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Although skilled cue utilization is presumed to result primarily from domain-specific experience, individual differences in learning are theorized to play a significant role. Using a single-group correlational design, this study tested whether individuals’ domain-general associative learning capacity was related to performance in a complex real-world decision task presumed to rely heavily on cues: lie detection. A total of 21 participants completed an associative learning task in the form of a Space Invaders-like game. In the game, those who learn the cues are able to respond faster to the appearance of an enemy ship. Participants were also surveyed on their awareness of cues in the game. This was followed by a lie detection task. It was hypothesized that greater associative learning would be associated with greater awareness of cues in the learning task, and subsequently, superior accuracy in the lie detection task. Participants’ associative learning was correlated with their cue awareness ( r pb = .782, p < .001). Further, learning was associated with better performance in the lie detection task ( r = .544, p = .011); however, accuracy was found to be unrelated to the types of cues reportedly used during detection. These findings have implications for our understanding of cue acquisition and expertise development.

Of the many futuristic prospects offered by neuroscience, one of the more controversial is ‘brain reading’: the use of functional neuroimaging to gain information about subjects’ mental states or thoughts. This technology has various possible applications, including ‘neuromarketing’ and lie detection. Would such applications violate subjects’ privacy rights? Conversely, if God knows and judges all our secret thoughts, do Christians have any stake in defending a right to mental privacy? This article argues that God’s knowledge of us is different not only in degree but in kind from the knowledge sought through brain reading. This view of divine knowledge supports a theological account of privacy, richer and broader in scope than standard accounts of privacy rights, which can aid the ethical analysis of the use of brain reading technology for purposes such as marketing and lie detection.

Deception detection is a topic covered in many psychology and communication courses. We designed and implemented an engaging class activity to facilitate the students’ learning of several key concepts related to sender and receiver variability in lie detection. The pedagogical effectiveness of the activity was measured. In line with previous research, the students had difficulty acknowledging and correcting their own biases. However, the teaching activity was successful in correcting their general beliefs and facilitating learning.

Deception studies typically focus on the deceiver (or the deceived), with lie detection of paramount concern. Consequently, little attention has been paid to the experience of third-party observers of deceptive communications. In the current study, therefore, we investigated the impact of deception priming on the subsequent information processing of outsiders, with a primary focus on the intent to deceive. Participants read pairs of stories (A and B) depicting everyday interpersonal interactions. In Story A, a phrase was rendered truthful, intentionally deceptive, or unintentionally misleading by context. In Story B, this same phrase was initially presented ambiguously, but followed by a sentence revealing it to be intentionally deceptive. Reading about an intentionally deceptive (as opposed to truthful) speaker (Experiment 1) and an unintentionally deceptive (as opposed to unintentionally misleading) speaker (Experiment 2) in Story A primed faster reading of the “deception” sentence in Story B. These results support the possibility of deception priming and suggest that observers are sensitive to intent (and not mere falsity) when exposed to misinformation scenarios.

In six studies ( N = 605), participants made deception judgments about videos of Black and White targets who told truths and lies about interpersonal relationships. In Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2, White participants judged that Black targets were telling the truth more often than they judged that White targets were telling the truth. This truth bias was predicted by Whites’ motivation to respond without prejudice. For Black participants, however, motives to respond without prejudice did not moderate responses (Study 2). In Study 3, we found similar effects with a manipulation of the targets’ apparent race. Finally, in Study 4, we used eye-tracking techniques to demonstrate that Whites’ truth bias for Black targets is likely the result of late-stage correction processes: Despite ultimately judging that Black targets were telling the truth more often than White targets, Whites were faster to fixate on the on-screen “lie” response box when targets were Black than when targets were White. These systematic race-based biases have important theoretical implications (e.g., for lie detection and improving intergroup communication and relations) and practical implications (e.g., for reducing racial bias in law enforcement).

Ostracism—being ignored and excluded by others—is a ubiquitous experience with adverse effects on well-being. To prevent further exclusion and regain belonging, ostracized individuals are well advised to identify affiliation partners who are sincerely well-disposed. Humans’ ability to detect lies, however, is generally not very high. Yet, veracity judgments can become more accurate with decreasing reliance on common stereotypic beliefs about the nonverbal behavior of liars and truth-tellers. We hypothesize that ostracized (vs. included) individuals base their veracity judgments less on such stereotypical nonverbal cues if message content is affiliation-relevant. In line with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 shows that ostracized (vs. included) individuals are better at discriminating affiliation-relevant lies from truths. Experiments 2 and 3 further show that ostracized (vs. included) individuals base their veracity judgments less on stereotypical nonverbal cues if messages are of high (but not low) affiliation relevance.

