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Within the current state of international jurisprudence, there is a growing recognition of the importance of ocean environmental protection. One of the most significant recent examples is the decision in the South China Sea Arbitration, which recognized the obligation of States to protect and preserve the marine environment in disputed territorial or maritime areas. Despite this overall trend, however, serious gaps in State practice remain. In particular, current research on State practice of national and regional marine pollution contingency planning in the Asia-Pacific reveals that there has been little regard displayed in the region for accommodating a proactive approach to marine environmental protection. The international community, particularly the States that are suffering the consequences of climate change and sea-level rise, is attempting to tackle the problem of climate change and to find ways to mitigate its damages. One suggestion has been to bring a legal claim before an international tribunal to commence climate change litigation. From the perspective of the current regime of international law, including the Law of the Sea and State responsibility, the feasibility and effectiveness of climate change litigation is highly questionable. This is largely due to the challenges of establishing causation and other related issues. An alternative suggestion is to use the legal mechanism of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, not to adjudicate the issue, but to seek the issuance of an advisory opinion on the legal question presented by climate change in light of international agreements related to the purposes of this Convention. The problem with such an advisory opinion, however, would be its potential for ineffectiveness due to its non-binding character. In conclusion, there is no single solution to resolve the issue of climate change. However, a better understanding of the linkages between Parties' obligations under relevant treaties such as t

The South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal award was an overwhelming legal and moral victory for the Philippines. The arbitral tribunal categorically declared that China's nine-dash line claim is incompatible with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, China's defiance of the ruling and refusal to honor and implement the award pose a serious challenge to Manila's victory. In addition, the astonishing shift in Philippine foreign policy direction, alongside the change in government, flouts the arbitral award and undermines previous State policies assertive of Philippine maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea. The current direction of Philippine-China relations under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has demonstrated positive signs of improvement compared with acrimonious bilateral relations pursued by the previous Aquino administration. The arbitral award has largely been set aside in the government's effort to restore amicable economic and diplomatic relations with China. This paper examines the South China Sea arbitral award amidst shifting Philippine foreign policy under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte.

On 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal formed under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) issued its award on the case brought by the Philippines against China over maritime claims in the South China Sea. The landmark victory categorically declared that China's nine-dash line claim is incompatible with the UNCLOS. The award was also an authoritative interpretation of various important issues relating to UNCLOS including the legal status of maritime features, historic rights, and the duty to preserve the marine environment. However, despite the final and binding nature of the arbitral ruling, China continues to reject the ruling. The shift in Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte administration has led to setting aside the ruling in order to restore amicable diplomatic and economic relations with China. This Special Issue of Asian Politics & Policy explores and revisits the South China Sea arbitral award from a multi-faceted perspective, focusing on challenges, implications, and post-arbitration strategies.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has remained an enduring fodder of international news since he was sworn in as the country's 16th president in June 2016. Despite massive criticisms from within the Philippines and overseas, he seems intent on taking his country down an untrodden, dangerous, lawless and bloody path. The president's relentless campaign to eliminate drugs in the country has resulted in a rapidly rising number of deaths occurring on a daily basis. A little more than six months into the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, records show that his anti-drug war campaign has resulted in over 7,000 deaths, or an average of more than 30 people summarily executed in extrajudicial fashion every day. The populist president, whilst otherwise hypersensitive to criticism, remains unfazed by almost universal condemnation by the international community over the extrajudicial killings in the country.

On July 12, 2016, an arbitration Tribunal registered under the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague handed down its unanimous award in the case filed by the Philippines against China concerning the dispute between the two countries over territory and maritime jurisdictions in the South China Sea (SCS). Though the Tribunal's decision did not include aspects related to sovereignty and boundary delimitation between the parties, it rendered final and binding judgments in favor of the Philippines on a host of critical issues as provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to the press statement it issued, there is "no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash line.'" Second, it also ruled that certain sea areas in the SCS fall within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines and none of the features in the Spratly Islands could generate its own EEZ. Third, it observed that China has caused serious damage to the marine environment and "violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species." Finally, the Tribunal found that China engaged in actions that aggravated the dispute, including "large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands."

