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Scholars have argued that utilization of quantitative performance indicators by public organizations could generate unintended consequences that might outweigh the benefits of performance measurement. We examined the relationships between goal ambiguity and external control, and distortive practices in performance measurement in public organizations. The data from 47 agencies of the central and local governments in Korea were analyzed using fixed-effect ordered logistic regression methods. The results showed that goal ambiguity was positively and significantly associated with distortive practices in performance measurement. Goal ambiguity may incentivize public employees to misuse performance information to obtain rewards for higher performance ratings. Contrary to our expectation, reinforced external control was negatively and significantly related to distortive behaviors in performance measurement. Higher work autonomy was not significantly associated with manipulation of performance information. Employees with higher intrinsic motivation were less likely to distort performance measures, whereas the ones with higher extrinsic motivation were more likely to misuse performance information to achieve higher performance ratings. Points for practitioners: To avoid the potential distortions in performance measurement, public managers should adopt a refined measurement model of performance customized to the unique characteristics of public services. Multiple sets of measures need to be developed and managed properly to respond to complex political environments which involve different key values and the stakeholders in the policy processes, and the nature of public service products and outcomes. Reinforced behavioral control in the process of measuring performance will also be necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy formation does not come to an end when a bill becomes a law. Streetlevel bureaucrats also play a role in shaping public policies through their daily use of discretion. Through a comparative analysis of the work done by street-level bureaucrats in two different organizations in charge of implementing the Spanish immigration policy, we examined the relation between goal ambiguity and the use of informal discretion using a qualitative method relying on Lipsky's theoretical framework. Based on the data obtained through five in-depth interviews with street-level bureaucrats in each of the two selected organizations, we confirm the link between goal ambiguity and the use of informal discretion. Besides, our observations also tend to associate a low level of informal discretion to a high level of engagement toward public service values such as impartiality and fairness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]