Search

An overlapping set of brain regions in parietal and frontal cortex are engaged by different types of tasks and stimuli: (i) making inferences about the physical structure and dynamics of the world, (ii) passively viewing, or actively interacting with, manipulable objects, and (iii) planning and execution of reaching and grasping actions. We suggest the observed neural overlap is because a common superordinate computation is engaged by each of those different tasks: A forward model of physical reasoning about how first-person actions will affect the world and be affected by unfolding physical events. This perspective offers an account of why some physical predictions are systematically incorrect - there can be a mismatch between how physical scenarios are experimentally framed and the native format of the inferences generated by the brain's first-person physics engine. This perspective generates new empirical expectations about the conditions under which physical reasoning may exhibit systematic biases.

ABSTRACT The role that language plays in shaping non-linguistic cognitive and perceptual systems has been the subject of much theoretical and experimental attention over the past half-century. Understanding how language interacts with non-linguistic systems can provide insight into broader constraints on cognitive and brain organization. The papers that form this volume investigate various ways in which linguistic structure can interact with and influence how speakers think about and perceive the world, and the related issue of the constraints that in turn shape linguistic representations. These theoretical and empirical contributions support deeper understanding of the interactions between language, thought, and perception, and motivate new approaches for developing directional predictions at both the neural and cognitive levels.

Sentence production involves mapping from deep structures that specify meaning and thematic roles to surface structures that specify the order and sequencing of production ready elements. We propose that the frontal aslant tract is a key pathway for sequencing complex actions with deep hierarchical structure. In the domain of language, and primarily with respect to the left FAT, we refer to this as the 'Syntagmatic Constraints On Positional Elements' (SCOPE) hypothesis. One prediction made by the SCOPE hypothesis is that disruption of the frontal aslant tract should disrupt sentence production at grammatical phrase boundaries, with no disruption of articulatory processes.  We test this prediction in a patient undergoing direct electrical stimulation mapping of the frontal aslant tract during an awake craniotomy to remove a left frontal brain tumor. We found that stimulation of the left FAT prolonged inter-word durations at the start of grammatical phrases, while inter-word durations internal to noun phrases were unaffected, and there was no effect on intra-word articulatory duration. These results provide initial support for the SCOPE hypothesis, and motivate novel directions for future research to explore the functions of this recently discovered component of the language system.

Direct electrical stimulation (DES) is a well-established clinical tool for mapping cognitive functions while patients are undergoing awake neurosurgery or invasive long-term monitoring to identify epileptogenic tissue. Despite the proliferation of a range of invasive and noninvasive methods for mapping sensory, motor and cognitive processes in the human brain, DES remains the clinical gold standard for establishing the margins of brain tissue that can be safely removed while avoiding long-term neurological deficits. In parallel, and principally over the last two decades, DES has emerged as a powerful scientific tool for testing hypotheses of brain organization and mechanistic hypotheses of cognitive function. DES can cause transient "lesions" and thus can support causal inferences about the necessity of stimulated brain regions for specific functions, as well as the separability of sensory, motor and cognitive processes. This Special Issue of Cognitive Neuropsychology emphasizes the use of DES as a research tool to advance understanding of normal brain organization and function.

The division of labour between the dorsal and ventral visual pathways is well established. The ventral stream supports object identification, while the dorsal stream supports online processing of visual information in the service of visually guided actions. Here, we report a case of an individual with a right inferior quadrantanopia who exhibited accurate spontaneous rotation of his wrist when grasping a target object in his blind visual field. His accurate wrist orientation was observed despite the fact that he exhibited no sensitivity to the orientation of the handle in a perceptual matching task. These findings indicate that non-geniculostriate visual pathways process basic volumetric information relevant to grasping, and reinforce the observation that phenomenal awareness is not necessary for an object's volumetric properties to influence visuomotor performance.

A major principle of organization of the visual system is between a dorsal stream that processes visuomotor information and a ventral stream that supports object recognition. Most research has focused on dissociating processing across these two streams. Here we focus on how the two streams interact. We tested neurologically-intact and impaired participants in an object categorization task over two classes of objects that depend on processing within both streams-hands and tools. We measured how unconscious processing of images from one of these categories (e.g., tools) affects the recognition of images from the other category (i.e., hands). Our findings with neurologically-intact participants demonstrated that processing an image of a hand hampers the subsequent processing of an image of a tool, and vice versa. These results were not present in apraxic patients (N = 3). These findings suggest local and global inhibitory processes working in tandem to co-register information across the two streams.

