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"Phenomenological Analysis of Children's Playing as a Modality of Perceptual Phantasy". The experience of playing is not unknown to anyone of us. As children we have all entered the world opened by phantasy and toys. This paper makes explicit --from a phenomenological perspective-- how this particular mixture of perception and phantasy takes place. To avoid confusing this experience with a hallucination or a mere simulation, I claim that playing can be analysed as a particular modality of perceptual phantasy in the "as if" mode. This modality, based on the neutralisation of a perceptual apprehension, enables the opening of the world of phantasy that is deployed in playing. Accordingly, this paper is divided in 3 parts: First, I present a general description of phantasy consciousness; then, I propose an analysis of perceptual phantasy in the experience of theatre; third, I describe the specificity of this modality of phantasy consciousness --called perceptual phantasy-- in the intentional structure proper of children's playing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From its capital in the Ayacucho highlands of Peru, the Wari Empire spread its influence over 1300 lateral kilometers from Cajamarca in the north to Cuzco and Moquegua in the south. Along its southern periphery, Wari presence has been documented most convincingly between 1000 and 3000 meters in elevation in valleys such as the Ocoña, Majes, Sihuas, Vitor, Chili, and Moquegua, where archaeological survey has been carried out in parts of this 300-kilometer stretch of the southern Peruvian sierra. In this paper, I examine the evidence for a Wari southern road and the settlements that connected the far southern part of Peru and eventually to the Ayacucho heartland to the north. I argue that the quichua ecological niche is a primary focus of Wari cultural landscapes and dictated the placement of the principal Wari road network. I further examine the organization of settlement along the proposed royal road, as well as the symbolic and demographic components of its route. Finally, I investigate the role of the Wari road in promulgating a Wari imperial political economy in the far south. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Animality's Problematic Place in Ortega's Philosophy". This paper discusses a problem of great actuality in contemporary philosophy: the understanding of animal being and its relationship with human being. It analyses, specifically, the way in which this problem is addressed by the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset, one of the first authors who deals with this issue as a specific and recurring theme in the context of his own thought. I show how Ortega arrives to this problem, which intellectual influences are behind his approach to the cluster of difficulties around the animal, and what place does this issue have in the context of Ortega's general philosophical proposal. As a conclusion, I suggest that Ortega's thought --as it is the case with many of the most relevant authors of the 20th Century-- is marked by his considerations on animals; and that his ideas could still be fruitful when studying important problems concerning the status and the significance of the animal condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Fiat cura, et pereat mundus. Husserl's Phenomenology of Care and Commitment". The present paper explores "the importance of what we care about" from a phenomenological angle in the spirit of Frankfurt's seminal essay. I shall reflect upon a few of its central concepts and issues within a Husserlian frame of analysis. My overarching claim is that Frankfurt's threefold distinction - knowing, ethical conduct, caring - is equally central to Husserl's phenomenology of reason and, more directly, underlies Husserl's phenomenological ethics of values and vocation in his Freiburg manuscripts of the 1920s and 1930s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Steadfastness and Da-sein. The Thinking of Ereignis and Transcendental Philosophy". This paper attempts to trace and identify Heidegger's attacks against transcendental philosophy, as they appear in his posthumous texts of the 1930s and 1940s, that is, the so-called treatises on Ereignis, and in the last volumes of the Gesamtausgabe. I will focus especially on volume 82, published in 2018, which includes a series of Heidegger's annotations and re-readings concerning his own published work--this volume has not drawn a lot of attention in recent research. This way of proceeding will allow to show the author's own critiques of his treatise Being and Time, and why he questions it a posteriori as a work of transcendental philosophy. After presenting the critique against all transcendental philosophy and transcendental subjects, it will be possible to describe the other possibility found in these posthumous works: the idea of steadfastness or "standing within" (Inständigkeit) in Being. Finally I will point out some difficulties and limitations implicit within the will to overcome our modern philosophical tradition, as it is shown by the project of a history of Be-ing (Geschichte des Seyns) as another beginning (andere Anfang) of thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As it is well known, throughout Being and Time Heidegger distinguishes between an ontic (Entdecken) and an ontological (Erschlossenheit) sense of truth. Whereas the first one involves truth, insofar as a way in which the Dasein can be concerning beings, the second one corresponds to the manner in which the Dasein opens and comprehends their being. In this paper, we will focus on developing the phenomenological aspect of the second sense of truth and its relation with the first one. We will recreate, first and foremost, Heidegger's characterization of the ontological sense. Then, we will make use of the asymmetry between both kinds of senses to inquire about the problem of normativity presupposed in his work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the close similarities between Husserl's, Scheler's and Stein's concept of the person as an absolute value that exercises itself in position-takings. Ethics, for the classical phenomenologists, Husserl, Scheler, and Stein, concerns the whole person, including the affective and rational dimensions, intellect and the heart, as well as volition. Persons are distinctive for their free agency, capacity to recognize norms, and ability to interact responsibly with other personal agents in the context of the communal and historical life-world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Fragility of the Future: Phenomenology of the Old-age". The central thesis of this paper is that old-age is not confused with illness, and its distinction is rooted in the temporal dimension of the living body. The body's time is an ingredient of the self-consciousness (selfconstitutive) in the horizon of the possibilities and potentialities of the ego, which in old-age appear under a fragile and worn condition. I present this thesis in three main parts: first, I try to distinguish the dimensions of time of nature and subjective time. In these distinctions old age is clarified, with respect to the time of nature, as the phase of normal fulfillment or of the broadest and unitary development of the body as a living thing. In the second part I define the fragility of the future as the structural specificity of the time horizon of old-age. Finally, in the third part I explore how this temporal condition determines the self-consciousness (self-constitution) and the signification (historization) of its own body in old-age. The methodological frame of this investigation is taken from the Husserlian analysis of constitution in Ideas II. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Intersubjectivity, Empathy and Education. A Phenomenological Approach". The aim of this paper is to describe from a phenomenological perspective: a) the relationships between intersubjectivity and the phenomenon of education; b) empathy as the basis and the foundation of intersubjective relationships; and c) the importance of empathy for education. The thesis to be defended states that every educational process of teaching and learning, whether in school, in the family or in society, needs the experiencing of others and empathy makes it possible to access this sort of experience. This experience is mediated by the body and develops into an intercultural, intersubjective and inter-corporeal dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Thing which Traces Itself: Limits and Apories of Sensible Appearing from Early Phenomenology". This paper aims to investigate the presence of sensible things in the light of the works of early phenomenology. For this purpose, a reflection will be made from the problems that some thinkers of Gotinga circle outlined in the context of Husserl's theses about Abschattung. Thus, we will distinguish between things and their sensible stroke, detecting the possibilities of their mutual phenomenal connection and detachment. By this way, a triple relationship will be identified in which the empirical thing appears, composed of sensitive qualities, sensations of the perceiver subject and its spatial location, in order to examine which of these instances explains the necessary link between sensitive stroke and thing as a possibility of its actual appearance in reality. It will be concluded that there is an a priori adjustment between qualities and physical properties that will allow to understand the presentative function of the sensible stroke of things. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How are we to understand the contradiction of a philosophy that claims to be a legitimate heir of the phenomenological tradition but, at the same time, intends to break free from its limits to allow an unconditioned manifestation? Should we comprehend Jean-Luc Marion's work as a true renovation of phenomenology -as he and his followers do-, or should we instead consider it as a pure theology independent from the phenomenological movement? Why would the theological way be the only possible way out of the crisis of contemporary metaphysics denounced by Marion and, even more, a necessary way? To answer these and other questions, this paper develops some of the paradoxes that arise from the Marionian theological turn, distinguishing two