Researchers rely on men’s self-reports of sexually aggressive behavior to identify the prevalence and correlates of men’s perpetration (i.e., their use of verbal or physical coercion to obtain sex from a nonconsenting partner). However, results from research based on men’s self-reported sexual perpetration are suspect because men may intentionally conceal their sexually aggressive behavior. The current study used a Bogus Pipeline (BPL) methodology to determine whether young, community men ( N = 93) intentionally underreport their use of sexually aggressive strategies on two self-report measures of perpetration. Compared with men in a Standard Testing (ST) condition, men in an experimental BPL condition—who believed that the honesty of their responses was being monitored—had 6.5 times greater odds of endorsing the use of illegal sexual assault strategies on a widely used measure. Indeed, over a third of men in the BPL condition admitted to using such strategies. However, there was no significant difference in men’s reports of verbally coercive strategies in the BPL versus the ST condition on the same measure. There were also no significant differences in reporting on the other, less commonly used measure of sexual aggression as a function of condition. Based on these preliminary findings, men’s use of sexual assault strategies may be far more common than is suggested by most self-report studies. Self-reports of verbal coercion, however, may be more trustworthy.

The human body was made legible long ago. But what of the human mind? Is it possible to ‘read’ the mind, for one human being to know what another is thinking or feeling, their beliefs and intentions. And if I can read your mind, how about others – could our authorities, in the criminal justice system or the security services? Some developments in contemporary neuroscience suggest the answer to this question is ‘yes’. While philosophers continue to debate the mind-brain problem, a range of novel technologies of brain imaging have been used to argue that specific mental states, and even specific thoughts, can be identified by characteristic patterns of brain activation; this has led some to propose their use in practices ranging from lie detection and security screening to the assessment of brain activity in persons in persistent vegetative states. This article reviews the history of these developments, sketches their scientific and technical bases, considers some of the epistemological and ontological mutations involved, explores the ecological niches where they have found a hospitable environment, and considers some implications of this materialization of the readable, knowable, transparent mind.

The lie detector test has long been treated with suspicion by the law. Recently, several authors have called this suspicion into question. They argue that the lie detector test may have considerable forensic benefits, particularly if we move past the classic, false positive-prone, autonomic nervous system-based (ANS-based) control question test, to the more reliable, brain-based, concealed information test. These authors typically rely on a ‘comparative advantage’ argument to make their case. According to this argument, we should not be so suspicious of lie detection evidence if it has comparative advantages over the epistemic methods currently utilised by the legal system. In this article, I add to this growing support by making a novel comparative advantage argument in favour of brain-based lie detection evidence. The argument focuses on the P300 concealed information test (P300 CIT), which has several unique properties, and on the effect it may have on pre-trial bargaining in criminal cases rather than in-court evidence. The thesis is that the P300 CIT could allow for innocent defendants to credibly signal their innocence to investigators and prosecutors during pre-trial bargaining more effectively than current proposed methods for doing the same thing. I defend this argument from a number of objections, and suggest that it opens up an interesting avenue in the ongoing debate about the merits of this technology. Although the argument is presented with the criminal law in mind, it could form part of a more general cumulative case in favour of this technology.

The primary duty of a court is to do justice. Implicit in this process is the principle that the court should assess the evidence in accordance with current scientific knowledge. Trials by ordeal and combat have long since been abandoned as it was recognised that they did not produce reliable, just outcomes. The law moved with the times. In criminal cases juries are directed that they can only convict ‘if they are sure’. The jurors might be sure, but are they correct? There now exists a substantial body of scientific evidence, which indicates that humans are very poor lie detectors, in fact performing at around chance. Given this incongruity in the system, is it not time to re-evaluate how cases are put before the courts, and what weight is placed on oral testimony? This is particularly acute in ‘credibility contests' where, it is argued, it is usually unsafe to convict.

