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The ability to move upward in social class or economic position (i.e., social mobility) is a defining feature of the American Dream, yet recent public-opinion polls indicate that many Americans are losing confidence in the essential fairness of the system and their opportunities for financial advancement. In two studies, we examined Americans' perceptions of both current levels of mobility in the United States and temporal trends in mobility, and we compared these perceptions with objective indicators to determine perceptual accuracy. Overall, participants underestimated current mobility and erroneously concluded that mobility has declined over the past four decades. These misperceptions were more pronounced among politically liberal participants than among politically moderate or conservative ones. These perception differences were accounted for by liberals' relative dissatisfaction with the current social system, social hierarchies, and economic inequality. These findings have important implications for theories of political ideology., (© The Author(s) 2015.)

An important component of political polarization in the United States is the degree to which ordinary people perceive political polarization. We used over 30 years of national survey data from the American National Election Study to examine how the public perceives political polarization between the Democratic and Republican parties and between Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. People in the United States consistently overestimate polarization between the attitudes of Democrats and Republicans. People who perceive the greatest political polarization are most likely to report having been politically active, including voting, trying to sway others' political beliefs, and making campaign contributions. We present a 3-factor framework to understand ordinary people's perceptions of political polarization. We suggest that people perceive greater political polarization when they (a) estimate the attitudes of those categorized as being in the "opposing group"; (b) identify strongly as either Democrat or Republican; and (c) hold relatively extreme partisan attitudes-particularly when those partisan attitudes align with their own partisan political identity. These patterns of polarization perception occur among both Democrats and Republicans., (© The Author(s) 2015.)

Three studies examined Americans' perceptions of incomes and income inequality using a variety of criterion measures. Contrary to recent findings indicating that Americans underestimate wealth inequality, we found that Americans not only overestimated the rise of income inequality over time, but also underestimated average incomes. Thus, economic conditions in America are more favorable than people seem to realize. Furthermore, ideological differences emerged in two of these studies, such that political liberals overestimated the rise of inequality more than political conservatives. Implications of these findings for public policy debates and ideological disagreements are discussed.

In three studies, we tested whether prejudice derives from perceived similarities and dissimilarities in political ideologies (the value-conflict hypothesis). Across three diverse samples in study 1, conservatives had less favorable impressions than liberals of groups that were identified as liberal (e.g., African Americans, homosexuals), but more favorable impressions than liberals of groups identified as conservative (e.g., Christian fundamentalists, businesspeople). In studies 2 and 3, we independently manipulated a target's race (European American or African American) and political attitudes (liberal or conservative). Both studies found symmetrical preferences, with liberals and conservatives each liking attitudinally similar targets more than dissimilar targets. The amount of prejudice was comparable for liberals and conservatives, and the race of the target had no effect. In all three studies, the same patterns were obtained even after controlling for individual differences on prejudice-related dimensions (e.g., system justification, social-dominance orientation, modern racism). The patterns strongly support the value-conflict hypothesis and indicate that prejudice exists on both sides of the political spectrum.

People tend to rate members of a positive group (e.g., best friends) as superior to the average of that group and members of a negative group (e.g., worst enemies) as inferior to the average of that group. Five experiments tested a new theoretical account of these nonselective superiority and inferiority biases. According to this account, a member's unique attribute (the dimension distinguishing that member positively or negatively from other group members) is used as the standard for comparing that member with other group members. The experimental results supported this hypothesis. When participants compared a randomly selected popular or unpopular vacation destination with other destinations, the target destination's unique attribute was more accessible than its nonunique attributes (Experiments 1-4), and a popular destination was judged less above average if one of its nonunique attributes was the salient comparison standard (Experiment 4). In addition, the unique attribute was used as the comparison standard for evaluating novel stimuli (Experiment 5). Alternative accounts and implications for general comparison processes are discussed.

People have more information about themselves than others do, and this fundamental asymmetry can help to explain why individuals have difficulty accurately intuiting how they appear to other people. Determining how one appears to observers requires one to utilize public information that is available to observers, but to disregard private information that they do not possess. We report a series of experiments, however, showing that people utilize privately known information about their own past performance (Experiments 1 and 2), the performance of other people (Experiment 3), and imaginary performance (Experiment 4) when intuiting how they are viewed by others. This tendency can help explain why people's beliefs about how they are judged by others often diverge from how they are actually judged.

Two studies examined misperceptions of disagreement in partisan social conflicts, namely, in the debates over abortion (Study 1) and politics (Study 2). We observed that partisans tend to exaggerate differences of opinion with their adversaries. Further, we found that perceptions of disagreement were more pronounced for values that were central to the perceiver's own ideology than for values that were central to the ideology of the perceiver's adversaries. To the extent that partisans assumed disagreement concerning personally important values, they were also inaccurate in perceiving their adversaries' actual opinions. Discussion focuses on the cognitive mechanisms underlying misperceptions of disagreement and strategies for reducing intergroup conflict.