Search

OCD has been conceptualized as a disorder arising from dysfunctional beliefs, such as overestimating threats or pathological doubts. Yet, how these beliefs lead to compulsions and obsessions remains unclear. Here, we develop a computational model to examine the specific beliefs that trigger and sustain compulsive behavior in a simple symptom-provoking scenario. Our results demonstrate that a single belief disturbance-a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of one's preventive (harm-avoiding) actions-can trigger and maintain compulsions and is directly linked to compulsion severity. This distrust can further explain a number of seemingly unrelated phenomena in OCD, including the role of not-just-right feelings, the link to intolerance to uncertainty, perfectionism, and overestimation of threat, and deficits in reversal and state learning. Our simulations shed new light on which underlying beliefs drive compulsive behavior and highlight the important role of perceived ability to exert control for OCD.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0093955.].

The antisaccade task is a classic paradigm used to study the voluntary control of eye movements. It requires participants to suppress a reactive eye movement to a visual target and to concurrently initiate a saccade in the opposite direction. Although several models have been proposed to explain error rates and reaction times in this task, no formal model comparison has yet been performed. Here, we describe a Bayesian modeling approach to the antisaccade task that allows us to formally compare different models on the basis of their evidence. First, we provide a formal likelihood function of actions (pro- and antisaccades) and reaction times based on previously published models. Second, we introduce the Stochastic Early Reaction, Inhibition, and late Action model (SERIA), a novel model postulating two different mechanisms that interact in the antisaccade task: an early GO/NO-GO race decision process and a late GO/GO decision process. Third, we apply these models to a data set from an experiment with three mixed blocks of pro- and antisaccade trials. Bayesian model comparison demonstrates that the SERIA model explains the data better than competing models that do not incorporate a late decision process. Moreover, we show that the early decision process postulated by the SERIA model is, to a large extent, insensitive to the cue presented in a single trial. Finally, we use parameter estimates to demonstrate that changes in reaction time and error rate due to the probability of a trial type (pro- or antisaccade) are best explained by faster or slower inhibition and the probability of generating late voluntary prosaccades.

Successful interaction with the environment requires flexible updating of our beliefs about the world. By estimating the likelihood of future events, it is possible to prepare appropriate actions in advance and execute fast, accurate motor responses. According to theoretical proposals, agents track the variability arising from changing environments by computing various forms of uncertainty. Several neuromodulators have been linked to uncertainty signalling, but comprehensive empirical characterisation of their relative contributions to perceptual belief updating, and to the selection of motor responses, is lacking. Here we assess the roles of noradrenaline, acetylcholine, and dopamine within a single, unified computational framework of uncertainty. Using pharmacological interventions in a sample of 128 healthy human volunteers and a hierarchical Bayesian learning model, we characterise the influences of noradrenergic, cholinergic, and dopaminergic receptor antagonism on individual computations of uncertainty during a probabilistic serial reaction time task. We propose that noradrenaline influences learning of uncertain events arising from unexpected changes in the environment. In contrast, acetylcholine balances attribution of uncertainty to chance fluctuations within an environmental context, defined by a stable set of probabilistic associations, or to gross environmental violations following a contextual switch. Dopamine supports the use of uncertainty representations to engender fast, adaptive responses.

Inferring on others' (potentially time-varying) intentions is a fundamental problem during many social transactions. To investigate the underlying mechanisms, we applied computational modeling to behavioral data from an economic game in which 16 pairs of volunteers (randomly assigned to "player" or "adviser" roles) interacted. The player performed a probabilistic reinforcement learning task, receiving information about a binary lottery from a visual pie chart. The adviser, who received more predictive information, issued an additional recommendation. Critically, the game was structured such that the adviser's incentives to provide helpful or misleading information varied in time. Using a meta-Bayesian modeling framework, we found that the players' behavior was best explained by the deployment of hierarchical learning: they inferred upon the volatility of the advisers' intentions in order to optimize their predictions about the validity of their advice. Beyond learning, volatility estimates also affected the trial-by-trial variability of decisions: participants were more likely to rely on their estimates of advice accuracy for making choices when they believed that the adviser's intentions were presently stable. Finally, our model of the players' inference predicted the players' interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) scores, explicit ratings of the advisers' helpfulness and the advisers' self-reports on their chosen strategy. Overall, our results suggest that humans (i) employ hierarchical generative models to infer on the changing intentions of others, (ii) use volatility estimates to inform decision-making in social interactions, and (iii) integrate estimates of advice accuracy with non-social sources of information. The Bayesian framework presented here can quantify individual differences in these mechanisms from simple behavioral readouts and may prove useful in future clinical studies of maladaptive social cognition.