The Philippines is a global and regional leader in climate change law and has been active in domesticating its international obligations. In the 1990s, the Philippines created an Inter-Agency Committee on Climate Change to draft policies and prepare strategies for climate change negotiations. The creation of this committee was an early signal of the government's commitment to its duty to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature as provided for by the Philippine Constitution. In 2009, the Philippines enacted the Climate Change Act (cca), the first standalone climate change law in Southeast Asia.

The leadership change in Manila after the May 2016 presidential elections will certainly have significant impact on the country's policy towards China over the ongoing dispute in the West Philippine Sea. The change in Philippine leadership may portend either continuity or dramatic foreign policy shifts when it comes to this heated issue.

The leadership change in Manila after the May 2016 presidential elections will certainly have significant impact on the country's policy towards China over the ongoing dispute in the West Philippine Sea. The change in Philippine leadership may portend either continuity or dramatic foreign policy shifts when it comes to this heated issue.

The Philippines is in the midst of a transition. The astonishing rise and decisive victory of Rodrigo Duterte in the presidential election in May 2016 marked a significant turning point in Philippine politics. Manila's longstanding territorial and maritime boundary disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea are among the most immediate and intricate foreign policy challenges facing President Duterte. However, in an unexpected twist, previously acrimonious bilateral relations with China have demonstrated signs of improvement while Duterte's relentless and fiercely critical rhetoric against the United States has placed the country's robust and longstanding security and defence relations with America in question. This turn of events heralds uncertain times for both the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

President Rodrigo Duterte has ushered in a new chapter in Philippine foreign policy: one lacking in continuity, coherence and direction. Previously acrimonious relations with China have drastically improved and creative solutions are now being found to disputes in the South China Sea. At the same time, Duterte's fiercely critical rhetoric toward the United States has placed the country's longstanding security alliance in question. These events herald an uncertain time for the Philippines and for Southeast Asia.

This chapter examines the role of the Coastal State in maritime regulation and enforcement. It will be divided into four sections. The first will discuss the general jurisdictional competence of Coastal States in order to provide a basic contextual information to the chapter. The second will examine the enforcement and regulatory powers of the Coastal State in the various maritinme zones of jurisdiction. The third will discuss contemporary challenges and enforcement issues. The final section will be the conclusion, which will provide some final observations and recommendations.

The Philippines is in the midst of a transition. The astonishing rise and decisive victory of newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte marks a significant turning point in the landscape of Philippine politics. Duterte's inimitable style outraged his critics, embarrassed imperial Manila's entrenched elites, and triggered disquieting ripples across the globe to an audience unaccustomed to the foul-mouthed, tough-talking, long-time mayor of Davao City in southern Philippines. But the Philippine electorate, angry and despondent, economically disenfranchised, and frustrated with perennial problems of corruption, crime and illegal drugs, massively supported his incendiary campaign. The resounding protest vote that catapulted Duterte into victory is a clear call for change from a nation weary of traditional politics and broken promises.

In this book, James Manicom contests the orthodox view that the strategic rivalry between China and Japan will escalate into a fullblown military conflict. The book concedes that the East China Sea will be the likely medium for Sino–Japanese military rivalry and cyclical tensions will persist; however, it makes the compelling case that cooperation will endure.

On 12 July, Manila was the global epicentre of news whose waves and ripples have not dissipated since. In a celebrated legal battle many have characterised as the epic clash between David and Goliath, the Philippines overwhelmingly emerged the victor. It was widely acclaimed as the triumph of international law, the great equaliser. It was the exemplary illustration that small, weak states can confidently challenge powerful nations, standing on equal footing with them and bolstered only by the enduring principle that law and right will always triumph and prevail over brute power and might.

This chapter examines the role of the Coastal State in maritime regulation and enforcement. It will be divided into four sections. The first will discuss the general jurisdictional competence of Coastal States in order to provide a basic contextual information to the chapter. The second will examine the enforcement and regulatory powers of the Coastal State in the various maritinme zones of jurisdiction. The third will discuss contemporary challenges and enforcement issues. The final section will be the conclusion, which will provide some final observations and recommendations.

The Philippines is among the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change. The 2014 Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) placed the Philippines, of 193 countries rated, as the ninth most at risk to the physical and economic impacts of climate change. The country's capital, Manila, is considered the second most vulnerable of the world's megacities to the effects of climate change.

The Philippines is among the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change. The 2014 Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) placed the Philippines, of 193 countries rated, as the ninth most at risk to the physical and economic impacts of climate change. The country's capital, Manila, is considered the second most vulnerable of the world's megacities to the effects of climate change.

