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The convergence of several technological systems (especially nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and robotics) has now been adopted as a strategic goal by several countries, most notably the United States and those of the European Union. The anticipated benefits and related fears of competitive disadvantage have brought together a wide range of interested parties, governmental and nongovernmental. In the rush to enter and/or dominate this arena, the benign promise of converging technologies (CT) are highlighted, although a range of risks and less welcome (if difficult to quantify) implications are at best understated. What, then, are the prospects for exercising governance over the technological systems we are busy creating—and the uses to which they might be put? What will it mean to speak of “global governance” in a world in which the technological promise of CT has been fulfilled?

The dichotomy between prohibitive law and moral responsibility is at the centre of debates about the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. However, political interests remain an important factor not only in determining and tempering the humanitarian impulses of states, but also for gauging their more general adherence to the rule of law. The humanitarian intervention debate only has meaning in a context in which there is general, routine adherence to the non-interventionist norm of the international system, codified as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre-emptive self-defence alters the political and politico-legal context that has until now given the humanitarian intervention debate its meaning and importance. Given this, together with a more general loosening of the strictures prohibiting or limiting the use of force, there is good cause for concern about the foundations of the post-1945 international order. The debate about humanitarian intervention can no longer abstract the tension between law and morality from a political arena that is facing such profound challenges.

Much of the global governance literature is devoted to the processes and outcomes of globalizing forces for the accrual of power by non-authoritative actors. The emphasis on process at the expense of detailed considerations of agency leaves open considerable questions about democratic accountability for the extension and consolidation of a summative global governance. It is not clear that the kinds of negotiated re-configurations of state and non-state actors and their roles that are possible within states can be `scaled up' to produce a global governance in which public policy and the larger determinants of political and economic life will be open to wide scrutiny or competing claims. The darker possibilities open to a new array of non-authoritative but effective actors are examined, together with a consideration of the prospects for the delivery of global public goods under global governance so constituted. `Unaccountable' is also frequently self-serving, which can only diminish our ability to organize concerted, coherent initiatives needed to deal with the global issues that now beset humanity.