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Author(s): Beatrice L. Brown, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Ameet Sarpatwari * Key points Teratogenicity is a common reason for the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to apply risk evaluation and [...]

Purpose: The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Amendments Act of 2007 authorized the FDA to require risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (REMS) programs for drugs with important safety concerns. REMS can have elements to assure safe use (ETASU), such as patient registries, dispensing restrictions, and physician training and certification requirements. We aimed to understand physician experiences with and perceptions of a selection of ETASU REMS. Methods: Physicians prescribing 1 of 4 ETASU REMS-covered drugs: natalizumab, riociguat, sodium oxybate, and vigabatrin. Study design: Descriptive phenomenological study based on semi-structured phone interviews. Data collection/Extraction methods: Qualitative content analysis to summarize physician responses to open-ended questions. Results: Of 31 physicians (14 female), 6 prescribed riociguat, 6 vigabatrin, 7 sodium oxybate, and 12 natalizumab (5 for Crohn's disease, 7 for multiple sclerosis), most demonstrated good understanding of the rationale for and requirements of the ETASU REMS but believed that the programs had limited effect on clinical practice. Some physicians reported that the ETASU REMS made them more comfortable with prescribing covered drugs due to heightened oversight, facilitated discussions about treatment, and were likely more beneficial for non-specialists. Concerns were raised about the administrative effort needed to comply with the programs and the potential misuse of patient health information transmitted to manufacturers. Conclusions: Physicians are generally aware of ETASU REMS and get reassurance from the additional oversight, but the programs can be better integrated into clinical workflows and can be designed to better protect patient health information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Some experts have proposed combating rising drug prices by promoting brand-brand competition, a situation that is supposed to arise when multiple US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved brand-name products in the same class are indicated for the same condition. However, numerous reports exist of price increases following the introduction of brand-name competition, suggesting that it may not be effective. We performed a systematic literature review of the peer-reviewed health policy and economics literature to better understand the interplay between new drug entry and intraclass drug prices. Methods and findings We searched PubMed and EconLit for original studies on brand-brand competition in the US market published in English between January 1990 and April 2019. We performed a qualitative synthesis of each study's data, recording its primary objective, methodology, and results. We found 10 empirical investigations, with 1 study each on antihypertensives, anti-infectives, central nervous system stimulants for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, disease-modifying therapies for multiple sclerosis, histamine-2 (H2) blockers, and tumor necrosis factor (TNF) inhibitors; 2 studies on cancer medications; and 2 studies on all marketed or new drugs. None of the studies reported that brand-brand competition lowers list prices of existing drugs within a class. The findings of 2 studies suggest that such competition may help restrain how new drug prices are set. Other studies found evidence that brand-brand competition was mediated by the relative quality of competing drugs and the extent to which they are marketed, with safer or more effective new drugs and greater marketing associated with higher intraclass list prices. Our investigation was limited by the studies' use of list rather than net prices and the age of some of the data. Conclusions Our findings suggest that policies to promote brand-brand competition in the US pharmaceutical market, such as accelerating approval of non-first-in-class drugs, will likely not result in lower drug list prices absent additional structural reforms., Author(s): Ameet Sarpatwari *, Jonathan DiBello, Marie Zakarian, Mehdi Najafzadeh, Aaron S. Kesselheim Introduction Prescription drug spending has risen sharply in the US over the last decade [1]. A 2018 [...]