possible ways of understanding its Kehre: either as a deviation that allows extending phenomenology to new fields, or as a return to and abandonment of the phenomenological project. Finally, we wonder if Marion's proposal of a gradual ontology does not encourage a third possible way, which would lead us to think of his thought not as phenomenology anymore, but as a gradualist-theological fansiology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Husserl's Appropriation of the Categorical Imperative". Husserl's attempts to elaborate a formal ethics analogous to logic reaches its highest point in the formulation of a superior formal law of practice, i.e., the categorical imperative, considered by him to be the central problem in ethics. Such formulation constitutes the main core of a system that, at its most fundamental level, aims to determine the formal laws of correct action. In this framework, the aim of the paper is to determine the precise meaning, function and scope of the Husserlian appropriation of the categorical imperative and its relationship with its main reference in the elaboration of a formal ethics: Kantian ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A preliminary overview of Husserl reading Kant shows that both thinkers represent two essentially different types of philosophies in their methods and reach. The judgement made by Husserl about Kant allows to state that we are facing two different privileged intuitions. Nevertheless, it also allows to state a "family resemblance" -if not in their styles and methodology- in certain ground convictions regarding philosophy and reason's finite nature. This paper approaches, from a Husserlian perspective, the relationship between "experience and judgment" -proper to a "Transcendental Theory of Elements"- and in that between "science and philosophy" -corresponding to a "Transcendental Theory of Method". Furthermore, it will approach the distinction between natural and transcendental-phenomenological attitudes that allow Husserl to introduce two levels of philosophical interrogation and two types of philosophical anthropologies, corresponding to the splitting of the ego - a pure constitutive ego and a constituted one. This last will lead to the genetic problem of the ego's self-constitution from the deepest strata of passive instinctive life (unconscious and irrational) towards rational life in a teleological ascending movement that enacts the Kantian problem of reason's finitude. Despite of the incorporation that Husserl makes of a teleology of Leibnizian type that resolves the Kantian hiatus between sensible and intelligible world, the Kant connoisseurs will recognize his tracks in the configuration of the Husserlian trascendental phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A preliminary overview of Husserl reading Kant shows that both thinkers represent two essentially different types of philosophies in their methods and reach. The judgement made by Husserl about Kant allows to state that we are facing two different privileged intuitions. Nevertheless, it also allows to state a "family resemblance" --if not in their styles and methodology-- in certain ground convictions regarding philosophy and reason's finite nature. This paper approaches, from a Husserlian perspective, the relationship between "experience and judgment" --proper to a "Transcendental Theory of Elements"-- and in that between "science and philosophy" --corresponding to a "Transcendental Theory of Method". Furthermore, it will approach the distinction between natural and transcendental-phenomenological attitudes that allow Husserl to introduce two levels of philosophical interrogation and two types of philosophical anthropologies, corresponding to the splitting of the ego -- a pure constitutive ego and a constituted one. This last will lead to the genetic problem of the ego's self-constitution from the deepest strata of passive instinctive life (unconscious and irrational) towards rational life in a teleological ascending movement that enacts the Kantian problem of reason's finitude. Despite of the incorporation that Husserl makes of a teleology of Leibnizian type that resolves the Kantian hiatus between sensible and intelligible world, the Kant connoisseurs will recognize his tracks in the configuration of the Husserlian trascendental phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Intuitive Finitude and Symbolic Infinitude in Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic and Crisis". Since its inception, Husserl's phenomenology oscillates between a positive valuation of technical calculus in order to compensate for the limited capacity of human beings, and a denunciation regarding the blindness that its extraordinary development has brought about regarding the true nature of scientific and philosophical thinking, in their sense as ?`???. Likewise, regarding intuition phenomenology oscillates between on one side a positive valuation of the foundational and authentic character of the basic intuitive representations and, on the other, the observation of their radical finitude. This paper explores some salient features of these oscillations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]