Separating the Malay Peninsular and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore form the most convenient route connecting the East and the West. The East Asian economic powerhouses of Japan, China and South Korea rely on these Straits to transport oil from their Middle Eastern suppliers. The emergence of China as one of the world's major economic power has enhanced the usage of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as important maritime conduits for the Chinese economy.

This paper will examine the arbitration case filed by the Philippines against China over the West Philippine Sea on 22 January 2013. The first part, and by way of introduction, will provide a concise summary of the competing territorial and maritime jurisdictional claims over the South China Sea highlighting recent developments. The second part will discuss the system of dispute settlement under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as relevant international jurisprudence and State practice. The third part will examine the arbitration case in greater detail discussing its factual antecedents and the specific reliefs sought by the Philippines. In the final part, the paper will conclude with an evaluation and analysis of the arbitration case in the context of its potential implications to the management of conflict and resolution of the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea.

Separating the Malay Peninsular and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore form the most convenient route connecting the East and the West. The East Asian economic powerhouses of Japan, China and South Korea rely on these Straits to transport oil from their Middle Eastern suppliers. The emergence of China as one of the world's major economic power has enhanced the usage of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as important maritime conduits for the Chinese economy.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) awarded Batu Puteh (Pedra Branca) to Singapore in 2008. However, the sovereignty over the Middle Rocks, a maritime feature that is located about one kilometre from Batu Puteh was granted to Malaysia. This decision left a huge impact for maritime boundary delimitations in this region and incited mixed feelings among Malaysians, Singaporeans and the global community as a whole. Quite recently, the Sultan of Johor has suggested for a special team to be established in making an appeal against the decision of the ICJ in 2008. This article therefore discusses the potential legal and political implications should both Malaysia and Singapore, agree to revive this case again at the ICJ. This article concludes that while this suggestion may possess merits, it is nevertheless more feasible for Malaysia and Singapore to resolve the related disputes through bilateral negotiations so as to preserve the concept of good neighbourliness and to avoid unnecessary disputes in the future.

Peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra are separated by a narrow funnel-shaped waterway of the Strait of Malacca. Plans have been made to link Sumatra and Peninsular Malaysia through a bridge or a tunnel, with the objectives of boosting trade and tourism activities in the region. Nevertheless, as the proposed bridge would span across the Strait of Malacca which is now one of the world's busiest maritime chokepoints, this proposed project may face objections from the international maritime community. As an alternative, a suggestion has been made of constructing the Johor-Riau Link by tunneling the Strait instead. This article examines the positive and negative economic, political and legal implications should the Johor Riau Link project is carried out. This article concludes by reiterating that both Malaysia and Indonesia are not prepared for the construction of Johor-Riau Link, at least not at the current point of time.

There has been no shortage of books written on vital aspects of oceans law and policy. But there are few with the breadth and diversity of coverage, written by the most prominent law of the sea scholars and practitioners assembled in a single volume, such as in The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction. The appeal of this book is undeniable: it is authoritative and scholarly yet accessible and refreshingly practical both to the seasoned scholar and the practitioner, dealing with important contemporary law of the sea issues from an enduring, intellectually robust and critical perspective.

The Socratic Method has been traditionally regarded as the core of legal pedagogy. It has come to define legal education for nearly two centuries and remains a potent influence on the method of instruction found in most modern law schools around the globe. In particular, the Socratic Method is almost universally acknowledged as the defining characteristic of the American legal education system. In fact, the Socratic Method is so entrenched in modern American legal pedagogy that it has been opined that ‘a law school just isn't a law school without the Socratic method.’ In the Australian context, the suggestion that Australian law teachers do use the Socratic style of teaching is not entirely accurate. Morgan argues that ‘it is used, perhaps not identified under the particular Socratic rubric. However, the Socratic Method, once the fundamental and irreplaceable tool of legal pedagogy appears to be declining in popularity and use. It has also been the subject of harsh and sustained challenges by a rising number of scholars who assail its methodological foundations and its efficacy as a teaching tool. There is a notable increase in the number of academic literature by law professors and even law practitioners dedicated to explore and discover new and better ways to teach law and to adopt and take advantage of new learning theories or advances in technology to provide new and better tools for teaching law. This trend of self-inquiry into the manner of teaching in law schools should be regarded as a positive development. This paper will examine the Socratic Method, a pedagogical technique used in law schools. This paper will be divided into three parts. In the first part, and by way of introduction, will investigate the origins and rationale of the Socratic Method as a pedagogical method used in legal education. The second part will analyse and examine existing studies and literature regarding the effectiveness of the Socratic Method as a teaching method in law schools, h