Dysregulation of mesolimbic dopamine transmission is implicated in a number of psychiatric illnesses characterised by disruption of reward processing and goal-directed behaviour, including schizophrenia, drug addiction and impulse control disorders associated with chronic use of dopamine agonists. Amphetamine sensitization (AS) has been proposed to model the development of this aberrant dopamine signalling and the subsequent dysregulation of incentive motivational processes. However, in humans the effects of AS on the dopamine-sensitive neural circuitry associated with reward processing remains unclear. Here we describe the effects of acute amphetamine administration, following a sensitising dosage regime, on blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal in dopaminoceptive brain regions during a rewarded gambling task performed by healthy volunteers. Using a randomised, double-blind, parallel-groups design, we found clear evidence for sensitization to the subjective effects of the drug, while rewarded reaction times were unchanged. Repeated amphetamine exposure was associated with reduced dorsal striatal BOLD signal during decision making, but enhanced ventromedial caudate activity during reward anticipation. The amygdala BOLD response to reward outcomes was blunted following repeated amphetamine exposure. Positive correlations between subjective sensitization and changes in anticipation- and outcome-related BOLD signal were seen for the caudate nucleus and amygdala, respectively. These data show for the first time in humans that AS changes the functional impact of acute stimulant exposure on the processing of reward-related information within dopaminoceptive regions. Our findings accord with pathophysiological models which implicate aberrant dopaminergic modulation of striatal and amygdala activity in psychosis and drug-related compulsive disorders.

The mismatch negativity (MMN) is a differential brain response to violations of learned regularities. It has been used to demonstrate that the brain learns the statistical structure of its environment and predicts future sensory inputs. However, the algorithmic nature of these computations and the underlying neurobiological implementation remain controversial. This article introduces a mathematical framework with which competing ideas about the computational quantities indexed by MMN responses can be formalized and tested against single-trial EEG data. This framework was applied to five major theories of the MMN, comparing their ability to explain trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude. Three of these theories (predictive coding, model adjustment, and novelty detection) were formalized by linking the MMN to different manifestations of the same computational mechanism: approximate Bayesian inference according to the free-energy principle. We thereby propose a unifying view on three distinct theories of the MMN. The relative plausibility of each theory was assessed against empirical single-trial MMN amplitudes acquired from eight healthy volunteers in a roving oddball experiment. Models based on the free-energy principle provided more plausible explanations of trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude than models representing the two more traditional theories (change detection and adaptation). Our results suggest that the MMN reflects approximate Bayesian learning of sensory regularities, and that the MMN-generating process adjusts a probabilistic model of the environment according to prediction errors.

The mismatch negativity (MMN) is an event related potential evoked by violations of regularity. Here, we present a model of the underlying neuronal dynamics based upon the idea that auditory cortex continuously updates a generative model to predict its sensory inputs. The MMN is then modelled as the superposition of the electric fields evoked by neuronal activity reporting prediction errors. The process by which auditory cortex generates predictions and resolves prediction errors was simulated using generalised (Bayesian) filtering--a biologically plausible scheme for probabilistic inference on the hidden states of hierarchical dynamical models. The resulting scheme generates realistic MMN waveforms, explains the qualitative effects of deviant probability and magnitude on the MMN - in terms of latency and amplitude--and makes quantitative predictions about the interactions between deviant probability and magnitude. This work advances a formal understanding of the MMN and--more generally--illustrates the potential for developing computationally informed dynamic causal models of empirical electromagnetic responses.

