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We often predicate capacities of substances in such a way so as to modify the way that they exist (e.g., the barbell has the capacity to bend). However, sometimes a capacity is not for the modification of a substance but for the existence of one. Moreover, we have reason to think that these capacities are just as real as other capacities. If that's right, then the question arises: if these capacities (for the existence of substances) are real features in the world, what they are real features of? Part I argues that they can't be capacities of substances, and so they must be capacities of some part of substances. Part II argues that they can't be capacities of the substance's integral/substantial parts. Part III argues that a possessor of such capacities would have to be a lot like prime matter in not being characterized by substantial forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I address both the interpretive and philosophical issues concerning prime matter. My aim is to show that a philosophically interesting account of prime matter can be articulated that strongly coheres with, even if it is not necessitated by, Aristotle's texts. In articulating the interpretation, I first examine a view defended by both Richard Sorabji and Robert Sokolowski according to which prime matter is extension. Such a view, I argue, is problematic for a number of reasons. Nonetheless, it provides a convenient starting point for the view I defend according to which prime matter is intimately linked to, though not identical with, extension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]