Teachers can incorporate topics in forensic psychology into lower level courses to increase student interest and to show how psychological processes influence outcomes in high-stakes applied contexts. One such topic is eyewitness identification, which teachers can use to show how stress affects memory and how memories can become distorted during encoding, storage, retrieval, and even postretrieval. A second topic is lie detection, which teachers can use to illustrate the limits of our ability to interpret the nonverbal behavior of others. Lie detection also illustrates the use and misuse of physiological measures (polygraph, functional magnetic resonance imaging, electroencephalogram) as indicators of psychological states. Like memory errors by eyewitnesses, the limitations of lie detection can lead to innocent people being accused and convicted of crimes they did not commit.

The apparent utility of the polygraph to work both as a treatment and supervision aid and as a deterrent for future offending is cited as ample justification for its use. This article examines these claims to demonstrate that although post-conviction polygraph testing may have some utility by increasing disclosures of prior offending and, within specific cases, admissions of treatment and supervision violations, the limited evidence accumulated thus far does not adequately ascertain its accuracy nor support its efficacy or effectiveness as a deterrent. The article concludes with recommendations for creating a real evidentiary base beyond polygraph testing’s apparent ability to elicit more information from offenders to evidence that can determine whether it is efficacious and effective in reducing criminality and deviance.

Accuracy rates with polygraphs using concealed information tests (CITs) depend on memory for crime details. Some participants read instructions on murdering a dummy victim that specified exact crime details asked on the subsequent CIT. Others read instructions not stating details, but still requiring interaction with the exact same details for the crime. For example, the murder weapon was under four heavy boxes. Instructions stated either "... remove the 4 boxes ..." or "... remove the boxes ..." Thus, each group removed four boxes, but only one group was primed with the number "4" beforehand. In addition, the victim unexpectedly shouted at some participants during the crime. An innocent group was not exposed to either manipulation. Memory, detection scores, and detection rates were lower for guilty participants not primed with details. Sound affected detection scores but not memory, and there was no interaction between the two factors. Information tests are limited by how crime information is received. Language: en

Five decades of lie detection research have shown that people’s ability to detect deception by observing behavior and listening to speech is limited. The problem is that cues to deception are typically faint and unreliable. The aim for interviewers, therefore, is to ask questions that actively elicit and amplify verbal and nonverbal cues to deceit. We present an innovative lie detection perspective based on cognitive load, demonstrating that it is possible to ask questions that raise cognitive load more in liars than in truth tellers. This cognitive lie detection perspective consists of two approaches. The imposing-cognitive-load approach aims to make the interview setting more difficult for interviewees. We argue that this affects liars more than truth tellers, resulting in more, and more blatant, cues to deceit. The strategic-questioning approach examines different ways of questioning that elicit the most differential responses between truth tellers and liars.

The question of whether discernible differences exist between liars and truth tellers has interested professional lie detectors and laypersons for centuries. In this article we discuss whether people can detect lies when observing someone’s nonverbal behavior or analyzing someone’s speech. An article about detecting lies by observing nonverbal and verbal cues is overdue. Scientific journals regularly publish overviews of research articles regarding nonverbal and verbal cues to deception, but they offer no explicit guidance about what lie detectors should do and should avoid doing to catch liars. We will present such guidance in the present article.

This research used a job interview context to investigate the relationship between peoples’ degrees of generalized trust—their default assessments of the likely trustworthiness of others—and their ability to detect lies. Participants watched videos of eight simulated job interviews: Half of the interviewees were completely truthful; half told a variety of lies to make themselves more attractive job candidates. Contrary to lay wisdom, high trusters were significantly better than low trusters were at detecting lies. This finding extends a growing body of theoretical and empirical work suggesting that high trusters are far from foolish Pollyannas and that low trusters’ defensiveness incurs significant costs.

The new television series Lie to Me portrays a social scientist solving crimes through his ability to read nonverbal communication. Promotional materials claim the content is based on actual science. Participants ( N = 108) watched an episode of Lie to Me, a different drama, or no program and then judged a series of honest and deceptive interviews. Lie to Me viewers were no better at distinguishing truths from lies but were more likely than control participants to misidentify honest interviewees as deceptive. Watching Lie to Me decreases truth bias thereby increasing suspicion of others while at the same time reducing deception detection ability.

Beliefs of 28 male police interrogators, 30 male prisoners, and 30 male laypersons about their skill in detecting lies and truths told by others, and in telling lies and truths convincingly themselves, were compared. As predicted, police interrogators overestimated their lie-detection skills. In fact, they were affected by stereotypical beliefs about verbal and nonverbal cues to deception. Prisoners were similarly affected by stereotypical misconceptions about deceptive behaviors but were able to identify that lying is related to pupil dilation. They assessed their lie-detection skill as similar to that of laypersons, but less than that of police interrogators. In contrast to interrogators, prisoners tended to rate lower their lie-telling skill than did the other groups. Results were explained in terms of anchoring and self-assessment bias. Practical aspects of the results for criminal interrogation were discussed.