Background To the extent that outcomes are mediated through negative perceptions of generics (the nocebo effect), observational studies comparing brand-name and generic drugs are susceptible to bias favoring the brand-name drugs. We used authorized generic (AG) products, which are identical in composition and appearance to brand-name products but are marketed as generics, as a control group to address this bias in an evaluation aiming to compare the effectiveness of generic versus brand medications. Methods and findings For commercial health insurance enrollees from the US, administrative claims data were derived from 2 databases: (1) Optum Clinformatics Data Mart (years: 2004-2013) and (2) Truven MarketScan (years: 2003-2015). For a total of 8 drug products, the following groups were compared using a cohort study design: (1) patients switching from brand-name products to AGs versus generics, and patients initiating treatment with AGs versus generics, where AG use proxied brand-name use, addressing negative perception bias, and (2) patients initiating generic versus brand-name products (bias-prone direct comparison) and patients initiating AG versus brand-name products (negative control). Using Cox proportional hazards regression after 1:1 propensity-score matching, we compared a composite cardiovascular endpoint (for amlodipine, amlodipine-benazepril, and quinapril), non-vertebral fracture (for alendronate and calcitonin), psychiatric hospitalization rate (for sertraline and escitalopram), and insulin initiation (for glipizide) between the groups. Inverse variance meta-analytic methods were used to pool adjusted hazard ratios (HRs) for each comparison between the 2 databases. Across 8 products, 2,264,774 matched pairs of patients were included in the comparisons of AGs versus generics. A majority (12 out of 16) of the clinical endpoint estimates showed similar outcomes between AGs and generics. Among the other 4 estimates that did have significantly different outcomes, 3 suggested improved outcomes with generics and 1 favored AGs (patients switching from amlodipine brand-name: HR [95% CI] 0.92 [0.88-0.97]). The comparison between generic and brand-name initiators involved 1,313,161 matched pairs, and no differences in outcomes were noted for alendronate, calcitonin, glipizide, or quinapril. We observed a lower risk of the composite cardiovascular endpoint with generics versus brand-name products for amlodipine and amlodipine-benazepril (HR [95% CI]: 0.91 [0.84-0.99] and 0.84 [0.76-0.94], respectively). For escitalopram and sertraline, we observed higher rates of psychiatric hospitalizations with generics (HR [95% CI]: 1.05 [1.01-1.10] and 1.07 [1.01-1.14], respectively). The negative control comparisons also indicated potentially higher rates of similar magnitude with AG compared to brand-name initiation for escitalopram and sertraline (HR [95% CI]: 1.06 [0.98-1.13] and 1.11 [1.05-1.18], respectively), suggesting that the differences observed between brand and generic users in these outcomes are likely explained by either residual confounding or generic perception bias. Limitations of this study include potential residual confounding due to the unavailability of certain clinical parameters in administrative claims data and the inability to evaluate surrogate outcomes, such as immediate changes in blood pressure, upon switching from brand products to generics. Conclusions In this study, we observed that use of generics was associated with comparable clinical outcomes to use of brand-name products. These results could help in promoting educational interventions aimed at increasing patient and provider confidence in the ability of generic medicines to manage chronic diseases., Author(s): Rishi J. Desai 1,*, Ameet Sarpatwari 1, Sara Dejene 1, Nazleen F. Khan 1, Joyce Lii 1, James R. Rogers 1, Sarah K. Dutcher 2, Saeid Raofi 3, Justin [...]

Prozac, Lipitor, Viagra, and numerous other brand names for prescription drugs have entered the common vernacular in the United States (US). This is for good reason, since pharmaceutical manufacturers spend [...]

Summary Points * Spending on brand-name prescription medications, particularly brand-name biologic drugs, continues to increase. * Considerable savings and improvements in medication adherence are possible from greater use of more affordable generic drugs and imminently available follow-on biologics. * Strategies to promote greater prescribing of generic drugs and follow-on biologics include traditional information-supplying programs such as formulary decision support and academic detailing and more novel financial incentives. * While private insurers, qualified health plans, and employers may legally offer physicians financial incentives to prescribe generic drugs and follow-on biologics, marginally greater risks and a developing evidence base militates against physician payment for therapeutic or noninterchangeable follow-on biologic substitution, and--at this time--for bioequivalent substitution of narrow therapeutic index (NTI) drugs or interchangeable follow-on biologic substitution. * Implementation of the various physician-centered strategies to promote greater prescribing of generic drug and follow-on biologics must be accompanied by comparative cost-utility studies assessing patient health outcomes., Introduction Health care spending on prescription medications comprises 1.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States (US) and continues to rise [1]. Brand-name prescription medications--both small-molecule and biologic [...]

In the past decade, the federal government has frequently investigated and prosecuted pharmaceutical manufacturers for illegal promotion of drugs for indications not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (“off-label” uses). State governments can choose to coordinate with the federal investigation, or pursue their own independent state investigations. One of the largest-ever off-label prosecutions relates to the atypical antipsychotic drug olanzapine (Zyprexa). In a series of settlements between 2008 and 2010, Eli Lilly paid $1.4 billion to the federal government and over $290 million to state governments. We examined the effect of these settlements on off-label prescribing of this medication, taking advantage of geographical differences in states’ involvement in the investigations and the timing of the settlements. However, we did not find a reduction in off-label prescribing; rather, there were no prescribing changes among states that joined the federal investigation, those that pursued independent state investigations, and states that pursued no investigations at all. Since the settlements of state investigations of off-label prescribing do not appear to significantly impact prescribing rates, policymakers should consider alternate ways of reducing the prevalence of non-evidence-based off-label use to complement their ongoing investigations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]