear deterrent postures between India and Pakistan in South Asia. A case is made for ‘security through community’ as a preferred basis for long-term regional security planning and some thoughts are offered on the means by which common security practices may be fostered in regions where the risks of nuclear conflict remain high. Important similarities between the conflictual history of Argentine–Brazilian relations and the current Indo-Pakistani nuclear stand-off suggest that it may be possible to learn substantively from the Latin American experience. In particular, analysis of the evolving Argentine–Brazilian relationship suggests that the cooperative security practices associated with regional security regimes such as Nuclear Free Zones can play a significant part in positively transforming security relations between otherwise mistrustful states.

To determine formally the effects of nuclear proliferation on the probability of a deliberate nuclear war requires more than just qualitative assertions about the change in the probability that an individual nation will initiate a deliberate nuclear war as the number of nuclear powers increases. For a model to predict that an increase in the number of nuclear powers will increase or decrease the probability of a deliberate nuclear war, it is necessary that it be able to predict the cardinality of the change in the probability that any one nation will initiate a nuclear war. Inasmuch as this is beyond the capability of most models in economics and political science, the formal debate on this issue should be viewed with caution. It is likely that the dominant factor when considering the effect of proliferation on the probability of a nuclear war is that it will occur as a result of an accident or other inadvertent behavior.

Little attention has been paid to Saddam Hussein's strategic surprise in the invasion of Kuwait. This is unfortunate, because in Saddam's invasion lies an exceptionally useful extension of what is known about surprise in strategy and diplomacy, an extension of particular value in the post-Cold War world where the risks of nuclear proliferation and the possible spread of other weapons of mass destruction heighten the importance of properly understanding surprise. This article argues that Saddam surprised Kuwait and its allies because they had deceived themselves about his intention to attack. It also argues that decision-makers and analysts are especially likely to indulge in self-deception when they believe they have found a way to avoid the dangers of their chosen path. American decision-makers minimized Saddam's rapacity and unpredictability because they thought the policy of tilting toward Iraq would convert him into a responsible international actor. The article first examines the literature on surprise attack for guidance in understanding Saddam's achievement of surprise. It then develops the concept of self-deception and illustrates the part it played in preparing for Saddam's surprise. The article. concludes with some advice to policymakers on how to avoid self-deception in evaluating another state's intentions.

It is often stated in academic analysis as well as in public discussions that there is a nuclear proliferation regime. The rather limited proliferation of nuclear weapons since the 1960s is then said to be the result of the erection and fairly successful working of this international regime. This view is criticized using a recent article in this journal as an example. One problem with the international regime approach is that proponents are often not very clear on who is in and who is out of regimes. In the area of non-proliferation, with its multitude of treaties, arrangements and policies, the distinction is especially difficult. It probably makes more sense to speak of several rather than just one international nonproliferation regime. While these regimes have important places in non-proliferation, analysis only looking at them misses important aspects. One is that national decision-making is influenced by norms around non-proliferation that are not international regimes. The neglect of norm-building reflects a major shortcoming of the international regime approach, namely its state-centeredness. This defect has consequences for the analysis of the importance of elements within the international non-proliferation area. Policy recommendations based solely on international regime analysis are misleading. Diplomats, policy-makers and the public concerned about nuclear non-proliferation are better advised if the problem is put into a larger perspective including both institutional and normative aspects.

Beyond a continuing effort to inhibit further nuclear proliferation, the proper shape and direction of arms control policies for a nuclear-armed world are not at all apparent. Many of the more popular arms control ideas that are discussed in the hypothetical context of a nuclear-armed world do not fare well under close critical examination. Specifically, the arms control value of attempts by well- established nuclear-weapon states at nuclear deemphasis, of issuing broad nuclear guarantees of the security of non- nuclear states, and of proffering advanced conventional weaponry in lieu of nuclear weapons are not viable save under very restricted conditions. Probably the most challeng ing arms control question for a nuclear-armed world will pertain to the area of nuclear weapon safety. Technical assistance to new nuclear-weapon states could greatly reduce the risks of accident or the anxieties that must attend recognized first-strike vulnerabilities, but such assistance would also, unfortunately, remove an important argument discouraging proliferation and render a crude capability more ready—for a wide variety of possible policy ends. The arms control challenge in a nuclear-armed world will be a need to accommodate some nuclear use and a readiness to exploit the reactions to such use for the end of greater international stability.