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Background. Based on the sources mostly unknown to Russian historiography, the article examines the socio-economic situation of the Chinese village during the socalled the agrarian revolution and the policy of the Communists, associated with strengthening the stability of the ruling regime of the CCP in the “red enclaves” on the example of the Central base in South China. The author’s attention is focused on identifying and characterizing economic sources and the origin of financial flows that contributed to the consolidation of party dictatorship without significant support from the peasantry and in conditions of economic decline, as well as an analysis of some causes of the collapse of the Soviet project in the country. Results. The article examines the main aspects and methods of “aiding the revolution” (expropriation) of rural rich men (“da tuhao”) and the invasion of market towns (“choukuan”) for hunt for prey of the Chinese Red Army; investigated the material capabilities of the peasantry and its reaction to the alienation of property. Conclusions. Analysis shows that the main task of the CCP’s economic policy was the total confiscation of values from the rural and urban population, regardless of their property status due to the general decline of the countryside.

Background. The CCP’s policy in the framework of two independent political campaigns – the “silent revolution” and the “movement for land reform” – has never been subjected to substantive analysis in Chinese, Russian and Western historiography. Moreover, the very names of these campaigns and, especially, the extent of violence committed during them, do not mean anything to many experts. Studying the topic allows to a certain extent to fill the gap. And in this regard, the work aims at analyzing, at least in general terms, the content of both the “revolution” and the “movement”. Results. The main aspects of the party’s general line, its politics and the socioeconomic activities of the Communists in the specified period, including the use of violence in its various forms as the main way to control the peasant masses by the CCP, are examined. Conclusions. The analysis shows that the main content and the most important condition for the success of both the “silent revolution” and the “movement for land reform” was extremely flexible and selectively dosed violence against the masses during the years of the “revolution” with the transition to total terror in the “old” liberated districts during the final phase of the struggle with Chiang Kai-shek, the absolutely ridiculously marked “land reform”.