Research on nonverbal detection of deception has normally been conducted by asking observers to judge the veracity of a number of videotaped communications. These video clips have typically been very short. Observers have a tendency to judge most of these statements as truthful. An experiment was conducted in which 52 participants (44 women, 8 men; M age = 22.2 yr., SD = 2.2) who were taking a psychology and law course were requested to make judgments of credibility at different points of the senders' statements. A strong truth bias was apparent when judgments were made at the beginning of the statements, suggesting that when exposed to brief communications, the observers make heuristic judgments. Over time, a decrease in the truth bias and an increase in overall accuracy were found, suggesting that later judgments were increasingly based on systematic information processing. These results suggest that the truth bias that has been found in previous deception research may be a result of having used very brief and uninformative behavioral samples as stimuli.

Sex differences in beliefs among Japanese students about cues to deception were explored. 171 participants (91 women, 80 men) read a scenario in which a protagonist caused a fatal traffic accident and told a lie to avoid responsibility. Then participants rated how the protagonist's behaviors would change when lying. Women participants believed significantly more than men that a liar shows body cues (e.g., body touching, biting lips) associated with anxiety, and that a liar has unsuccessful impression management (e.g., fewer smiles, fewer facial expressions). Furthermore, the women's scores also indicated that a liar would increase the amount of information (e.g., longer response length, gestures) and show more nonfluent speech (e.g., speech disturbances, inconsistency of speech contents).

The autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) was recently introduced in this journal as a new and promising lie-detection tool. The initial report found 91% accuracy in determining which of two autobiographical events was true. It was suggested that the aIAT, unlike other lie-detection tests, is resistant to faking. We investigated whether participants can strategically alter their performance on the aIAT. Experiment 1 showed that participants guilty of a mock theft were able to obtain an innocent test outcome. Two additional experiments showed that guilty participants can fake the aIAT without prior experience with the aIAT and when a response deadline is imposed. The aIAT is subject to the same shortcomings as other lie-detection tests.

Confession evidence is powerful but flawed, often in nonintuitive ways. Contradicting widely held beliefs, research reviewed in this article suggests the following: Despite special training in how to conduct interviews, police cannot distinguish better than the layperson whether suspects are lying or telling the truth. Suspects in custody routinely waive their self-protective rights to silence and to counsel—especially if they are innocent. Certain legal but deceptive interrogation tactics increase the risk that innocents will confess to crimes they did not commit. Judges and juries are easily fooled, unable to distinguish between true and false confessions. Appellate courts cannot be expected to reasonably determine whether the error of admitting a coerced confession at trial was harmless or prejudicial.

With the exclusion of some specific circumstances, police officers typically pay more attention to nonverbal behavior than verbal behavior when they attempt to detect deceit. One of the reasons for this is that they believe that suspects are less able to control their nonverbal than verbal behavior and, consequently, nonverbal cues to deception are more likely to leak through. The author states that this assumption is not necessarily valid; deception research has revealed that many verbal cues are more diagnostic cues to deceit than nonverbal cues. Paying attention to nonverbal cues results in being less accurate in truth/lie discrimination, particularly when only visual nonverbal cues are taken into account. Also, paying attention to visual nonverbal cues leads to a stronger lie bias (i.e., indicating that someone is lying). The author recommends a change in police practice and argues that for lie detection purposes it may be better to listen carefully to what suspects say.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the electroencephalography (EEG)-based technology of Brain Fingerprinting have been hailed as the next, best technologies for lie detection in America, particularly in the context of post-9/11 anxiety. In scientific journals and the popular press, each has been juxtaposed and deemed superior to traditional polygraphy, which measures changes in the autonomic nervous system and correlates these fluctuations with emotions such as anxiety, fear, and guilt. The author contends that the juxtaposition of polygraphy and brain-based detection is a rhetorical strategy that foregrounds the corrective advantage of brain-based techniques, creates an artificial rupture between contiguous technologies, and ignores the shared assumptions foundational to fMRI, EEG, and two older ``truth telling'' technologies: polygraphy and fingerprinting. Far from describing the brain and its functions, fMRI and Brain Fingerprinting produce models of the brain that reinforce social notions of deception, truth, and deviance.