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) provides for a dispute settlement regime that establishes a compulsory and binding framework for the peaceful settlement of all ocean-related disputes. In Southeast Asia, despite the long-standing myriad of territorial and maritime disputes, there appears to be a general reluctance to utilize the dispute settlement provisions of LOSC. The region has very little experience in international litigation involving territorial and maritime disputes, and a reluctance to utilize the dispute settlement provisions of LOSC.While the LOSC legal framework offers some options, the highly complicated nature of the disputes in the region, especially those pertaining to the overlapping and conflicting claims over the South China Sea, cultural factors, and other pragmatic considerations, test the limits of international lawand obscure the possibility of a legal solution.

The South China Sea has been an area of focus, particularly in the issues of conflicting maritime claims among countries in the region. Less focus, however, is given to the conflicting maritime claims that are still ongoing between Malaysia and its neighbours in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

The UNCLOS provides for a dispute settlement mechanism that establishes a compulsory and binding framework for the peaceful settlement of all ocean- related disputes, including territorial and maritime disputes. The UNCLOS clearly creates an obligation among claimant countries to settle their conflicting claims peacefully, using any of forums specified under the UN Charter and the Convention itself. However, since the dispute settlement mechanism within the framework of UNCLOS operates on the basis of the sovereign equality of states, the submission of a dispute to such a forum depends on the willingness of the parties. In the case of Southeast Asia, despite the longstanding myriad of territorial and maritime disputes , there appears to be a general reluctance to utilize the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. The states in Southeast Asia have very little experience in litigation at the international level with regard to the settlement of territorial and maritime disputes and a general reluctance to utilize the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. Moreover, while the legal framework under the UNCLOS offers some options, the highly complicated nature of the disputes in the Southeast Asian region especially those pertaining to the overlapping and conflicting claims over the South China Sea, test the limits of international law and obscure the possibility of a legal solution. Moreover , the cultural aversion of Asians against a judicial settlement, where there are victors and losers, almost renders this option illusory.

The UNCLOS provides for a dispute settlement mechanism that establishes a compulsory and binding framework for the peaceful settlement of all ocean- related disputes, including territorial and maritime disputes. The UNCLOS clearly creates an obligation among claimant countries to settle their conflicting claims peacefully, using any of forums specified under the UN Charter and the Convention itself. However, since the dispute settlement mechanism within the framework of UNCLOS operates on the basis of the sovereign equality of states, the submission of a dispute to such a forum depends on the willingness of the parties. In the case of Southeast Asia, despite the longstanding myriad of territorial and maritime disputes , there appears to be a general reluctance to utilize the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. The states in Southeast Asia have very little experience in litigation at the international level with regard to the settlement of territorial and maritime disputes and a general reluctance to utilize the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. Moreover, while the legal framework under the UNCLOS offers some options, the highly complicated nature of the disputes in the Southeast Asian region especially those pertaining to the overlapping and conflicting claims over the South China Sea, test the limits of international law and obscure the possibility of a legal solution. Moreover , the cultural aversion of Asians against a judicial settlement, where there are victors and losers, almost renders this option illusory.

The UNCLOS provides for a dispute settlement mechanism that establishes a compulsory and binding framework for the peaceful settlement of all ocean- related disputes, including territorial and maritime disputes. The UNCLOS clearly creates an obligation among claimant countries to settle their conflicting claims peacefully, using any of forums specified under the UN Charter and the Convention itself. However, since the dispute settlement mechanism within the framework of UNCLOS operates on the basis of the sovereign equality of states, the submission of a dispute to such a forum depends on the willingness of the parties. In the case of Southeast Asia, despite the longstanding myriad of territorial and maritime disputes , there appears to be a general reluctance to utilize the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. The states in Southeast Asia have very little experience in litigation at the international level with regard to the settlement of territorial and maritime disputes and a general reluctance to utilize the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. Moreover, while the legal framework under the UNCLOS offers some options, the highly complicated nature of the disputes in the Southeast Asian region especially those pertaining to the overlapping and conflicting claims over the South China Sea, test the limits of international law and obscure the possibility of a legal solution. Moreover , the cultural aversion of Asians against a judicial settlement, where there are victors and losers, almost renders this option illusory.

