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This article evaluates if brazilian publicly traded companies that have higher corporate governance levels, according to brazilian stock exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) segments, have more pulverized property structures, as diffused by corporate governance principles, or if the adhesion to the segments can occur only due to the isomorphism process described by the New Institutional Sociology. For that, this study used, after the elimination of atypical observations, and using the data from 343 companies, in wich 122 are owned by Novo Mercado (NM) list, 17 to Nivel 2 (N2), 37 to Nivel 1 (N1) and 167 that were not owned by any governance special segment (Grupo Tradicional - GT). To statistic operationalization, there were used hypothesis tests (t test and ANOVA) to verify if there were substantial differences between the ownership dispersion averages of especial corporate governance and the traditional segments averages from BM&FBOVESPA. The percentual of stocks belonged to stockholders with less than 5% of stocks from each species were used as proxy of dispersion degree. The test t results revealed the existence of significant differences between the dispersion averages from the enterprises group belonged to the special segment and the GT averages, translating the expectations existents in literature about the possibility of corporate governance mechanisms propitiate higher ownership dispersion. Through Variance Analysis (ANOVA), it was also identified significant differences between the four segments (NM, N2, N1 and GT), however, differently than expected, it wasn't verified a linear stock dispersion increase according to the governance level increase of BM&FBOVESPA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]