Search

The tax penalty for noncompliance with the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is to be eliminated starting in 2019. We investigated the potential impact of this change on enrollees' decisions to purchase insurance and on individual-market premiums. In a survey of enrollees in the individual market in California in 2017, 19 percent reported that they would not have purchased insurance had there been no penalty. We estimated that premiums would increase by 4-7 percent if these enrollees were not in the risk pool. The percentages of enrollees who would forgo insurance were higher among those vdth lower income and education, Hispanics, and those who had been uninsured in the prior year, relative to the comparison groups. Compared to older enrollees and those with two or more chronic conditions, respectively, younger enrollees and those with no chronic conditions were also more likely to say that they would not have purchased insurance. Eliminating the mandate penalty alone is unlikely to destabilize the California individual market but could erode coverage gains, especially among groups whose members have historically been less likely to be insured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2006 numerous insurers have stopped serving the low-income segment of the Medicare Part D program, forcing millions of beneficiaries to change prescription drug plans. Using data from participating plans, we found that Medicare payments do not sufficiently reimburse insurers for the relatively high medication use among this population, creating perverse incentives for plans to avoid this part of the Part D market. Plans can accomplish this by increasing their premiums for all beneficiaries to an amount above regional benchmarks. We demonstrate that improving the accuracy of Medicare's risk and subsidy adjustments could mitigate these perverse incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]