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The Belgian Constitution holds an obligation for governmental schools to organise RE in the recognised religions and in non-confessional ethics for all children of school age. While neither the Flemish nor the French Community legislator can thus abandon RE altogether, both legislators have recently taken initiatives, moving beyond the opt-out system, towards an opt-in system and a partial withdrawal of RE in governmental schools. After a brief description of the Belgian RE system and its historical roots, we scrutinise these evolutions. Although the Constitution does offer some room for manoeuvring, not everything goes: ending the possibility for students in governmental schools to opt for RE in any of the recognised religions or in non-denominational ethics altogether would, for instance, not be allowed. This is different from the perspective of human rights instruments such as the ECtHR, which permits, but does not require governmental schools to organise moral or religious education. Following the margin of appreciation doctrine of the ECtHR, the ECHR does not pose strict limits on governmental possibilities. It remains, however, to be seen whether the Flemish and French Community will manage to stay in line with the stricter regime of the Belgian Constitution.

Legal communication and precontractual communication depend on a mutual understanding and acceptance by the participants. This chapter focuses on the role of empathy in the context of the regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) innovations, with a particular focus on intellectual property law and privacy laws. Interactions in law between human beings as well as between enterprises such as organisations and governments govern the realities and situations within society. The chapter addresses the challenge by analysing selected situations that are particularly relevant in the context of businesses and organisations. It presents the possible role of empathy in the context of AI developments to position the current discussions related to embedding empathy in AI technology. The chapter proposes how empathy could be better embedded in the regulation of both AI-generated works through copyright and the regulation of situations that are relevant to privacy laws.

This book focuses on border deaths at sea. It unravels how the interplay of the law of the sea and rules on jurisdiction widen the opportunity for states to make and enforce rules outside their territory, and questions whether this is also accompanied with an obligation to respect the right to life under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) when doing so.By embarking upon the challenge of analysing a cross-border phenomenon in which direct encounters between state agents and the victims are few through the lens of legal obligations, the book unearths avenues for arguing that the ECHR is applicable to border deaths on the high seas and showcases the Court’s creativity in bridging the gap between the Convention and people in need of protection. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the ECHR is applicable to border deaths occurring within the territorial seas of states. It discusses the right to life, as well as the specific obligations of states in respect to border deaths at sea, and demonstrates that in many instances, EU policies fall short of the standards set under the right to life.This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners in migrant rights, international human rights law, public international law including, refugee and migration law, maritime law, and security studies.

This concluding chapter draws together the threads of principle, evidence, and global practice relating to children who commit serious offences. It reflects on the key themes emerging from the individual contributions in this collection, and identifies the challenges and possibilities raised by the variety of global practice discussed by contributors. It explores some of the challenges in implementing measures which are compliant with children’s rights principles. We conclude by identifying some steps which may be taken by states to develop a principled and evidence-based approach to responding to children when they become involved in committing serious crimes.

This chapter explores the sentencing laws and practices for children who commit serious violent or sexual offences across six Northwestern European jurisdictions, i.e., Belgium (Flanders), Germany, England & Wales, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. First, we outline the foundations of the youth justice systems and the applicable sentencing laws, followed by an analysis of sentencing practices based on case-law. The comparative analysis reveals that the common law jurisdictions apply a more punitive approach than the civil law jurisdictions. Exclusion from the youth justice framework by imposing adult sentences on children is widespread. Finally, we conclude that there is a need for further in-depth, multi-method comparative research into sentencing practices to advance cross-national understanding of responses to serious offending by children in the region.