This study compared a group of 104 adult male sex offenders who received community cognitive-behavioral treatment, correctional supervision, and periodic polygraph compliance exams with a matched group of 104 sex offenders who received the same type of treatment and supervision services but no polygraph exams. Polygraph exams focused on whether participants were following their conditions of community supervision and treatment and had avoided committing new sexual offenses. The two groups were exact pair-wise matched on three variables: (1) Static-99 risk score (Hanson & Thornton 2000, Law and Human Behavior, 24, 119-136), (2) status as a completer of prison sex offender treatment, and (3) date placed in the community. At fixed 5-year follow-up periods, the number of individuals in the polygraph group charged with committing a new non-sexual violent offense was significantly lower than in the no polygraph group (2.9% versus 11.5%). However, there were no significant between-group differences for the number of individuals charged for new sexual (5.8% versus 6.7%), any sexual or violent (8.7% versus 16.3%), or any criminal offense (39.4% versus 34.6%). The results are discussed in terms of their clinical and research implications.

Legally relevant lying is an intentional attempt to convince another of the truth of a proposition the liar believes to be false. Delusion is an unintentional product of impaired reality testing that occurs in a range of psychiatric conditions and psychological states, some of which could be clinically subtle. Since deception, truth and delusion differ in the intent rather than reality testing criterion. Deception and delusion are influenced by the degree of congruence between subjective and objective reality and are probably mutually exclusive. Thus, a delusion could lead to an objectively false statement, that could nevertheless be subjectively true and indistinguishable from truth by its psychophysiological (i.e., the polygraph) signature. This article presents a relevant case as a starting point of an examination of the current and future role of neurophysiological (i.e., functional brain imaging) measurements in the detection of deception. The authors incorporate the recent data on functional brain imaging to the neuroanatomical mechanisms of true and false recall, behavioral regulation and deception into a testable model that could redefine deception and separate it from delusions on the basis of objective functional brain imaging measures.

Professionals conclude that child molesters (CMs) hold offense-supportive beliefs (or cognitive distortions) from CMs'questionnaire responses. Because questionnaires are easily faked, we asked 32 CMs to complete a cognitive distortion scale under standard conditions (Time 1). A week later (Time 2), the same CMs completed the scale again. This time, approximately one half of CMs were attached to a pseudo lie detector (a bogus pipeline), and the rest completed the scale again under standard conditions (controls). At Time 1, CMs showed low cognitive distortion scores, seeming to indicate that they were faking good. At Time 2, bogus pipeline CMs seemed to believe that the apparatus could detect lies. However, this did not encourage more distorted belief disclosure compared with (a) their own previous scores and (b) controls. Furthermore, the bogus pipeline appeared to reduce cognitive distortion endorsements. The results stand in marked contrast to the common view that most CMs hold distorted beliefs.

Post-conviction polygraph testing of adult sex offenders in treatment has been a somewhat controversial subject. This study (n = 95 participants who took 333 polygraph tests) explored how sexual offenders enrolled in outpatient treatment programs perceived their polygraph experience. Participants reported a relatively low incidence of false indications of both deception (22 of 333 tests) and truthfulness (11 of 333) tests, suggesting that clients agreed with examiners' opinions 90% of the time. The majority of clients reported that polygraph testing was a helpful part of treatment. Finally, about 5% of participants reported that they responded to allegedly inaccurate accusations of deception by admitting to things they had not done. The data offer encouragement for continued but cautious use of polygraphs by sex offender treatment programs. Implications for practice and research are identified.

One of the most frequently administered psychometrics is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2). Occasionally, those participants taking the MMPI-2 will malinger or exaggerate their symptoms. Several malingering detection devices are available, and a significant body of literature exists concerning their efficacy. However, little research is available considering those factors that facilitate successfully evading detection as a malingerer. Some of these studies have identified general intelligence and knowledge of the MMPI-2 as key variables in the likelihood of escaping detection as a malingerer. The extant research considered the utility of general intelligence and knowledge of the MMPI-2 as predictors in avoiding detection as a malingerer. To detect malingering, the two traditional detection devices were employed: the F-Scale and the F - K Index. Results indicate that intelligence and MMPI-2 knowledge contribute significantly to the likelihood of successfully escaping detection as a malingerer.