The debate about the causal role of the motor system in speech perception has been reignited by demonstrations that motor processes are engaged during the processing of speech sounds. Here, we evaluate which aspects of auditory speech processing are affected, and which are not, in a stroke patient with dysfunction of the speech motor system. We found that the patient showed a normal phonemic categorical boundary when discriminating two non-words that differ by a minimal pair (e.g., ADA-AGA). However, using the same stimuli, the patient was unable to identify or label the non-word stimuli (using a button-press response). A control task showed that he could identify speech sounds by speaker gender, ruling out a general labelling impairment. These data suggest that while the motor system is not causally involved in perception of the speech signal, it may be used when other cues (e.g., meaning, context) are not available.

A unifying theme that cuts across all research areas and techniques in the cognitive and brain sciences is whether there is specialization of function at levels of processing that are "abstracted away" from sensory inputs and motor outputs. Any theory that articulates claims about specialization of function in the mind/brain confronts the following types of interrelated questions, each of which carries with it certain theoretical commitments. What methods are appropriate for decomposing complex cognitive and neural processes into their constituent parts? How do cognitive processes map onto neural processes, and at what resolution are they related? What types of conclusions can be drawn about the structure of mind from dissociations observed at the neural level, and vice versa? The contributions that form this Special Issue of Cognitive Neuropsychology represent recent reflections on these and other issues from leading researchers in different areas of the cognitive and brain sciences.

An important issue in contemporary cognitive neuroscience concerns the role of motor production processes in perceptual and conceptual analysis. To address this issue, we studied the performance of a large group of unilateral stroke patients across a range of tasks using the same set of common manipulable objects. All patients (n = 37) were tested for their ability to demonstrate the use of the objects, recognize the objects, recognize the corresponding object-associated pantomimes, and imitate those same pantomimes. At the group level we observed reliable correlations between object use and pantomime recognition, object use and object recognition, and pantomime imitation and pantomime recognition. At the single-case level, we document that the ability to recognize actions and objects dissociates from the ability to use those same objects. These data are problematic for the hypothesis that motor processes are constitutively involved in the recognition of actions and objects and frame new questions about the inferences that are merited by recent findings in cognitive neuroscience.

We review the development and current status of theories of the organisation and representation of conceptual knowledge in the human brain. The currently known facts from optic aphasia, category-specific semantic deficits, and functional neuroimaging are consistent with a framework in which the first-order constraint on the organisation of conceptual knowledge is domain. Data from functional neuroimaging suggests additionally a framework characterised by both domain- and modality-specific constraints. Work in congenital disorders and in apraxia indicate that the content of conceptual knowledge is not exhausted by modality-specific input/output processes. It is concluded that future empirical and theoretical work on the organisation and representation of conceptual knowledge will profit from a reorientation of the problem from the organisation of distinct processing systems to the content of information represented internal to such systems.

Research over the last several decades has led to clear and empirically tractable proposals about the representation of conceptual knowledge in the brain. Here we argue that there are already sufficient data from neuropsychology to strongly constrain extant hypotheses about the representation of conceptual knowledge. One constraint imposed by these neuropsychological data is that recognition of actions and understanding of objects do not necessarily depend on the ability to produce object-associated actions. This conclusion compels a reconsideration of the role played by motor planning and/or execution processes in action and object recognition and understanding.

The Sensory/Functional Theory, until recently the received explanation of category-specific semantic deficits, has been shown to be at variance with various facts that have emerged about the nature of these deficits. In this context, Rosazza, Imbornone, Zorzi, Farina, Chiavari, and Cappa (2003: The Heterogeneity of Category-Specific Semantic Disorders: Evidence from a New Case. Neurocase, 9, 189-202.) report the case study of a patient, MA, with a purported category-specific semantic deficit for living things compared to nonliving things, and an associated modality-specific impairment that differentially affected visual/perceptual compared to functional/associative knowledge. While acknowledging that the Sensory/Functional Theory cannot account for the existence of category-specific semantic deficits, Rosazza and colleagues (2003) contend that "...the presence of a more severe loss of specific visual rather than functional knowledge could support an interpretation according to the Sensory/Functional Theory" [sic] (p. 200). Our comments are divided into two parts. First, we point out that there is an asymmetry between evidence and theory: if there is clear evidence that "disconfirms" a given theory, evidence that is consistent with the theory cannot be argued to support the theory. Second, we argue that the performance profile of MA could potentially be relevant to other interpretations of category-specific deficits but that theoretical interpretations of the performance profile of patient MA are undermined by a lack of methodological rigor, as well as the generally weak data associated with the case.

In this article we assume a domain-specific organisation of conceptual knowledge and consider two questions: How does this architecture constrain further assumptions that might be made regarding (1) the organisation of conceptual knowledge in the brain, and (2) the representation of conceptual knowledge in the brain? Data from category-specific semantic deficits, functional neuroimaging, and apraxia are recruited in attempt to clarify these questions. It is shown that the domain-specific hypothesis can account for the extant facts. Furthermore, we outline one possible theoretical framework that imposes empirical constraints on proposals that might be advanced in response to the two questions raised above.