Conflicting claims to sovereignty over islands, related overlapping maritime claims, and undelimited maritime boundaries are an enduring source of tension between the Philippines and China. In particular, an influential and often corrosive factor in their bilateral relations is their competing claims in the South China Sea. China asserts territorial sovereignty over numerous islands in the southern South China Sea, generally referred to as the Spratly (Nansha) islands, on historic grounds. Meanwhile, the Philippines claims sovereignty over many of the same islands, which it refers to as the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), on the basis of discovery and effective occupation (see Map 16.1). Both countries are parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 and both refer to international law to support and bolster their respective claims. The Philippines and China also contest sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, located in the northeast of the South China Sea, with a potential exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of approximately 54,000 nm2 (185,500 km2). Moreover, the Philippines has yet to delimit its overlapping maritime claims to the northwest with the Republic of China (ROC) administered Pratas islands and to the north with respect to the island of Taiwan.

This paper views the UCH Convention as an important and progressive development in the field of international law. The UCH Convention, akin to the LOSC, is likewise a compromise package of solutions to a delicate issue of indisputable global significance. Hence, despite its flaws, it should be regarded no less as a monumental international instrument for providing a wider scope of protection for underwater cultural heritage. The fact that the UCH Convention was adopted was success enough. In accordance with its Article 27, the UCH Convention entered into force on 2 January 2009 for States which have deposited their respective instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession on or before 2 October 2008. It shall enter into force for any other State three months after the deposit by that State of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. This paper will examine the international legal framework on the protection of underwater cultural heritage with particular emphasis on the protective regimes under the UCH Convention and the LOSC. This paper aims to: first, provide an overview of the theoretical and historical antecedents of the UCH Convention and its relation to the LOSC; second, discuss the salient provisions of the UCH Convention; third, compare the protective regimes afforded to underwater cultural heritage within the differe~.t maritime zones under both the LOSC and the UNESCO Convention· and fourth, identity the promises of the UNESCO Convention' framework as well as issues and gaps that need to be addressed.

In a move that further escalated tension in the region, China’s announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, elicited strong protests from the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The Chinese ADIZ includes airspace over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands claimed by both China and Japan and requires that aircraft entering its ADIZ must report flight information to Chinese authorities, otherwise, “China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.” These measures are clearly provocative, contrary to international practice, and increase the risk for clashes and collisions which could escalate into a larger and more serious conflict.

The Philippine claim to Bajo de Masinloc, otherwise referred to as Scarborough Shoal, finds solid basis in international law. The territorial claim of the Philippines over Bajo de Masinloc is strong relative to the claim of China as well as with respect to the principles on the acquisition of territory in international law, in particular, on the basis of effective occupation. The sovereign rights and jurisdiction asserted by the Philippines over the maritime entitlements of the features in Bajo de Masinloc are founded on principles of international law and consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which both the Philippines and China have signed and ratified. This paper aims to examine the Philippine claim over Bajo de Masinloc particularly focusing on the 2012 standoff between the Philippines and China and the arbitration case filed by the Philippines against China over the West Philippine Sea.