This book explores the principles, practice and challenges in determining justice system responses to serious offending by children globally.Divided into four parts, the book provides a balance of theoretical and empirical insights. Anchored in a theoretical framework based on the human rights of children, as set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it considers the relationship between scientific evidence (such as brain development) and the human rights framework, before going to explore the diversity of responses to children who are found responsible for serious offences. It brings together experts from various disciplines to fill a gap relating to serious offending by children in the literature. Scholars from Africa, Latin America and Asia, as well as Europe, North America and Oceania provide perspectives from legally, socially and culturally distinct jurisdictions. The first part focuses on the theoretical framework and explores the applicable standards and principles, including the relevant human rights framework and penological approaches to sentencing children for serious crimes. The second part analyses available empirical evidence, including evidence relating to the profiles of children who commit serious crimes, child and adolescent development, effective sentencing approaches and evidence of disparities in responses to serious offending by children. The third part provides a discussion of justice system responses to serious offending by children in a range of jurisdictions or regions with diverse and distinct legal, social and cultural contexts. Finally, the book uses the theoretical framework, empirical evidence, and case studies of jurisdictions to reflect on how principles relating to responses to serious offending by children can be translated into practice, and to highlight key debates and issues that will need to be explored into the future.Adding much-needed international perspectives to the scholarship addressing the issue, this book will be of great interest to academics, students, legal practitioners and social work professionals working on youth justice and children’s rights across the globe.

In this chapter I reflect on the research methodology that I employed for my research of the 2009–2011 Mexican curricular reform to primary education in unsafe field sites. Taking an autoethnographic approach, I reflect on how my personal network of education actors formed the basis for my access to these field sites and how they constituted my safety. Moreover, I discuss how they altered the course of my research and, ultimately, my knowledge of the reform. In doing so, I make a case for emphasising the importance of interpersonal relationships in social science research as a criterion for accessing and assessing research sites, to counterbalance more detached criteria of what constitutes researcher safety, as employed in many university protocols that are founded upon research risk avoidance. These methodological issues are important, as the consequence of not researching in places deemed too risky according to university constructions is likely to underrepresent particular geographical and socio-economic areas, which ultimately may lead to important connections between global education policy and the transformation of education being missed.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the use of the case-study method and real-life cases in transferring knowledge about migration and asylum law to university students. The chapter focuses on two educational examples, the UNESCO Chair on Free Movement of Persons, Migration and Inter-Cultural Dialogue of the University of Zagreb and the Migration Law Clinic of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU University). Both examples are not only similar in that they use real-life cases as their basis but also in that they encourage students to become active participants in their own learning. Another common characteristic is that they focus on European migration law and the roles and impact of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In this context, education moves beyond the substantive rules and addresses the dynamics of law and the legal process. The examples demonstrate that education based on case-studies and real-life cases have much to offer to students, teaching staff and, where applicable, those actively involved in cases before the courts and tribunals, as it makes in-class discussions lively and meaningful to students.

Free movement is intended to bring Europeans together. This article suggests it may have the opposite effect: it may drive them apart. The mechanism involved is sorting. This happens when people are free to choose where to live, and choose a community which matches their preferences. This match can come about in different ways, but the result of them all is that people of particular preferences are clustered together, leading to society being structured as a series of adjacent mono-cultures. It is not a large step to suggest that this arrangement is likely to cause alienation between the communities. The fact of sorting means that they have less in common than they did before. For Europe, if sorting happens, this would imply that polarization between states would increase and the governability of the EU would be threatened. Free movement may be less a mechanism of integration than one of disintegration.

This chapter explores how the human social right to a minimum means of subsistence is being deployed as an instrument for governing the work behaviour of welfare recipients and whether deployment of this right creates an active self-responsible worker mentality, as presupposed by EU social policies. For this purpose, the chapter draws on two empirical case studies on labour activation programmes for benefit recipients conducted in the Netherlands. Using Foucauldian power analytics, it is concluded that, depending on the nature of the sanctioning system, the technology of human social rights produced either subjects who primarily played the role of an active worker, or subjects who primarily acted as an active worker in the labour activation programmes, instead of behaving as an active, forward-looking worker, seeking to transfer to a regular job.