Crossover sexual offenses are defined as those in which victims are from multiple age, gender, and relationship categories. This study investigates admissions of crossover sexual offending from sex offenders participating in treatment who received polygraph testing. For 223 incarcerated and 266 paroled sexual offenders, sexual offenses were recorded from criminal history records and admissions during treatment coupled with polygraph testing. The majority of incarcerated offenders admitted to sexually assaulting both children and adults from multiple relationship types. In addition, there was a substantial increase in offenders admitting to sexually assaulting victims from both genders. In a group of incarcerated offenders who sexually assaulted children, the majority of offenders admitted to sexually assaulting both relatives and nonrelatives, and there was a substantial increase in the offenders admitting to assaulting both male and female children. Although similar trends were observed for the sample of parolees, the rates were far less dramatic. Parolees appeared to have greater levels of denial, had participated in fewer treatment sessions, and perceived greater supervision restrictions as a result of admitting additional offenses. These findings support previous research indicating that many sexual offenders do not exclusively offend against a preferred victim type.

To teach the importance of deception in everyday social life, an in-class activity called the Speed Lying Task was given in an introductory social psychology class. In class, two major research findings were replicated: Individuals detected deception at levels no better than expected by chance and lie detection confidence was unrelated to lie detection accuracy. Using a pretest–posttest design, the activity led to significant increases in deception knowledge, and the activity was seen as helpful, engaging, and interesting to the students. This study supports using students as both research subjects and research consumers in the classroom to teach classical concepts in social psychology.

Although lie detection procedures have been fundamentally criticized since their inception at the beginning of the 20th century, they are still in use around the world. In addition, they have created some remarkable appeal in the context of counterterrorism policies. Thereby, the links between science and fiction in this topic are quite tight and by no means arbitrary: In the progressive narrative of the lie detection devices, there is a promise of changing society for the better, which is entangled in a fictional narrative provided by many cinematic and literary examples. By drawing on the concept of “diegetic technologies” formulated by David Kirby, we want to highlight the role of science fictional narratives in the historical development and current application of lie detection procedures. We therefore aim to use this conceptual frame to analyze the role of prevention-oriented mind reading procedures, which are developed for or already used in the “war on terror” with reference to their fictional predecessors. One virulent factor has to be highlighted in this context: The fictional engagement with possible new lie detection practices is in itself creating a legitimating ground for future security technologies.

Polygraph tests to assess veracity are widely promoted for application in sexual abuse matters. The use of polygraph tests is advocated despite substantial differences in professional and scientific opinion about the validity of such techniques. Polygraph diagnoses of an individual's deception are inferences made by an examiner who compares physiological reactions to a set of questions. The test situation, however, is also used to induce examinees to admit crimes. In addition to their use in investigations, polygraph tests are used by defendants seeking exculpatory evidence and by treatment and probation programs to assess and monitor sexual offenders. Although there are dissenters, most knowledgeable scientists consider polygraph testing as unvalidated. Professionals need to access the literature on polygraph testing, evaluate the efficacy and ethics of polygraph tests in their community, and further develop standards for their use.

Sexual offenders are extremely reluctant to disclose their offending histories for a variety of psychosocial and legal reasons. The polygraph has shown promise as a intervention for eliciting admissions of past sexual offending behaviors. For 60 adult male sexual offender (35 inmates and 25 parolees), the number of victims and offenses were recorded from the Presentence Investigative Report, Sexual History Disclosure form, and 2 consecutive polygraph examination reports. Dramatic increases in the number of admitted victims and offenses were found for inmates, but not for parolees, across each source. However, there was a substantial decline in the number of victim and offense admissions by the second polygraph examination for both groups, even though 80% of the examination results reveled deception about sexual offending behaviors. Standardized use of sanctions and privileges for deceptive and nondeceptive polygraph results, respectively, are proposed as a way of eliciting full disclosure of offending histories for these offenders.

Videotaped samples of target individuals making honest or dishonest statements were shown to 66 male and female participants who judged each sample in terms of honesty. The participants were either highly involved in the judging task or relatively uninvolved. It was assumed that highly involved participants would engage in central route processing and therefore attend more to the verbal message, whereas less-involved participants would engage in peripheral route processing and therefore attend more to the nonverbal behavior of the targets. Because nonverbal cues are most indicative of deception, it was hypothesized—and found—that low-involvement participants would be more accurate at detecting deception than would high-involvement participants. Furthermore, gender differences and support for a motivational impairment effect were found, in which lies told by people who were highly motivated to lie successfully were more easily detected.