Conflicting claims to sovereignty over islands, related overlapping maritime claims, and undelimited maritime boundaries are an enduring source of tension between the Philippines and China. In particular, an influential and often corrosive factor in their bilateral relations is their competing claims in the South China Sea. China asserts territorial sovereignty over numerous islands in the southern South China Sea, generally referred to as the Spratly (Nansha) islands, on historic grounds. Meanwhile, the Philippines claims sovereignty over many of the same islands, which it refers to as the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), on the basis of discovery and effective occupation (see Map 16.1). Both countries are parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 and both refer to international law to support and bolster their respective claims. The Philippines and China also contest sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, located in the northeast of the South China Sea, with a potential exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of approximately 54,000 nm2 (185,500 km2). Moreover, the Philippines has yet to delimit its overlapping maritime claims to the northwest with the Republic of China (ROC) administered Pratas islands and to the north with respect to the island of Taiwan.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay examines recent decisions of international courts and tribunals—specifically, the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case between Romania and Ukraine—and draws implications for the territorial and maritime boundary disputes in East and Southeast Asia. Main Findings The judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Black Sea case is a landmark jurisprudential contribution to the development of the law of maritime delimitation. In this case, the ICJ explicitly provided a three-stage delimitation method—which, although not novel, is a clarification and clear articulation not seen in previous cases. The peaceful settlement of disputes over territory and over unresolved maritime boundaries is fundamental for the prevention of interstate conflict. Disputed territorial sovereignty and contested maritime boundaries impair maritime security, hamper effective interstate cooperation, compromise sustainable use of scarce natural resources, and hinder the flow of goods and resources. International adjudication offers one important way to resolve long-standing and apparently intractable disputes, especially concerning sovereignty over territory. However, this mode of dispute settlement is only one of the options open to states and is not necessarily ideal, as the vast majority of boundary agreements have resulted from diplomatic negotiations. Policy Implications States have an obligation under international law to cooperate, negotiate in good faith, and settle their disputes peacefully. The claimant states should be willing to submit their territorial and maritime disputes to any of the various dispute resolution mechanisms available under international law. The parties must be willing to negotiate on the basis of international law and in particular the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Maritime delimitation can only proceed after the sovereignty issues are resolved; these disputes must, therefore, b

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay examines recent decisions of international courts and tribunals—specifically, the 2009 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case between Romania and Ukraine—and draws implications for the territorial and maritime boundary disputes in East and Southeast Asia. Main Findings The judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Black Sea case is a landmark jurisprudential contribution to the development of the law of maritime delimitation. In this case, the ICJ explicitly provided a three-stage delimitation method—which, although not novel, is a clarification and clear articulation not seen in previous cases. The peaceful settlement of disputes over territory and over unresolved maritime boundaries is fundamental for the prevention of interstate conflict. Disputed territorial sovereignty and contested maritime boundaries impair maritime security, hamper effective interstate cooperation, compromise sustainable use of scarce natural resources, and hinder the flow of goods and resources. International adjudication offers one important way to resolve long-standing and apparently intractable disputes, especially concerning sovereignty over territory. However, this mode of dispute settlement is only one of the options open to states and is not necessarily ideal, as the vast majority of boundary agreements have resulted from diplomatic negotiations. Policy Implications States have an obligation under international law to cooperate, negotiate in good faith, and settle their disputes peacefully. The claimant states should be willing to submit their territorial and maritime disputes to any of the various dispute resolution mechanisms available under international law. The parties must be willing to negotiate on the basis of international law and in particular the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Maritime delimitation can only proceed after the sovereignty issues are resolved; these disputes must, therefore, b

In a historic moment that culminated almost a decade of negotiations, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UCH Convention) was adopted on 2 November 2001.2 The UCH Convention is the fourth international instrument dealing with cultural heritage adopted under the aegis of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the first one specifically addressing the protection of underwater cultural heritage (UCH) in international law.3 The UCH Convention is the first universal instrument that exclusively deals with the preservation of UCH in international waters. The UCH Convention builds upon and addresses the gaps of the very limited, vague and contradictory protective regime afforded to UCH within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).

The territorial boundaries of the Philippines, inherited from Spain and the United States in 1898, are disputed in international law. The boundaries of the Philippines are not recognised by the international community for two principal reasons: first, because of the fundamental position of the Philippines that the limits of its national territory are the boundaries laid down in the 1898 Treaty of Paris which ceded the Philippines from Spain to the United States; and second, is its claim that all the waters embraced within these imaginary lines are its territorial waters. The Philippine Government is not unaware of these issues and has time and again assured the international community that it will harmonise its domestic legislation in conformity with its international legal obligations. This paper will address and clarify the above issues, and explain the internal tension between the country’s colonial boundaries and its sincere yet seeming ambivalence to conform with international law.