Decoding models, such as those underlying multivariate classification algorithms, have been increasingly used to infer cognitive or clinical brain states from measures of brain activity obtained by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The practicality of current classifiers, however, is restricted by two major challenges. First, due to the high data dimensionality and low sample size, algorithms struggle to separate informative from uninformative features, resulting in poor generalization performance. Second, popular discriminative methods such as support vector machines (SVMs) rarely afford mechanistic interpretability. In this paper, we address these issues by proposing a novel generative-embedding approach that incorporates neurobiologically interpretable generative models into discriminative classifiers. Our approach extends previous work on trial-by-trial classification for electrophysiological recordings to subject-by-subject classification for fMRI and offers two key advantages over conventional methods: it may provide more accurate predictions by exploiting discriminative information encoded in 'hidden' physiological quantities such as synaptic connection strengths; and it affords mechanistic interpretability of clinical classifications. Here, we introduce generative embedding for fMRI using a combination of dynamic causal models (DCMs) and SVMs. We propose a general procedure of DCM-based generative embedding for subject-wise classification, provide a concrete implementation, and suggest good-practice guidelines for unbiased application of generative embedding in the context of fMRI. We illustrate the utility of our approach by a clinical example in which we classify moderately aphasic patients and healthy controls using a DCM of thalamo-temporal regions during speech processing. Generative embedding achieves a near-perfect balanced classification accuracy of 98% and significantly outperforms conventional activation-based and correlation-based methods. This example demonstrates how disease states can be detected with very high accuracy and, at the same time, be interpreted mechanistically in terms of abnormalities in connectivity. We envisage that future applications of generative embedding may provide crucial advances in dissecting spectrum disorders into physiologically more well-defined subgroups.

Generative models of neuroimaging and electrophysiological data present new opportunities for accessing hidden or latent brain states. Dynamic causal modeling (DCM) uses Bayesian model inversion and selection to infer the synaptic mechanisms underlying empirically observed brain responses. DCM for electrophysiological data, in particular, aims to estimate the relative strength of synaptic transmission at different cell types and via specific neurotransmitters. Here, we report a DCM validation study concerning inference on excitatory and inhibitory synaptic transmission, using different doses of a volatile anaesthetic agent (isoflurane) to parametrically modify excitatory and inhibitory synaptic processing while recording local field potentials (LFPs) from primary auditory cortex (A1) and the posterior auditory field (PAF) in the auditory belt region in rodents. We test whether DCM can infer, from the LFP measurements, the expected drug-induced changes in synaptic transmission mediated via fast ionotropic receptors; i.e., excitatory (glutamatergic) AMPA and inhibitory GABA(A) receptors. Cross- and auto-spectra from the two regions were used to optimise three DCMs based on biologically plausible neural mass models and specific network architectures. Consistent with known extrinsic connectivity patterns in sensory hierarchies, we found that a model comprising forward connections from A1 to PAF and backward connections from PAF to A1 outperformed a model with forward connections from PAF to A1 and backward connections from A1 to PAF and a model with reciprocal lateral connections. The parameter estimates from the most plausible model indicated that the amplitude of fast glutamatergic excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials (IPSPs) behaved as predicted by previous neurophysiological studies. Specifically, with increasing levels of anaesthesia, glutamatergic EPSPs decreased linearly, whereas fast GABAergic IPSPs displayed a nonlinear (saturating) increase. The consistency of our model-based in vivo results with experimental in vitro results lends further validity to the capacity of DCM to infer on synaptic processes using macroscopic neurophysiological data.