This chapter highlights several traits of institutional design that characterise the current discontent among states with liberal institutionalist governance. It discusses these traits with states’ critiques of transnationalism. The chapter analyses how states respond to such frustration by developing policies and practices designed to reclaim sovereign manoeuvrability by circumventing or creatively navigating these same international legal structures. This development draws on the very same transnational structures and modus operandi as foreseen by transnational law scholars. The chapter argues that in contrast to the predictions of transnational legal scholarship, this form of transnationalism is increasingly used as a managerial tool to limit the impact or development of more traditional and liberal forms of international law. The expansion and increased institutionalisation of international law itself seem to have created the structural premise for this type of politics of international law. In sum, international law has developed to a point where some states feel threatened by their own creation.

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In this chapter, the reader is taken on a tour through the diplomatic assembly (ASP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Whereas the ICC is a frontstage for the world that seeks to observe the production of justice for and on behalf of humanity, this chapter demonstrates how the ASP functions not only as the ICC’s backstage, but also as a frontstage in itself. Guided by the main theme of this book to bring to light the backstages of international law, this chapter argues that the annual ASP meetings represent a fundamental space that is an essential part of international criminal justice’s ‘self’. Whereas the ICC and its trials are the frontstage where performances of justice take place, the ASP appears as a key backstage: at the ASP meetings, international criminal law is made and negotiated, the ICC’s judges and prosecutors are chosen, the functioning of the ICC evaluated, and its budget set. In that perspective, the ICC is a product of what the ASP allows and provides, while in the eye of the public, the ICC is where the action occurs and what the limelight is on. Yet, as we show, the ASP is itself a frontstage for power and politics in international criminal justice, where political proxy battles take place, which find their way into the courtroom and in the (non-)cooperation with the ICC. As such, the chapter demonstrates the significance of the ASP for the study of international criminal justice.

This book explores the ‘backstage’ of transnational legal practice by illuminating the routines and habits that are crucial to the field, yet rarely studied. Through innovative discussion of practices often considered trivial, the book encourages readers to conceptualise the ‘backstage’ as emblematic of transnational legal practice. Expanding the focus of transnational legal scholarship, the book explores the seemingly mundane procedures which are often taken for granted, despite being widely recognized as part of what it means to ‘do transnational law’. Adopting various methodologies and approaches, each chapter focuses on one specific practice: for example, mooting exercises for law students, international travel, transnational time, the social media activities of lawyers and legal scholars, and the networking at the ICC’s annual Assembly of States Parties. In and of themselves, these chapters each provide unique insights into what happens before the curtain rises and after it falls on the familiar ‘outputs’ of transnational law. It does more, however, than provide a range of different practices: it takes the next step in theorizing on the importance of the marginal and the everyday for what we ‘know’ to be ‘the law’ and what the international legal field looks like. Furthermore, by interrogating undiscussed academic practices, it provides students with a candid view on the perils and promises of transnational legal scholarship, inviting them to join the discussion and to practice their discipline in a more reflexive way.Written in an accessible format, containing a readable collection of personal and recognizable accounts of transnational legal practice, the book provides an everyday insight into transnational law. It will therefore appeal to international legal scholars, alongside any reader with an interest in transnational law.

In this chapter, the question is raised how different types of (causal, motivational, and organizational) remoteness should be tackled when holding business leaders accountable for international crimes. This issue arises because corporate involvement in international crimes is mostly indirect. Businessmen seldom physically perpetrate international crimes, but generally fund or benefit from such crimes in more indirect ways, for example by providing goods, logistical support, or information. Moreover, businessmen normally act with business-related purposes and interests, rather than with the intent to commit international crimes. In particular, when corporations have a complex structure consisting of multiple branches and departments, individual businessmen may also not know exactly what happens within the corporation. This makes it difficult to establish that businessmen intentionally contributed to the commission of international crimes and thus fulfilled the actus reus and mens rea requirements of these offenses. This chapter addresses if and how these problems related to remoteness can be tackled in order to prevent impunity, and whether the possible solutions are acceptable from a fair labeling perspective.