The fundamental position of the Philippines is that the limits of its national territory are the boundaries laid down in the 1898 Treaty of Paris which ceded the Philippines from Spain to the United States. The position of the Philippine Government is contested in the international community and runs against rules in the Law of the Sea Convention, which the Philippines signed and ratified. The issue of the legal status of the Philippine Treaty Limits in international law has been subject of much academic debate and serious criticisms. This paper will analyse the legal status of the Philippine Treaty Limits in international law on the following criteria: the interpretation of the colonial treaties that defined the Treaty Limits; the points of conflict the limits have with the Law of the Sea Convention; the status of these lines in customary international law; the acquiescence and opposition of other States to the Philippine position and lastly, the opinion of publicists

The fundamental position of the Philippines regarding the extent of its territorial and maritime boundaries is based on two contentious premises: first, that the limits of its national territory are the boundaries laid down in the 1898 Treaty of Paris which ceded the Philippines from Spain to the UnitedStates; and second, that all the waters embraced within these imaginary lines are its territorial waters. The position of the Philippine Government is contested in the international community and runs against rules in the Law of the SeaConvention, which the Philippines signed and ratified. This situation poses two fundamental unresolved issues of conflict: first, is the issue on the breadth of its territorial sea, and second, its treatment of supposed archipelagic watersas internal waters. The twin issues of the legal status of the Philippine Treaty Limits and its extensive historic claims to territorial waters have been subject of much academic debate and serious criticisms. The delimitation of Philippine territorial and maritime boundaries in conformity with international law necessitates the reform of the existing national legal, policy and administrative framework to resolve fundamental issues ofconflict between domestic legislation and international law. This paper, proceeding from both a national and an international legal perspective, aims to clarify the legal status of the Philippine Treaty Limits and territorial watersclaim in international law.

The Philippine territorial water claim is unique in international law. On the basis of historic right of title, the Philippines claims a rectangular territorial sea fully enclosing the entirety of the archipelago, which at some points exceed 12 nautical miles in breadth. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which the Philippines signed and ratified, prescribes the maximum breadth of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles. For this reason, the Philippine territorial sea claim has been criticized for being excessive. This paper will discuss and clarify the historical background, geographical extent, and legal bases of the Philippine territorial water claim.

The Philippine Treaty Limits define the colonial territorial limits of the Philippine Archipelago and impose serious restrictions on navigational rights andfreedoms accorded to ships under the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), which the Philippines has signed and ratified. This paper discusses these navigational rights and freedoms and analyses the inconsistencies between the navigational regimes provided for in LOSC and their implementation in various Philippine maritime zones of jurisdiction.

The Philippines, on the basis of historic right of title, claims that its territorial sea extends to the limits set forth in the colonial treaties, which define the extent of the archipelago at the time it was ceded from Spain to the U.S. in 1898. The line drawn around the archipelago marks the outer limits of the historic territorial seas of the Philippines, which will be referred to here as the Philippine Treaty Limits. The Philippine Treaty Limits are contested in international law because they evidently breach the twelve-mile breadth of the territorial sea provided for in the Law of the Sea Convention, which the Philippines signed and ratified. The Philippine Treaty Limits are almost universally contested and seemingly irreconcilable with conventional and customary international law. This paper will clarify the historical context, extent, and basis of the Philippine Treaty Limits. The international legal status of the Philippine Treaty Limits, which is a far more complex issue, will not be covered in this paper. This paper is in four parts. Part I discusses the international legal norm of territorial integrity and provides a brief outline of the development of the Philippines as a nation-state. Part II discusses the cession of the Philippines from Spain to the U.S. by looking at state succession in international law and examining the colonial treaties which collectively defined the Philippine Treaty Limits. Part II also analyzes the nature and defects of the Spanish and American titles over the Philippines. Part III illustrates the extent of the territorial boundaries claimed by the Philippines based on historic title by treaty, explains the juridical function of these lines from a municipal point of view, and discusses historic rights in international law and the basis of the Philippine historic right of title to its Treaty Limits. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the Philippines’ burden of proof to overcome challenges to the validity of its territorial l

The South China Sea issue is a geopolitical tinder box waiting to explode.2 It is clear that the primary reason for the claims is based on its strategic location and its hydrocarbon potential,3 However, this is more than a simple conflict over resources.4 The issue goes beyond the question of territorial sovereignty and natural resource jurisdiction.s This 1S more than a legalquestion of ownership.

The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) created within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WIO) poses a contentious discord between developed and developing nations. The criticism that TRIPS is nothing more than a modern vehicle of western imperialism encapsulates the perception that the TRIPS is inimical to the interests of developing countries. The ostensible failure of the wro regime to raise the living standards of developing countries, a centerpiece putative effect of economic liberalization heralded in the Uruguay Round, miserably highlighted the fundamental social, cultural and widening economic differences between the two bipolarized camps.