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The revelation effect is a robust phenomenon in episodic memory whereby stimuli that immediately follow a simple cognitive task are more likely to garner positive responses on a variety of memory tests, including autobiographical memory judgments. Six experiments investigated the revelation effect for judgments of past and future events as well as judgments made from others' perspectives. The purpose of this work was to determine whether these subjectively distinct judgments are subject to the same decision-making biases, as might be expected if they are governed by similar processes (e.g., Schacter, Addis, & Buckner 2007). College-aged participants were asked to rate a variety of life events according to whether the events had occurred during their childhoods or would occur during the next 10 years. Events that followed an anagram task were judged as more likely to have happened in the past and more likely to occur in the future. We also showed a revelation effect when participants were asked to adopt the perspective of others when making judgments about past and future events. When the task was reworded to be non-episodic (participants judged how common the events were during childhood and adulthood), no revelation effect was found for either past or future time frames, which suggests common boundary conditions for both types of judgments. The results are consistent with studies showing strong parallels between remembering and other forms of self-projection but not with semantic memory judgments.

Five experiments were conducted to test whether encoding manipulations thought to encourage unitization would affect fluency attribution in associative recognition memory. Experiments 1a and 1b, which utilized a speeded recognition memory test, demonstrated that definitional encoding increased reliance on familiarity during the recognition memory test. Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3, however, replicated previous research that had shown that fluency is unlikely to be attributed as evidence of previous occurrence in associative recognition (Westerman, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 27:723-732, 2001). The results put limits on the degree to which fluency can influence recognition memory judgments, even in cases of enhanced familiarity, and are consistent with previous work suggesting that participants have preexperimental expectations about fluency that are difficult to change (e.g., Miller, Lloyd, & Westerman, Journal of Memory and Language 58:1080-1094, 2008), as well as with work suggesting that fluency has less of an influence on recognition memory decisions that are conceptual in nature (Parks, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 39:1280-1286, 2013).

Four experiments were conducted to test the impact of having multiple heuristics (distinctiveness and fluency) available during a recognition test. Recent work by Gallo, Perlmutter, Moore, and Schacter (Memory & Cognition 36:461-466, 2008) suggested that fluency effects are reduced when the distinctiveness heuristic can be applied to a recognition decision. In Experiment 1, we used a response reversal paradigm (Van Zandt & Maldonado-Molina Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 30:1147-1166, 2004) to demonstrate that participants transitioned from an early response strategy that was largely reliant on fluency to a later strategy in which the influences of fluency and distinctiveness were both observable. Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3 showed no evidence for reduction of the fluency heuristic after picture study when the test required a delayed response (Exp. 2a), confidence ratings (Exp. 2b), or the application of conceptual fluency (Exp. 3). The results are consistent with models of memory that assume that familiarity and recollection influence individual memory decisions Wixted (Psychological Review, 114:152-176, 2007).

Two experiments are presented that explore the role of the distinctiveness heuristic (e.g., Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999) on rates of conjunction errors as a function of encoding condition. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate a reliable reduction of conjunction errors when participants study pictures relative to both reading words aloud and silently. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the nature of the pictures presented during the study phase is important for reducing conjunction errors. Collectively, the experiments demonstrate that participants can use the distinctiveness heuristic in addition to recall-to-reject strategies to avoid conjunction errors. These findings add to a growing body of literature that suggests that participants are able to use expectations for memory to guide their recognition decisions.

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the effect of letter location information in recognition memory judgments. The experiments used the recognition without identification paradigm (Peynircioglu, 1990), in which participants first attempt to identify the test item and then make a recognition decision as to whether or not the item was studied. In these studies, items that are not identified but that correspond to items that were presented are typically still rated as more likely to have been studied than those that were not presented. The present experiments demonstrated this finding with a variant of the conjunction lure paradigm. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were tested with word fragments that were made from the letters of two words. When the letters were from studied items, fragments were rated higher than when the test items were derived from two unstudied items, or one studied item and one unstudied item, suggesting that recognition without identification is prone to the same types of errors as recognition with identification. Results are discussed in terms of familiarity effects in recognition memory.

In five experiments, we investigated the primacy effect in memory for repetitions (DiGirolamo & Hintzman, 1997), the finding that when participants are shown a study list that contains two very similar versions of the same stimulus, memory is biased in the direction of the version that was presented first. In the experiments reported, the generality of the effect was examined by manipulating the orientation and features of the repeated stimuli. The results confirmed that the effect is reliable when stimulus changes affect the accidental properties of the stimulus (properties of the stimulus that give information about distance or angle but do little to aid in identification). However, the effect was not found when changes were made to other aspects of the stimulus. The results suggest that the primacy effect in memory for repetitions is not robust across all stimulus changes and converge with previous findings that have demonstrated that such properties of stimuli as orientation and size are represented differently in memory than are other stimulus characteristics.

Four experiments (total N=295) were conducted to determine whether within-modality changes in perceptual form between the study and the test phases of an experiment would moderate the role of the fluency heuristic in recognition memory. Experiment 1 showed that a change from pictures to words reduced the role of fluency in recognition memory. In Experiment 2, the same result was found using counterfeit study lists that supposedly consisted of pictures or words. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that changes in the font used to present the study and test words also attenuated the contribution of fluency to the recognition decision when font change was manipulated between subjects, but not within subjects. Results suggest that the fluency heuristic is subject to metacognitive control, since participants' attributions of perceptual fluency depend on the perceived usefulness of fluency as a cue to recognition.