I recount the first time I took the half hour stroll to the EU’s External Action Service, walking up the Rue de la Loi towards the Rond-point Schuman at the top. The architecture along this street in Brussels, which houses the buildings of EU institutions, is very much the front stage of the EU. At the same time, the real frontstage of the EU is elsewhere, as most people do not visit the EU here. As a backstage, this street reveals an unchoreographed landscape of buildings that do not match. As part of a story and as storytellers themselves, what do these buildings communicate about the backstage of transnational legal practice?

I have always felt ambivalent about coaching teams for moot courts competitions. While these competitions offer very valuable experiences for students and a lot of fun in the preparation stage, they also force teams and their supervisors to focus on a very particular form of competition. The competition takes place in an artificial environment that often has little to do with how international law is most often applied in practice. What is more: students are trained to compete; as if winning is the most important part of the exercise. In this chapter, I explore my ambivalence about moot court competitions. To that end, I treat those competitions as theatrical exercises in two different ways: (a) as theatrical re-enactments and dress rehearsals at the same time (see section ‘Moot courts as representations of past and future’); as a series of rehearsals in preparation for a performance (see section ‘Moot courts and rehearsal traditions’). Building on two traditions in theater rehearsal, I develop a critical take on moot courts and sketch some possible avenues for alternative ways of rehearsing legal practices.

The crimes known as the core international crimes, such as crimes against humanity and genocide, are imprescriptible, i.e., no time bars apply for their prosecution. Ever since the atrocities of the Second World War, the notion of the imprescriptible has become synonymous with the law’s dealing with the most heinous criminal acts. Not only lawyers, also philosophers have reflected on the theme and related concepts such as forgiveness and revenge. In criminal law, imprescriptible crimes form an exception. Normally, alleged criminal behaviour is subject to a so-called statute of limitations. These are ‘statute(s) providing for a timeframe within which criminal proceedings must be instituted. Statutes of limitation provide for a non-exculpatory defense to a criminal defendant. Accordingly, even if the accused is allegedly culpable, a statute of limitations will bar prosecution if an action is not timely commenced. Statutes of limitation appear not only in criminal law, but in international, civil, administrative, or tax law as well.’ 2 These statutes tend to ‘limit two types of action: limitations to criminal actions and limitations to the enforcement of sentences.’ 3 In other words, the passage of time affects the question whether or not a crime can be prosecuted. Time thus co-determines whether something is a matter of law. As said, the absence of such a statute of limitations is in contradiction with the normal situation in criminal law, in which crimes are (basically) all subjected to a statute of limitations. The especially shocking nature of international crimes is usually regarded as the justification for this exception.

Europe’s area of freedom, security and justice is of increasing importance in contemporary EU law and legislation. It is worthy of special research attention because of its high-stakes content (particularly from an individual and a state perspective) and because its development to date has tangentially thrown up some of the most important and contentious constitutional questions in EU law. As the AFSJ becomes more and more intertwined with ‘mainstream’ EU law, this edited collection provides a timely analysis of the merger between the two. Showcasing a selection of work from key thinkers in this field, the book is organised around the major AFSJ themes of crime, security, border control, civil law cooperation and important ‘meta’ issues of governance and constitutional law. It also analyses the major constitutional and governance challenges such as variable geometry, institutional dynamics, and interface with rights around data protection/secrecy/spying. In the concluding section of the book the editors consider the extent to which the different facets of the AFSJ can be construed in a coherent and systematic manner within the EU legal system, as well as identifying potential future research agendas.

In common representations of migration from Africa, Europe is considered the intended destination and its neighbouring countries as ‘transit zones’. These representations are nourished by images in the media of overcrowded boats and political rhetoric of ‘influxes’ of migrants, which foster the idea that migrants are heading en masse for Europe. The stories of Boubakar and Filemon illustrate that migration processes of African migrants in the Mediterranean Region do not necessarily develop along straightforward lines following the decision to migrate (cf. Wissink et al. 2013). Neither is Europe always the intended final destination. Moreover, their experiences indicate that decisions on migrating to and through the Mediterranean are not only taken at the beginning of the journey; migration is a process which involves various moments of decision-making (see Chapters 4, 9 and 10).

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