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This paper offers two related reflections on the questions of metaphysics after critique. The first is an analysis of the project of critique since Kant and its influence on the disputed status of metaphysics. It explores the theoretical and practical aspects of this by claiming that an understanding of thinking as negativity, whether in Hegelian form as determinate negation or in more radical deconstructive forms, lies at the heart of this disputed status. Not least, the relation of philosophy to religion and to previous practices of metaphysics is at stake. The paper argues that there is more at work in critique than critique can account for through itself. In a second reflection, the arguments bearing on this "more" are explored in a more constructive spirit. On the basis of an account of the sources of metaphysical thinking beyond the resources of critique alone, the lineaments of what is needed for a metaxological metaphysics after critique are sketched. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question posed in this paper is: Is there an end to some type of activity which is the end of any rational agent? It approaches an answer by a critical examination of one view of human beings that excludes this possibility, that advanced by Harry Frankfurt. It is argued that once we have distinguished, as Frankfurt does not, that which we have good reason to care about from that which we do not have good reason to care about, we are able to identify a conception of a final end for human activity, one that we put to work when we consider the ways in which a life may have gone wrong and one that we find indispensable for our understanding of narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has four parts. The first part gives an overview of Alasdair MacIntyre's theory of rationality; the remaining three parts examine the theory's implications through the consideration of three examples. Two examples, the reception of MacIntyre's mature work and the study of Thomas Aquinas's Five Ways, illustrate the implications of MacIntyre's theory for reading and interpreting contemporary literature and historical texts. A third example, the investigation of late medieval nominalism, shows how the more straightforward problems of reading and interpreting can be exacerbated during periods of transition within traditions. Traditions, it turns out, can be fragile, yet once broken they are capable of concealing their incoherence and inconsistency from their current and fixture scholars. If MacIntyre's theory that rationality is both tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive is truthful, it follows that the work of contemporary reading, traditional interpretation, and historical scholarship always requires careful attention to differences in rationalities, lest readers misinterpret by filling gaps in their readings with their own presuppositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aurel Kolnai, born in Hungary and mainly influenced by realist phenomenology, completed his dissertation in Vienna in 1926. After fleeing throughout Europe and living in the United States and Canada for some years, he eventually left for the United Kingdom. While Kolnai's early philosophical work (and his dissertation) mainly concentrated on ethics, he dedicated most of his time and work during the 30s and 40s to political-philosophical writings. But once in England, Kolnai became interested in the British moralists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, in general, in ethics again. His exile-existence meant that Kolnai would remain relatively unknown, although he developed a somewhat eclectic moral philosophy and held political-philosophical views that certainly made him into a distinguished philosopher. This paper offers a short introduction to Kolnai's main ethical views and shows the relevance of Kolnai's views to certain contemporary controversies in ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peer instruction is a simple and effective technique you can use to make lectures more interactive, more engaging, and more effective learning experiences. Although well known in science and mathematics, the technique appears to be little known in the humanities. In this paper, we explain how Peer Instruction can be applied in philosophy lectures. We report the results from our own experience of using Peer Instruction in undergraduate courses in philosophy, formal logic, and critical thinking. We have consistently found it to be a highly effective method of improving the lecture experience for both students and the lecturer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of whether there is a proper analogy of being according to both meaning and being. I disagree with Ralph Mclnerny's understanding of how things are named through concepts and argue that Mclnerny's account does not allow for the thing represented by the name to be known in itself. In his understanding of analogy, only ideas of things may be known. This results in a wholesale inability to name things at all and thereby forces Mclnerny to relegate naming to a purely logical concern. As a consequence, for Mclnerny, since naming becomes only a logical concern, being itself cannot be known as analogous according to being and meaning since naming only involves the naming of ideas, not of things. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this introduction, I summarize the main themes of my book, particularly those that my critics have focused on in their papers that follow. I also argue that I could not have reached the conclusions that I have if I hadn't employed a peacemaking rather than a warmaking way of doing philosophy. I provide a characterization of a peacemaking way of doing philosophy and show how the conclusions of my book depend on doing philosophy in that way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In one form or another the concept of the Absolute has played a prominent role in Western philosophy from Plato to Hegel and beyond. The present paper addresses in particular the idea of the Absolute as the completion or perfection of the cognitive project of inquiry into the nature of the real. The discussion first traces the historical development of this conception, and then addresses the question of what sort of constructive role such a concept of cognitive absoluteness can continue to play in philosophical deliberation, arguing that it does indeed afford an instrumentality able to accomplish useful work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to explore the perplexity of the notion of sincerity, chiefly by examining Lionel Thrilling's account in his "Sincerity and Authenticity."Aspects of the account, which is problematic if interpreted as a "truthfulness account." Opinion that his basic insight can be preserved in the authors own account of sincerity as a kind of congruence between the gent's avowal and those beliefs, feelings, and dispositions that constitute the agent's "true self." The latter include a set of minimally morally acceptable beliefs, feelings and dispositions that constitute the agent's moral integrity. Further, the context of sincerity is one in which the gent realizes that his or her integrity, particularly the moral part, is vulnerable.

The article offers information on the Arnold Wilson prize essay competition organized by the periodical to award selected paper related to goals, significance, and nature of philosophy teaching. It states that the prize has been named to honor periodical's founding editor. It mentions the topic of the essay which is "The Place of Philosophy in the Humanities" which should be submitted by October 1, 2015. It also mentions several concerns related to philosophy which should be included in essay.