Control Question Tests were altered for 12 of 24 students who were examined with a polygraph about a mock crime which half of them had committed. The altered tests substituted control questions about students' cheating and plagiarism for the standard questions about crime issues. Responses to the altered tests were compared with those from tests using regular control questions which are usually about criminal issues. All tests were conducted by a professor. Detection scores derived from response magnitudes of skin resistance differed between innocent ( M = 2.0) and guilty participants ( M = −1.9). Guilt and innocence interacted with the type of test. Those examined with control questions oriented towards students scored as more innocent when actually innocent ( M = 4.3) than guilty students examined with the student form ( M = −3.0) or the crime form ( M = −0.8) of the test and innocent students ( M = −0.3) examined with control questions oriented towards crimes. The discussion is augmented by results from a direct analysis of magnitude of scores.

I describe a classroom exercise that demonstrates people's inability to detect deception better than chance. In the exercise, students worked in pairs and took turns asking each other a series of questions. Students lied to their partners some of the time, and they in turn attempted to determine when their partners lied to them. Students also reported their degree of confidence in their lie detection abilities. The results consistently replicated classic findings in this area of research. In addition, students who participated in this exercise retained the knowledge gained from their participation for 6 to 30 months. I discuss the courses in which this exercise might be useful.

Psychological Association, Questionnaires Used in the Prediction of Trustworthiness in Pre-Employ ment Selection Decisions: An APA Task Force Re port (Author, Washington, DC, 1991); R.M. O'Ban non, L.A. Goldinger, and G.S. Appleby, Honesty and Integrity Testing: A Practical Guide (Applied In formation Resources, Atlanta, 1989). 5. D.S. Ones, C. Viswesvaran, and F.L. Schmidt, Comprehensive meta-analysis of integrity test validities: Findings and implications for person nel selection and theories of job performance, jour nal of Applied Psychology, 78, 679-703 (1993); J.M. Collins and F.L. Schmidt, Personality, integrity, and white collar crime: A construct validity study, Personnel Psychology, 46, 295-312 (1993). 6. Sackett et al., note 4; J. Hogan and R. Hogan, How to measure employee reliability, Jour nal of Applied Psychology, 74, 273-279 (1989). 7. Sackett et al., note 4; O'Bannon et al., note 4. 8. See U.S. Congress (1990), note 1; American Psychological Association, note 4. 9. U.S. Congress (1990), note 1, p. 10. 10. See Saxe, note 3; H. Sigall and E.E. Jones, The bogus pipeline: A new paradigm for measuring affect and attitude, Psychological Bulletin, 76, 349 364(1971). 11. D.T. Lykken, The lie detector controversy: An alternative solution, in Advances in Psychophys iology, j.R. Jennings, P.K. Ackles, and M.G.H. Coles, Eds. (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London, 1991). 12. L. Farwell and E. Donchin, The truth will out: Interrogative polygraph ("lie detection") with even-related potentials, Psychophysiology, 28, 531 (1991).

This laboratory study dealt with real-life intense emotional events. Subjects generated embarrassing stories from their experience, then submitted to polygraph testing and, by lying, denied their stories and, by telling the truth, denied a randomly assigned story. Money was given as an incentive to be judged innocent on each story. An interrogator, blind to the stories, used Control Question Tests and found subjects more deceptive when lying than when truthful. Stories interacted with order such that lying on the second story was more easily detected than lying on the first. Embarrassing stories provide an alternative to the use of mock crimes to study lie detection in the laboratory.

The efficacy of the F, K, L, F-K, and O-S scales of the MMPI-2 in detecting fake good, fake bad, and honest profiles was investigated. A total of 110 undergraduate educational psychology students were administered the MMPI-2 under instructions to fake good, fake bad, or respond honestly. Multiple analysis of variance resulted in a significant (p < .001) difference on all validity scale scores of the three groups of respondents.

Lie detection, a topic that most students of psychology find fascinating, can be demonstrated using an inexpensive, highly portable galvanic skin response (GSR) monitor. This demonstration can be used to touch on the current controversy surrounding the use of physiological measures in detecting deception and is relevant to other topics, such as emotion, perception, and industrial/organizational psychology.

It was suggested that, when the Guilty Knowledge Test uses two repetitions, these should be combined showing the contribution of the second repetition to the accuracy of the first. Also recommended were effect size statistics in addition to accuracy rates.