In a companion paper [1], we have presented a generic approach for inferring how subjects make optimal decisions under uncertainty. From a Bayesian decision theoretic perspective, uncertain representations correspond to "posterior" beliefs, which result from integrating (sensory) information with subjective "prior" beliefs. Preferences and goals are encoded through a "loss" (or "utility") function, which measures the cost incurred by making any admissible decision for any given (hidden or unknown) state of the world. By assuming that subjects make optimal decisions on the basis of updated (posterior) beliefs and utility (loss) functions, one can evaluate the likelihood of observed behaviour. In this paper, we describe a concrete implementation of this meta-Bayesian approach (i.e. a Bayesian treatment of Bayesian decision theoretic predictions) and demonstrate its utility by applying it to both simulated and empirical reaction time data from an associative learning task. Here, inter-trial variability in reaction times is modelled as reflecting the dynamics of the subjects' internal recognition process, i.e. the updating of representations (posterior densities) of hidden states over trials while subjects learn probabilistic audio-visual associations. We use this paradigm to demonstrate that our meta-Bayesian framework allows for (i) probabilistic inference on the dynamics of the subject's representation of environmental states, and for (ii) model selection to disambiguate between alternative preferences (loss functions) human subjects could employ when dealing with trade-offs, such as between speed and accuracy. Finally, we illustrate how our approach can be used to quantify subjective beliefs and preferences that underlie inter-individual differences in behaviour.

In this paper, we present a generic approach that can be used to infer how subjects make optimal decisions under uncertainty. This approach induces a distinction between a subject's perceptual model, which underlies the representation of a hidden "state of affairs" and a response model, which predicts the ensuing behavioural (or neurophysiological) responses to those inputs. We start with the premise that subjects continuously update a probabilistic representation of the causes of their sensory inputs to optimise their behaviour. In addition, subjects have preferences or goals that guide decisions about actions given the above uncertain representation of these hidden causes or state of affairs. From a Bayesian decision theoretic perspective, uncertain representations are so-called "posterior" beliefs, which are influenced by subjective "prior" beliefs. Preferences and goals are encoded through a "loss" (or "utility") function, which measures the cost incurred by making any admissible decision for any given (hidden) state of affair. By assuming that subjects make optimal decisions on the basis of updated (posterior) beliefs and utility (loss) functions, one can evaluate the likelihood of observed behaviour. Critically, this enables one to "observe the observer", i.e. identify (context- or subject-dependent) prior beliefs and utility-functions using psychophysical or neurophysiological measures. In this paper, we describe the main theoretical components of this meta-Bayesian approach (i.e. a Bayesian treatment of Bayesian decision theoretic predictions). In a companion paper ('Observing the observer (II): deciding when to decide'), we describe a concrete implementation of it and demonstrate its utility by applying it to simulated and real reaction time data from an associative learning task.

Mathematical models of scientific data can be formally compared using Bayesian model evidence. Previous applications in the biological sciences have mainly focussed on model selection in which one first selects the model with the highest evidence and then makes inferences based on the parameters of that model. This "best model" approach is very useful but can become brittle if there are a large number of models to compare, and if different subjects use different models. To overcome this shortcoming we propose the combination of two further approaches: (i) family level inference and (ii) Bayesian model averaging within families. Family level inference removes uncertainty about aspects of model structure other than the characteristic of interest. For example: What are the inputs to the system? Is processing serial or parallel? Is it linear or nonlinear? Is it mediated by a single, crucial connection? We apply Bayesian model averaging within families to provide inferences about parameters that are independent of further assumptions about model structure. We illustrate the methods using Dynamic Causal Models of brain imaging data.

This work examines the computational architecture used by the brain during the analysis of the spectral envelope of sounds, an important acoustic feature for defining auditory objects. Dynamic causal modelling and Bayesian model selection were used to evaluate a family of 16 network models explaining functional magnetic resonance imaging responses in the right temporal lobe during spectral envelope analysis. The models encode different hypotheses about the effective connectivity between Heschl's Gyrus (HG), containing the primary auditory cortex, planum temporale (PT), and superior temporal sulcus (STS), and the modulation of that coupling during spectral envelope analysis. In particular, we aimed to determine whether information processing during spectral envelope analysis takes place in a serial or parallel fashion. The analysis provides strong support for a serial architecture with connections from HG to PT and from PT to STS and an increase of the HG to PT connection during spectral envelope analysis. The work supports a computational model of auditory object processing, based on the abstraction of spectro-temporal "templates" in the PT before further analysis of the abstracted form in anterior temporal lobe areas.